On the 12th of November 2008 Jersey's most senior Police Officer, Graham Power QPM, was (possibly illegally) suspended from duty during the biggest Child Abuse investigation Jersey has ever seen. The "real reasons" for his suspension remain as much a mystery today as they did back then some 9 years ago.
The then Home Affairs Minister, Deputy Andrew Lewis, told the Islands Parliament, in a secret debate where the transcripts/Hansard were never meant to see the light of day.......(BUT DID):
I have read an alarming report from the Metropolitan Police which led me to this decision (suspend the Chief of Police) in the first place.” Which any fair minded person would/should take to mean that he had "read an alarming report from the Metropolitan Police." Well, as regular readers will be aware, it means nothing of the sort (according to Deputy Andrew Lewis) It means he read a letter from David Warcup........The man who wanted the Chief Police Officer's job. Soon after the (possibly illegal) suspension Deputy Lewis stood down from politics and was replaced, as Home Affairs Minister, by former Magistrate, Senator Ian Le Marquand.
A. Whatever the intentions of Wiltshire Police, the practical effect of their activity has been to support the actions of those in Jersey who have used public funds to undermine the confidence of abuse victims and witnesses, and to persecute those who strived to bring abusers to justice. They should be ashamed of their involvement in this sordid affair and some of the sordid individuals behind it. After nearly two years and well over a million pounds of investigation I retired without facing a single disciplinary charge. All allegations against me were abandoned. I stand exonerated and remain proud of the part I played in breaking down the culture of abuse which existed almost unchallenged in the Island for decades. I remain grateful as ever for the past and continuing messages of encouragement and support I receive from Islanders, all of whom have my thanks and best wishes."
Statement made by Graham Power QP.M. Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police.
and to resist the encroachment of English policing practices, which were perceived to be process-bound, bureaucratic, and remote from the everyday concerns of most people.
58. Over a period of time I worked with others to address these issues. This resulted in the production of a succession plan which offered a good prospect of resolving the problem. The first feature was for someone to understudy John Pearson closely, and spend a year or more shadowing him as his potential successor. The selected person would also benefit from secondments to U.K. forces and additional training. The person selected was the then head of C.l.D. Andre Bonjour, who seemed at that time to be the obvious choice. Initially things went according to plan, but then difficulties arose. The first setback was that as John Pearson was approaching retirement, Andre did not pass the assessment procedure for the rank of Superintendent, even though he was the only candidate. As I recall the selection panel consisted of, myself, Wendy Kinnard, Andrew Lewis (who was then Assistant Minister for Home Affairs,) and a member of the Jersey Appointments Commission. The background was that the position had been advertised internally, but only Andre Bonjour had applied. He had been set some written project work, some letters to answer and had undertaken psychometric tests. The panel met to consider the preliminary results before planning the next stage which was a presentation and interview. It quickly became clear that all members felt that the standard of the work seen so far did not justify promotion without competition, and the position should be advertised again, and other potential local candidates should be encouraged to apply. This happened and Shaun Du Val was successful, and promoted to Superintendent on John Pearson's departure.
59. Soon afterwards Information was received which suggested that Andre Bonjour had failed to take action in respect ofsome earlier reports of child abuse. The concerns were such that South Yorkshire Police were asked by Lenny Harper to conduct an Investigation. This effectively put Andre Bonjour's career on hold. It will be necessary to return to the matters investigated by South Yorkshire later in this statement.
60. Running alongside these events was the succession plan for my own position. Political soundings indicated that approval of a succession plan was unlikely unless it offered the prospect of local succession and promotion. At this stage I perhaps ought to explain that an external appointment to the force was not within the political remit of the Minister for Home Affairs. She could only begin the process by producing a written proposal. Approval was also needed from the Ministers who controlled Housing and Public Sector Employment, and it was probable that the States Employment Board and the Jersey Appcifntments Commission woulq need to be involved. Even if approved by all of the above, It would be open to States members to discuss the plan, and If dissatisfied, to seek to have it overturned. This is the reality of island policing. What the force actually needs in terms of skills and experience is relegated to a side- issue. The overwhelming consideration is what can be achieved politically, and this is heavily dependent on the extent to which any plan for management succession favours locally qualified candidates. I still thought we needed an experienced "heavyweight" detective but it looked unlikely we were going to get one. I did however make it clear to both Wendy Kinnard and Andrew Lewis that I hoped the new D.C.O. would have current skills in the oversight of major crime enquiries. I was concerned that having failed to bridge the gap caused by the departure of John Pearson we would be left vulnerable until more local development could take place.
61. I met with Wendy Kinnard and Andrew Lewis. We discussed a draft succession plan. Basically it involved my existing contract being extended by a further three years to a total of ten years. This duration was chosen because it can, in some circumstances, trigger certain entitlements with regard to residency, should that be a preferred option. I made no secret of the fact that I wished to leave earlier, but the ten year contract was seen as a safeguard against the unforeseen, or a change in personal plans. It was then envisaged that we would recruit a new DCO from outside the island, and he or she would be designated as the next Chief Officer, subject to the requirement that this would enable locally qualified officers to be promoted into the consequential vacancies. When it was felt that locally qualified officers were ready to be promoted into the positions of D.C.O. and Superintendent Iwould retire and the succession plan would fall into place. The most probable candidates for the internal promotions were seen as Shaun Du Val for D.C.O. and David Minty for Superintendent. This plan then went forward into the political process, and the repercussions began.
62. Wendy Kinnard was the only female to hold Ministerial office in Jersey, and in my view she appeared to be under constant political pressure. She sometimes made comments on what she saw as the oppressive attitude of some Ministerial colleagues towards her. Her political influence was not strong. Her position was not helped by the fact that she did not always cope well with unforeseen media and polltical questions, sometimes becoming "flustered" and appearing confused. On occasions I would see the need to give interviews which "explained" or "clarified" something she had said. This had the side effect of providing an opening for further critical comment which raised questions regarding the chain of accountability, and sometimes challenges as to who was actually in charge of whom. In my view this was a symptom of the totally unsatisfactory arrangement whereby the Chief Officer is accountable to a single Minister. In the absence of a Police Authority or a governing Committee there is no mixture of strengths and weaknesses, no balance of views and no corporate strength to fall back on when under challenge. I have addressed this matter in greater detail in my Judicial Review applicat on, a copy of which is with the Investigating Officer. Nevertheless, in spite of the imperfections f the system, I believe that I was always Joyal and supportive of Wendy Kinnard during her ti e as President and then Minister for Home Affairs. I admired her political integrity, her progressive values, and her courage as a female working in a male dominated environment.
63. As soon as the succession plan became known, the political debate started. There were difficulties with other Ministers on matters of detail, and threats from some States members to put forward a vote of "no confidence" on the basis that Wendy Kinnard had not planned for local succession to the rank of Chief Officer. I spent some time preparing briefs, presentations and answers to questions, as we responded to the criticism. For a while the matter hung in the balance but we eventually seemed to secure the agreement of all of the relevant parties. Then two things happened which threatened the whole proposal. The first occurred when the then Chief Minister, Frank Walker, asked the Chief Executive, Bill Ogley, to email me and ask whether Andre Bonjour had been on the Senior Command Course, and if not, why not? I took this as the revival of a recurrent proposal, sometimes repeated in politics and radio phone-ins by a range of individuals, that Andre should be the Chief Officer. Leaving aside the absurdity of what was being suggested this was an example of an agreed plan being undermined from within the heart of government. The second event happened when for some reason Wendy Kinnard was absent from the States during questions to Ministers, and Andrew Lewis answered a question in relation to the succession plan. In the process he unexpectedly departed from his script. He said that the position of Deputy Chief Officer and Chief Officer designate would after all be open to local officers. I later learned from a reliable source that he had apparently spoken to Chief Inspector David Minty and suggested that he apply.
64. All of this was completely unexpected. For some reason I learned of it while at the local airport. I immediately rang my P.A. (REDACTED) and dictated an email to the Chief Executive asking whether there had been a change in government policy. As it was, the email was drafted but not sent as I met Andrew Lewis at the airport and dealt with the issue face to face. I recall I pointed out that I had agreed to serve beyond retirement age in order to deliver an agreed succession plan which would ensure that the force had a person with relevant skills and qualifications in a senior position, and that I was not inclined to continue on any other basis. Andrew back-peddled. As I recall he said that he had been misunderstood. I then helped him draft a "clarification" in which he said, that what he had actually meant was that there were currently officers with Jersey residential qualifications who were serving in UK forces and that these officers may well apply(none did.)
65. After a few further difficulties we eventually began the process of advertising and selection. By then, more time had lapsed. I had been hoping for a long handover between the new DCO and Lenny Harper, It was even possible that had a successor been identified earlier, and had the right approach been made, Mr Harper would have agreed to bring forward his retirement to facilitate the succession. All of this was now less probable due to the arguments and delays. The whole process left Wendy Kinnard exhausted. She had managed to stay firm under pressure, but had required strong support from myself. At the end of the process I was clear in my mind that we could not go through such an exercise again in the near future. We had to operate with the management resources we had, and try to bring the new appointment forward if that was possible. I have rehearsed all of this because there are some fundamental points which emerged:
. While others played a role, the succession plan was mostly my plan and it was my determination and drive to bring it to fruition which enabled it to survive. Without my input there would have been no external appointment of a D.C.O., no appointment of David Warcup, nobody at D.C.O. rank with the relevant experience skills and qualifications to be considered for the position of Chief Officer, and no "Operation Haven" either, as I would have walked away and retired earlier.
. At some stage when the command of "Rectangle" is discussed, I might be asked "Why didn't you just bring a senior officer in from the outside." The above account is offered in order to bring a touch of realism to that suggestion.
66. Finally, it might be of benefit if I reiterate some key issues around the succession plan, and my agreement to serve beyond the normal retirement age of 60. Everyone knew that I was past the normal retirement age for my position, everyone knew that I had agreed to serve on to bridge a gap until others were ready to move into more senior positions Additionally, although it was not greatly discussed, everyone knew that my training and qualifications were becoming dated. Ministers knew it, Civil Servants knew it, and other senior officers knew it. It was a decision taken and owned by a whole range of senior figures, all of whom went into the arrangement with their eyes open. I have since read in the press that in England some Chief Constables who have agreed to serve beyond their retirement dates have been paid a significant "retention fee." I do not remember this being discussed in my case.
67. Mr Leonard Harper's Background and Experiences in the States Police.
I have indicated earlier, that at the selection stage it was noted Mr Harper had high standards, and that these were combined with Intrusive tendencies. It was foreseen that the combination of these attributes could generate tension in some quarters. It is however fair to say that there was some acceptance that, with the Force still in the aftermath of the 2000 H.M.I. report, a degree of robust management of performance and ethical issues was seen as overdue. At this point it might be of value to give some details of events prior to "Rectangle" in order to provide a history of attitudes and relationships. It is important to recognise that the enquiry developed against a background of previous experiences. Some of these experiences influenced how people subsequently behaved.
68. As Mr Harper settled into his role as DCO it became apparent that his intrusive approach to professional standards issues was revealing more problems than anyone had anticipated. A full account is not necessary, but it needs to be recorded that a significant number of staff left the force as a result of investigations into their conduct. Some of these staff had used their position for personal gain, and not all were police officers. Proportionately, civil servants became subject to investigation at about the same rate as police officers, and some of the attitudes displayed were revealing. For example, one member of staff, having been found to have ordered electronic equipment on the force account and taken it home, protested that such actions were a recognised "perk of the job."
69. There were also a number of covert professional standards operations against police officers who appeared to be working in a relationship with drug importation gangs. These relationships involved, among other things, the leaking of intelligence from police systems. Mr. Harper conducted these operations entirely within the resources of the force. He developed a circle of officers he could trust, and worked on a strict "need to know" basis. In a small force with one operating base, this created some unusual situations. I recall seeing four constables taking their meal together in the canteen. All had served in the force for some years and must have been colleagues at various stages. I knew that three of the constables had for some time, been engaged in the covert investigation of the fourth. Yet there never seemed to be any compromise.
70. My Harper was particularly strong on diversity issues. People left the organisation having been found to have been engaged in sexual harassment. We also had what is believed to be the first case of dismissal in Jersey for racial abuse in the workplace. This proved to be controversial, particularly as racial abuse in public was not illegal. Running alongside this was the political agenda of Wendy Kinnard. As a politician I think that she could be fairly described as "liberal left." Her political agenda overlapped with Mr Harper's professional agenda. She was involved in groups which had been established to try and bring discrimination laws into force in Jersey. It was not Illegal to discriminate on the basis or race or gender, and she hoped to change this. I gave her periodic discreet support with a number of initiatives but the task proved too formidable, and her efforts made little progress. We had a little more success in relation to racial abuse. I worked, again with Detective Inspector Alison Fossey as I recall, to draft a law based partly on the English Public Oder Act which would have addressed some public order issues but also provided powers to deal with racial abuse. The first attempt to introduce the law failed, having been criticised as "political correctness." However, a weakened draft was introduced a year or two later and eventually came into force.
71. I also had some engagement on the general issue of corruption, It was in relation to this matter that an apparent oversight by the Home Affairs Department had adverse consequences which to some extent carried forward into Rectangle. In order that the matter can be fully understood, it Is necessary to draw attention to the late Lillie Langtry (1853-1929) who was reported to be the mistress of Edward VII. Miss Langtry holds the distinction of being the only person known to have been convicted of corruption in Jersey, in a case which, if I have heard it right, involved the bribing of a customs officer in relation to a passport. The Langtry case set a precedent in respect of any future prosecution. Shortly after my initial appointment I attended a meeting with politicians and law officers who were considering drafting a Jersey corruption law. It was said that in order for Jersey to retain approval as an international finance centre it was necessary to have such a law. I do not remember anyone saying that such a law was a good thing in itself. I believe that discussions continued for three or four years. I remember making a number of representations concerning what I thought to be the weaknesses in the draft law but I do not remember these being influential.
72. Eventually the Corruption Law was adopted by the States on 25th October 2005 and was sanctioned by the Privy Council on 9th May 2006. It was registered by the Royal Court on 26th May 2006. It was against this background that Mr Harper received information which drew his attention to the fact that one tow-away contractor had a near monopoly of police business. This was said to be a consequence of him providing gifts and favours to police officers. These included such things as free fuel, hire cars and use of accommodation in Spain. To shorten the story, a type of amnesty was agreed and in consequence about 20 police officers made statements describing a corrupt relationship with the contractor, who was a Mr Roy Boschat. Mr Harper caused the conduct of Boschat, and some police officers who had not come forward, to be investigated.
73. For some politicians and public figures this was the last straw. A political and media campaign was waged against Mr Harper. The core of the argument against him was that the award of business in exchange for favours was a traditional part of Jersey life and that Mr Harper was an intruder who was interfering in the "Jersey Way." Prominent in these attacks was Senator Ben Shenton. Running parallel with this was a letter campaign and personal threats to Mr Harper emanating from Boschat and his associates. The documents disclosed to me also make reference to letters from a Mrs Mauger. She is Boschat's sister and effectively Boschat under another name. At some stage files were submitted alleging offences under the Corruption Law. Not long afterwards I learned that lawyers were trying to see if Boschat's conduct fell within the parameters of the Langtry case. When I asked why, I was told that although the corruption law had been through the legislative processes, nobody had brought forward an "Appointed Day Act" to bring it into force. I have since been told that the responsibility for this rested with the Home Affairs Department and for some reason the need for an Appointed Day Act had apparently been overlooked. The consequence was that Boschat was not eligible for prosecution for corruption and effectively no action was taken. Apparently prompted by these events the Minister for Home Affairs brought forward an Appointed Day Act which was lodged on 2nd February 2007. Soon afterwards the law came into force as the "Corruption (Jersey) Law 2006."
74. There was however one further episode which led to Boschat appearing in court. The way this happened had some influence on how some issues relating to the abuse enquiry were approached. The chain of events began when Boschat gave evidence In the defence of a police officer who had been charged with disclosing information from police computers. As I recall, it was believed that the police officer and Boschat had a mutual interest in vehicles with unusual number plates. The belief was that police systems were being used to identity the owners of such vehicles in order that Boschat could consider purchase. When he was giving evidence Boschat appeared to say that he had on one occasion asked the police officer to check a police computer for owner details. I recall that Mr Harper obtained a transcript of the trial and caused further enquiries to be made. These further enquiries provided some corroboration of what Boschat had said in evidence.
75. A file was submitted to the Law Officers Department and a member of that department directed that Boschat be charged. My recollection is that Boschat was in the custody area waiting to be charged when two States Members went to see the Attorney General Mr William Bailhache, and made representations on Boschat's behalf. The States Members concerned were Deputies Colin Egre and Sarah Ferguson (who has since been elected Senator.) The Attorney General then intervened personally, and directed that Boschat should not be charged and that the papers be referred to him. This was done and nothing was heard for some weeks. At some point a journalist became interested and addressed a question to the Attorney General. Shortly afterwards Boschat was charged and later appeared in Court. I believe that there are some email exchanges involving Mr Harper and the Attorney General which will corroborate this sequence of events.
76. To conclude the story; at Boschat's trial, the Magistrate ruled that the main evidence against him, was that which he gave himself on oath when he was a witness, and that Its use would infringe his rights against self incrimination. Accordingly, he was acquitted. Nevertheless, I know that this episode was influential in shaping Mr Harpers views of the relationship between the law officers and politics, and that it entered his thinking when he considered how issues of arrest, advice and charge should be approached during "Rectangle."
77. Running parallel with this was a series of complaints made by Boschat against Mr Harper, alleging abuse of authority and related allegations. This in itself raised interesting questions. The D.C.O. is appointed by the Minister for Home Affairs and appears to be ultimately accountable to the Minister. There is no disciplinary code relating to the Deputy Chief Officer. The complaints by Boschat therefore raised interesting legal issues, and the advice of the Attorney General was sought on how they should be progressed and what, if anything, anyone was entitled to do should they turn out to be substantiated. Eventually I asked Devon and Cornwall Police to investigate. As is customary when a U.K. Force is invited to operate in Jetsey I ensured that they were given designated point of contact in the force to assist them with local laws and procedures. I have been told since, that none of the complaints were substantiated. The issue of who, if anyone has disciplinary powers in relation to the D.C.O. was not, so far as I recall, fully resolved.
78. These occurrences led to a series of attitudes and perceptions which impacted on future events. In some sections of society, Lenny Harper, Wendy Kinnard and to some extent myself, became regarded by some elements in the political community and the media as dangerous radicals, interfering in the islands traditional ways and poking our noses into places where we were not welcome. To others, Lenny Harper was a popular hero who was rattling the cage of those with reactionary attitudes and interests, and bringing a welcome and challenging approach. Mr Harper sometimes spoke of these things. He was confident that he was carrying out his duties in a proper manner, but felt that large sections of the political establishment were out to get him. He also felt that support from the Law Officers was weak, and that there was no real appetite for a challenging approach driven by values of fairness and integrity.
79. I have been asked by the investigating officer to make specific comment on my view of Mr Harper's strengths and weaknesses. His strengths were evident. He was hardworking, tenacious, and committed to maintaining high standards of conduct and performance. He was active in maintaining the traditional role of the Deputy of the Force In protecting my interests, and acting as an effective sounding board and gatekeeper on difficult issues. I could depend on his loyalty, and had no reservations regarding him being in charge of the force during my absence.
80. In addressing his less positive qualities some may expect me to speak of his ability to work in partnerships and his approach to professional standards issues. But in this respect, all was not as it is sometimes alleged to have been. I found him to be active and committed in respect of those partnerships where he felt that there was corresponding commitment on the part of other participants, and where there was a worthwhile and progressive agenda. For example, on his own initiative, he at one time formed a group representing minority Interests in the island. I forget the title of the group, but the purpose was to establish links and to provide a sounding board for the force, and a voice for less visible elements of the community. I recall that he established contacts with the gay community and with people of Portuguese heritage. I am aware that Stephen Regal, who later became a member of the Independent Advisory Group, may have been involved at some stage. He appears to touch upon the matter in his statement. For an alleged "dinosaur" Lenny Harper was remarkably active on progressive issues. However, he was not one for maintaining the appearance of a relationship where he felt that his commitment was not being reciprocated. He was no diplomat, and his distain for those who he regarded as unprofessional or obstructive to progress was sometimes visible. Over time he came to have a negative view of a number of Jersey Politicians, many of the senior figures in the public sector, and the Law Officers Department. In those cases he tended to manage relationships in a rather formal and professional way. I do not recall him being deliberately offensive in those relationships but there was no visible warmth either.
81. On professional standards issues he was direct and robust. Together we had inherited a viper's nest of problems and set about them with determination. Island police forces can present some challenging issues. It needs to be remembered that in Jersey people of all characters, backgrounds and positions in later life, often went to the same school, and in some cases are related to each other. This can create a network of relationships between police officers and other sections of the community. Sometimes this works to the advantage of the Force but at other times it can lead to the risk of compromise and similar problems. There is only one significant base of police operations, and any other premises used by the Force are only a few miles away. Unlike larger forces, problems cannot be addressed by the transfer of personnel. Nobody can be given a "fresh start" in another division. There are no other divisions. Problems have to be addressed directly. They cannot be passed to another group of senior officers in another place. Against this background Mr Harper brought to bear what I think can be fairly described as a low tolerance level on conduct issues. This was particularly noticeable where he felt that a member of staff was not responding to his agenda for improvement. Nevertheless it was not within his power to impose significant disclplinary sanctions. Any sanction beyond advice and warnings was a matter for me. I applied my own judgement. Sometimes my findings in disciplinary matters would support his view. Sometimes they very clearly did not. That is a matter of record.
82. He was a firm believer in the rehabilitation of offending officers wherever that was possible. Keith Bray, who has provided a witness statement, is an example. Keith was a good officer who went through a period of difficulty and had a series of disciplinary problems, all of which Lenny Harper addressed by advice, warnings, and changes of duties. As soon as it was felt that Keith had recovered his position Lenny was keen to bring him back into the fold. Keith was made acting inspector for part of the enquiry and trusted with high levels of responsibility. Some officers admired what Lenny had done in improving standards in the force, others disliked him intensely, That is the nature of things, It is not the role of the Deputy in a police force to be always popular. If It is, I know of nobody who has achieved It. I never did.
83. Finally, I was sometimes asked if I thought that Lenny could be a successor to my own position. Leaving aside the issue of qualifications, I thought not. The Chief Officer's position demands wider skills. I have to maintain a working relationship with all manner or people, some of whom I neither admire nor respect. This requires degrees of tact and diplomacy which were not Lenny's strongest skills. He was plain, personal and direct. He was best suited to the position he held, and the job he enjoyed.
84. The Handover to David Wacup and Related Issues.
Before I move to the next stage it may be appropriate to deal with some peripheral items raised in the statements of witnesses, but not part of the core of the allegations. I think that they are worth covering at this stage for a number of reasons. It might for example assist the Investigating Officer in gaining a better understanding of the background to the main events. It might also assist with an assessment of the credibility of some of the witnesses. The investigating officer may feel entitled to conclude that if some witnesses are not speaking the truth in respect of some marginal issues, they may be less credible in respect of core issues.
85. I see from my notebook that operations began at Haut de la Garenne on Tuesday 19th February 2008. The following morning I had my first face to-face meeting with David Warcup in my office at police headquarters. (Notebook 07/358 pages 78·80.) This had been preceded by a number of telephone conversations. Mr Warcup was a candidate for Mr Harper's position at the time, but already emerging as a person who was showing strong interest, and who appeared to have the qualifications and background suitable for the post. However, in reviewing his application at the short listing stage I had made notes and given advice in relation to the fact that he had only ever served in Northumbria Police. This was my only matter of concern at that time, but I saw it as significant. Having moved forces myself on a number of occasions I am aware of how unsettling the changes in culture and working practices can be, particularly when the new force is in a different legal jurisdiction. It is easy for a new-appointee to become unsettled by the change, and to retreat to the comfort zone of regarding the practices of their previous force as "the right way to do things" and everything in their new environment which is different as something which has to be changed. In policing terms Jersey is about as "different" as it is possible to get. I know that at various stages I alerted Mr Warcup to this danger and gave him examples from my own experience.
86. At our first meeting and In subsequent meetings and conversations, I spoke about the needs of the enquiry, and expressed the hope that succession could take place as early as possible. Once his appointment had been confirmed I encouraged him to think about how things could be taken forward after Mr Harper's departure, and consulted with him regularly when decisions needed to be taken in order to ensure that I was not acting in a way which was inconsistent with his intentions.
87. I offer one example at this time. Andre Baker, in paragraph 50 of his statement speaks of the need to discuss options with regard to who would be S.I.O after the departure of Lenny Harper. Paragraph 16.1 of the third Homicide Working Party report sets out a range of options. Paragraph 55 of Mr Baker's statement indicates that on 20th May 2008 I had a very open mind on the subject. Paragraph 71 of his statement speaks to events on 30th June 2008 when there was a meeting involving myself, David Warcup, and the Homicide Working Group. It can be inferred from the text that Mr Baker was expecting a discussion of the options. Instead he discovered that David Warcup was to take the strategic lead and that a S.I.O. was to be seconded from the U.K. He states "There was no further discussion on the options as he had made his mind up and was very strong about this." This is correct. I had consulted prior to the meeting with Mr Warcup and we had agreed that this was his preferred option. I then used the authority of my position to ensure that Mr Warcup got the management structure he wanted.
88. In all respects my handover to Mr Warcup was thorough and professional. It must be remembered that this was not an ordinary induction process. Mr Warcup had been agreed by Ministers as my successor. It was my understanding of the spirit of the succession plan that I should progressively withdraw from setting the policy for the force and allow Mr Warcup to gradually take the lead to the point where a handover could be seamless. I had no intentions of relinquishing my command in any formal sense, but I recognised that it would not be within the spirit of the plan for me to develop policy in a way which was not consistent with Mr Warcups longer term intentions.
89. As soon as it became known that Mr Warcup was the successful candidate I began a series of contacts intended to facilitate his induction into the force. I asked if he could start as soon as possible, and take an early handover of the position of D.CO. (at that time held by Shaun Du Val in an acting capacity.) This would have enabled him to gain an early oversight of "Rectangle" and present me with plans to take it forward. He said that he could not do this, as his Chief Constable had commitments which required that he remain in Northumbria during his notice period. This was a setback. I felt that we were ready for a "fresh start" and an early handover would have been welcomed.
90. I nevertheless pressed ahead with a range of actions intended to ensure that he had a positive and welcoming introduction to the force. I arranged for the production of an induction programme which would allow him to visit key players in the force, the public sector and the wider community. My recollection is that my then staff officer, Jeremy Phillips administered this on my behalf, using templates which had been developed for previous newcomers. It was passed electronically between the forces until agreed by both parties. The induction programme should still be available to the investigating officer. I also gave a number of media interviews, making positive statements regarding Mr Warcup's background and achievements. I spoke to the Chief Executive to the Council of Ministers Bill Ogley regarding Mr Warcups role on the Corporate Management Board. Normally deputies and substitutes are not allowed. I made representations to the effect that an exception should be made in Mr Warcup's case given that he was my intended successor. After discussion this was agreed. I took him to a meeting of the Board and introduced him to key partners. Our joint presence should be recorded in the minutes.
91. Housing is always a difficult issue for newcomers to the island, Mr Warcup indicated that he preferred to rent a property. He also told me that there was a complication in that his wife had a dog to which she was attached. He had become aware that Jersey landlords normally specify that no dogs are allowed. On being told this I made use of local contacts and identified potential properties where the landlord may be willing to waive this consideration. I passed details to Mr Warcup. At some stage Liz Webster, who was the head of H.R. for Home Affairs approached me regarding a request she had received from Mr Warcup. She said that he had asked for his first three months rent to be paid by the force. The justification for this request being that Mr Warcup had said he had been unable to sell his house in England and would therefore be paying both mortgage and rent at the same time. I was told that this was not a usual entitlement but there was a degree of discretion, and if I gave my agreement then it could be done. I thought that the request was presumptive, and appeared to show an inappropriate attitude, but I nevertheless gave my agreement In the interests of good relations and a smooth transition.
92. A date was set for Mr Warcup to be sworn In at the Royal Court. I arranged positive media releases and media opportunities following the event. I accompanied him personally and introduced him to key individuals In the media and public life. I suggested "lines to take" which included maintaining the momentum of the enquiry. I recall that he used the material I had suggested during his Interviews.
93.At every stage during his induction I was positive and supportive. I made it clear that I regarded Rectangle as his operation, and although periodic briefings and updates would be welcomed, I would not interfere. I particularly assured him that I would not be giving any directions to Mick Gradwell. I would concentrate on the running of the force for the time being and would assess from time to time how the transition was developing and what advice, if any, I should give to the new Minister, when elected, regarding a possible handover of command. It may be remembered that Mr Warcup's induction to the force was taking place in August 2008. The elections for Senators and Deputies were due In October and November, and a new government would be appointed in December. The serving Chief Minister, the Minister for Home Affairs, and the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs, were not standing as candidates. Different people would be appointed to these key positions. It was therefore anticipated that in January 2009 there would be an opportunity to sit down with key individuals and discuss the future direction of the force, and the structure of its political and professional leadership. I took the view that no significant change of direction was appropriate in the meantime.
94. The working relationship with Mr Warcup appeared to be going well, but there were some negative signals. For example, he would persistently arrive late for meetings. It was my habit to insist that meetings would always start precisely on time. I believe that this is appropriate in a professional organisation, and assists in setting a businesslike tone. Mr Warcup seemed to make a point of being a few minutes late, and neither apologising nor offering comment. I tried not to take this as a deliberate slight and preferred to believe that he had formed this habit in a less professional organisation. I made the occasional comment but decided to wait a while before addressing the issue directly. I hoped at the time that he would gradually adjust to the requirements of his new environment.
95. There was one other negative episode which I remember well. This was the morning on which we were both booked to undertake our Officer Safety Programme (O.S.P.) training. I was conscious that my annual qualification was due for renewal and had asked for my own training to be at a time when Mr Warcup was available. So far as I recall, it was in his induction programme, and would certainly have been in his diary. While I am not familiar with requirements elsewhere, local procedures necessitate that officers are O.S.P. trained at all times, and particularly when undertaking uniform patrols. As Chief Officer of the Force I patrol in uniform on a regular basis, Including occasional night shifts, late night shopping, and special events. During these patrols I attend operational incidents on the same basis as any other police officer. Over the years of my command this has led to an expectation in the community that their Chief Officer of Police will be visible and accessible. Such patrols also afford an opportunity for informal feedback from the community and States members. Patrols during the lunchtime break in States sittings can be a useful opportunity for chance encounters and informal meetings.
96. On the morning in question I had changed into my tracksuit and was ready to go downstairs to undertake the training when David Warcup appeared, He had not changed from his office clothes. He said that he had remembered another commitment and could not do the O.S.P. training after all. I then went ahead without him. This did nothing for his credibility as staff became aware of what had happened. By this time a picture was emerging of a somewhat bookish individual who was perhaps less comfortable with the visible leadership aspects of his role, Nevertheless, I still felt at that time that although his development needs were greater than anticipated, they were still capable of being addressed.
97. I now turn to some of the other negative comments which feature variously in the statements of Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell. Both seem to think that I do not work long enough hours. This is untrue. I am either at work or available for duty 24/7. I rarely take days off and hardly ever take "proper" holidays. During leave periods I am either available locally or attending to family matters in the U.K. I live a few minutes walk from my office and have created a small office in a spare bedroom of my home. That office was connected to police l.T. systems. I also kept a police radio at home. I sometimes prefer to study files and documents at home rather than in the headquarters environment. That Is not an unusual way of working. My notebooks show much of my recorded work activity. It can be seen that I frequently record the fact that I am undertaking clerical work on evenings, weekends, and public holidays. In most of those occasions I will also have used force l.T. systems, either to communicate, or to monitor operational events. The investigating officer will be able to verify this.
98. It ls also said that I pay frequent visits to the gymnasium at the police station. It ls true that I do this approximately three times a week. It is a good habit and I recommend it. Mostly it is at lunchtime but occasionally it is at other times. I do not take proper lunch breaks. Normally I have either a quick bowl of soup in the canteen, or, if I am busy, a sandwich in my office. I am a police officer. I need to maintain a level of fitness to carry out my duties.
99. Mr Warcup suggests that I allocated him a disproportionate amount of cover duties. He is missing the point. We are an island force. For the senior leadership there Is no time off, there are no days off, and there is no "off duty". I am permanently available when on the Island. I suggested that Mr Warcup took "first call" for a while in order that staff could become accustomed to dealing with him, and to enable him to establish a profile. I also made it clear that I would be available at the same time, and that he should speak to me whenever he felt the need, He did this when issues arose regarding Chief Inspector John Sculthorp. He set out a proposed course of action which I discussed with him. I recall that his plan was agreed with some minor changes. (Notebook 08/95 page 79.) In any event calls off duty are rare. Weeks can pass without a call being received. It is barely an imposition for an experienced senior officer.
100. Mr Gradwell suggests that I spend a disproportionate number of lunchtimes at the Rotary Club. (Presumably I do this when not in the gymnasium or when I have not gone home early.) He is wrong. The Rotary Club of Jersey has a meeting programme which includes one lunchtime meeting per month. About a year ago I received a warning letter for poor attendance. I ought to add that the club is active in supporting community initiatives in which the police are partners. My attendance at any time can be justified on that basis alone. The keeper of the club attendance register is Mr Chris Barney, who lives near La Rue de Samares. His full contact details are in the public domain.
101. Mr Gradwell says that I did not discuss the enquiry with him in detail. He is right about that. I made it clear that I would not cut across his line of management which was to Mr Warcup, with whom I was in regular contact regarding Rectangle and other issues. I did however ensure that I personally welcomed him and checked that we were doing all that we could to support his secondment. He confirmed that this was the case, and made particular positive comment regarding some extra travel arrangements which had been made to enable his wife to visit. I did warn him about the local sensitivities to high profile "outsiders,'' and gave him some general advice regarding the need to show respect for these sensitivities and local traditions. I also warned him that his presence as S.I.O. was a disappointment to the expectations of some local officers, and that he should not be intrusive beyond his allocated role. He had been seconded for a limited period to undertake a specific task and nothing more. That part at least fell on stony ground. He had not been seconded long when Superintendent Shaun Du Val alerted me to an email chain which referred to the need for the Law Officers to interview and select a Police officer for a secondment. I recall that the Law Officers Department had asked for a "representative of the force" to take part in the process and Mick Gradwell had, for some reason, allowed himself to be selected by the Law Officers Department for that role. This set a number of alarm bells ringing among the Operations Management team. The controversy which followed the appointment of John Pearson came to mind.
102. There was clearly a view within the force management team that this was evidence of a "plot" to retain Mr Gradwell in a senior position in the force to the detriment of local succession. I assured Shaun Du Val that I had no knowledge of the matter, and that there was no plot. Shaun made some contact with the relevant parties and smoothed things over. I recall that he later told me that it would be best if I did not get further involved. I believe that this episode showed that Mr Gradwell had not absorbed the simple advice I had given him. I cannot think how I could have made it simpler. Moreover, on reading his witness statement I see that he has not learned from the experience. At paragraph 33 he appears to say that he is joint third In seniority in the force. Unless something is going on which has so far not been made public, he is not a member of the force at all. He is a member of Lancashire Constabulary seconded to work temporarily in the Island for a limited purpose. If he persists in taking any different position it will be damaging to morale and lead to understandable tensions in the management team.
103. I now turn to one of the lighter features of the allegations, which is Mr Gradwell's assertion that I did not acknowledge or speak to him at a reception held prior to a community service at St Heller Parish Hall. Apparently he wishes to complain about this. I remember the event in question. I saw that Mick Gradwell was there, and I think that I acknowledged him across the room. It Is possible that I did not speak to him. This would be because I was circulating among the visitors and members of the public who were present. In my view events of this kind are too often characterised by groups of police officers huddled together, to the detriment of the purpose of the occasion. I did not see Mr Gradwell circulating. He seemed to be spending his time In close discussion with David Warcup. When the event started I chose to sit among people who were not police officers. As I recall I was seated close to the Dean of Jersey and his wife, with whom I had some conversation. I noted that Mick Gradwell was seated in the row behind. He was next to David Warcup. I consider Mr Gradwell's complaint to be childish, frivolous, and unbecoming of a senior police officer.
104. I now turn to a matter of more substance. In paragraph 515 of his statement David Warcup refers to the locked cabinet in my office and states "I established that Mr POWER refused to disclose the combination of the safe as a result of which I arranged for a locksmith to attend." It is untrue that I refused to provide details of the combination. I note that Mr Wayne Bonne was present when the cabinet was opened. I understand that Mr Bonne Is a member of the Wiltshire force and is assisting the investigating officer. By virtue of his presence he appears to be a witness in this matter. I am content for the Investigating officer to come to his own assessment of what implications, if any, this has for Mr Bonne's role in this enquiry.
105. The true facts, which can be supported by documents and witness evidence, are as follows. In early December 2008 I received notification that the combination for the cabinet had been requested. This request came to me by way of a telephone call from Liz Webster, who is my appointed contact with the Force and States Departments. I agreed at once to provide the combination. I provided a written authority for the cabinet to be entered for legitimate purposes, and asked that Advocate Lakeman, who was acting as a friend and advisor at that time, be present to represent my interests. On 15th December 2008 Mr Ian Crich, who had previously been authorised to communicate on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, wrote and confirmed that the arrangement was agreed and that a Mr Phil Wells would be the point of contact. I placed the combination in a sealed envelope and handed it to Advocate Lakeman. On 22nd December Mr Crich wrote again. He confirmed that there had been contact between Advocate Lakeman and Mr Wells but added that Mr Warcup was objecting to the agreed arrangements. On the 9th January 2009 Mr Crich wrote again and stated that Mr Warcup was not willing to proceed on the basis of the agreement which had been reached in our correspondence. This was in spite of the fact that Mr Crich had apparently been authorised to deal with the matter on the Ministers behalf. I sent a reply dated 12th January 2009 indicating that I was taking advice.
106. On 13th January 2009 my professional representative, Dr Timothy Brain, Chief Constable of Gloucestershire, wrote to the Minister confirming my continued willingness to assist in this matter and offering two senior police officers as possible alternative representatives to be present on my behalf. They were the Conneteble of St Helier and the Chef-de-Police of St Peter. The letter from Dr Brain was ignored. No acknowledgement or reply was ever received. I later learned that the cabinet had been opened and that no person representing my Interests had been present. In the light of these events it is my position that nothing in my conduct in relation to access to the cabinet was in any way unreasonable. I was professional and cooperative at every stage and certainly nothing done on my part amounted to a refusal to disclose the combination. I consider that the statement made In relation to this matter by Mr Warcup is deliberately false and misleading In a way which is calculated to misrepresent my actions, and damage my interests.
107. Finally, in this section of the report, I note that Mr Warcup states that I lack interest and motivation. He is wrong in that assessment. I have a longer experience in the police service than anyone I know, I do not get animated, I do not get excited and I never panic. I am calm, controlled and give good advice, particularly in respect of the complexities of managing a police service in Jersey. One of Mr Warcup's problems Is that he would not listen to my advice. Anyone who doubts my stamina and ability to deal with long and complex challenges has not been paying attention for the previous eight months. I will deal with other matters raised by Mr Warcup later in this statement.
108. Other Matters Relevant to the Reliability of some Witnesses.
I now hope to cover briefly some peripheral issues, which may assist the investigating officer In an assessment of the credibility of some witnesses. The first relates to the statement of Andrew Lewis dated 6th January 2009. The statement says a number of things which are not true. However, the claim which can most readily be checked is at paragraph 19 in which Mr Lewis states that I "dismissed" allegations of bullying and harassment made by customs and immigration staff working in the joint intelligence bureau. This is untrue. When I became aware of these allegations I caused them to be registered as formal complaints, and they were notified to the Police Complaints Authority. The allegations were fully investigated and one was found to be substantiated. One police officer was given formal words of advice. Deputy Lewis was updated on the progress and the outcome of these complaints during the course of the Ministers meetings with myself and senior staff to which he refers elsewhere in his statement. The investigating officer should have little difficulty in verifying this.
109. I now turn to the case of the documentation given to me at the time of my suspension, which has already been subject of correspondence dating back over eight months, and is currently subject of an appeal under the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982. Copies of the relevant documents are in the possession of the investigating officer. In their statements both Mr Ogley and Mr lewis taken together appear to claim that the letter notifying me that I would be subject of the disciplinary process was created on the morning of the suspension itself, namely Wednesday 12th November 2008, or at the earliest the previous evening, and was in consequence of information they were given on the 11th November 2008. Neither Mr Ogley or Mr Lewis make any reference In their statements either to the letter from the Minister to the Chief Executive which is required under paragraph 2.1.1, of the code in order to initiate the disciplinary process, or to the letter of suspension itself. However, both seem to claim that the decision to activate the disciplinary process was taken in consequence of information received on the 11th November 2008, and by implication, not before.
110. My initial views of these events are covered in more detail in my two affidavits copies of which are in the possession of the investigating officer. When I first examined the three documents I felt that they were not consistent with what I was being told about the sequence of events and the decision making process. Firstly, they are unusually legalistic and complex. They seem to be the product of significant thought and preparation. It is not immediately evident that they could have been produced within the timescale apparently claimed. Secondly, the suspension letter refers to a meeting earlier In the day which everyone agrees did not happen. No explanation is offered for this by anyone. It Is just left hanging in the air. There is also the question of the order in which the different documents were created. For example, was the letter confirming the suspension created before or after the letter initiating the disciplinary process? Even If it was afterwards, what was the gap between the two, and, what consideration took place during that period?
111. I have sought the disclosure of this material for a variety of reasons, one of which is to test the truthfulness of the official account of the decision to suspend. If key figures have lied about this, they may have also lied about other things. My attempts to obtain this information have proved to be challenging. Jersey does not have a freedom of Information law and the political culture is one which gives priority to confidentiality over transparency. There is a Code of Practice on Access to Information. It can, with effort, be found on the States website. Civil servants are not trained in its use, nor are they encouraged to use it. I have nevertheless sought this information under the Code, but at the time of writing the disclosure of the information continues to be refused, and nothing has been provided. It is of course a matter for the investigating officer to consider to what extent this issue is relevant to the credibility of some key witnesses. I offer the view that in the context of the determined refusal which currently extends over eight months, to provide basic information, it is almost beyond belief that there is nothing to hide. In my view the refusals and the evasions speak for themselves. Something occurred which is not consistent with the official account of the decision to suspend, and there is a determination at the highest level to prevent the truth being known.
112. It may be of assistance to point out that Mr Ian Crich appears to be a key player in both the issues over access to the secure cabinet, and the suspension process. I am told that Mr Crich is now working in the U.K. and therefore presumably beyond the influence of the Jersey authorities. The value or otherwise of Mr Crich as a witness may be something which the Investigating officer may wish to consider.
113. Equivocation in the Use of the Term "Chief Officer."
Collin's dictionary defines "Equivocate" as "to use vague or ambiguous language in order to deceive someone or to avoid telling the truth." Equivocation has a long history in the English language, and In religion and politics. During periods of religious persecution in the 15th and 16th centuries, it was taught and written about as a doctrine by means of which believers could provide misleading answers to questions without committing the sin of lying. In more recent times equivocation has been used by political speech writers, and sometimes lawyers, to construct misleading arguments. The skill in equivocation is to shift the meaning or a word or phrase in mid argument in order to justify a conclusion which "sounds right" but is in fact Invalid.
114. Equivocation does not necessarily Involve deception. There are a number of examples in popular speech which equivocation is used to convey a meaningful statement. A common example is the phrase "boys will be boys." Taken literarily, this statement is entirely tautological. "Boys will be boys," appears to be in the same category as "yellow is yellow" or "hot Is hot," that is, the phrase Is circular and provides no information. Yet when I say "boys will be boys" I am communicating a message. This is because I am equivocating. In "boys will be boys" the first use of the word "boys" refers to young men. The second use of the word "boys" refers to persons who are inclined to mischief. Thus by means of equivocation I am able to convey a meaningful statement without deception.
115. I now invite consideration of the following:
civilian member of staff operating at executive level with a direct line of reporting to a Chief Constable. (There may be some minor exceptions, but they are not Important for the current purpose.) Furthermore, it is commonly understood that when the term "Chief Officer" Is, used in the context of the conduct or oversight of significant operations it is nearly always addressed to Operational Assistant Chief Constables. In putting forward this view I find some suppport in the statements of Mr Gradwell and Mr Warcup.
legitimate exercise of my common-law right to communicate with my elected representative.
144. On the morning ofTuesday 19th February 2008 I attended St Martins Parish Hall where I met with the Connetable, Silva Yates. I had arranged the meeting some days before on the basis that I wanted to discuss a "Parish Issue." I told him the Force was about to start some exploratory work at Haut de la Garenne, and this was part of a search for evidence in relation to the abuse enquiry. I said that we would hope to keep the work discreet, but we might be there for a couple of weeks. There might be some media interest or some questions to him as Connetable. I took this conversation to be a discharge of my responsibilities under Article 7 of the 1974 Police Law. The Connetable thanked me for the information, and said he did not intend to become closely involved. I took these comments as a request for "assistance" under article 6 of the Police Law. (Notebook 07/358 page 78 refers.) He said that we should ask if we needed any help, and in fact he was of considerable assistance in the weeks which followed, supporting the use of Honorary Police on the cordon and related duties.
145. As Is now well known the U.K. media became aware of the work at Haute de la Garenne, and the whole enquiry became the subject of Intense media and political interest. The political interest was both external and internal. Long-standing political rivalries were re-ignited and challenging questions were raised regarding the constitutional position of the island and the ability of its institutions to deal with issues of this nature. I will address some of these consequences later in this statement.
146. "The Standards the SOJP Work to. with Particular Reference to ACPO/NPIA Guidance."
I have been asked to make comment regarding the above. Most of what I have to say is not really a matter of my own or anyone else's opinion. It is a matter of law. Jersey is an independent legal jurisdiction. It has its own laws, its own courts and its own police services. It is bound by nobody else's laws or procedures. There are thirteen police forces in the island. Twelve are elected volunteer forces which largely operate within their Parish. The thirteenth Force is the States Police, which now has jurisdiction throughout the island to patrol and to gather evidence in relation to alleged offences. The States Police do not charge or prosecute offenders. Any suspected offences have to be reported to the honorary police in the relevant parish. A Centenier will then decide what action, if any, is to be taken with regard to a suspected offence. In taking decisions Centeniers refer to guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Should it be felt that a Centenier has taken an apparently perverse decision the Law Officers are able to intervene. Nevertheless, the discretion of the Honorary Police is considerable. The States Police have no powers to charge or prosecute any offender for any offence. That is the law. Some might think it a strange business. It is however Jersey's business. It is nobody else's business.
156. I have seen statements in the disclosure file which speak of the limitations of the mandate of the H.W.G. These are interesting but well informed by hindsight. What I was told at the time regarding the role of the Homicide Working Group is what is set out in their terms of reference and reports. I note that the terms of reference state that they will "quality assure the investigation." I relied heavily on the H.W.G. to guide me and others as to what we should be doing and how. The analogy is not perfect, but during this period Andre Baker assumed something of the status of the A.C.C. (Crime) which we needed but did not have. I relied heavily on the H.W.G. for expert advice. And I was resolved to take their advice. If for example they had advised that there was a serious deficiency which could only be solved by a change in key personnel then I would have tried to do that. I was not given such advice and therefore I did not do it. I note that in his statement John Stoddart speaks of the supervisory role of a "Chief Officer" In such circumstances and says "I am however acutely aware that Mr Power was the only other chief officer and that this may have presented him with some real difficulties. He then goes on to consider how these difficulties might have been addressed and suggests "extra resilience at ACPO level." For reasons given earlier, such a solution was impossible under the rules under which the Force is required to operate. Accordingly I did the next best thing and relied on the senior expert who was available. In managing the situation which existed at the time, I acted on my own authority, but in doing so was heavily guided by Andre Baker and his team. Andre Baker was an experienced and seasoned ACPO officer who was either present on the ground, or in regular contact throughout the key events. I valued his support.
"The SIO is responsible for the strategic direction of the investigation. He makes and records the decisions."
193. These issues were managed through the force management process, and through daily contacts and meetings. It was a difficult period, but with a few exceptions, the performance of the force was maintained, and the wider community did not suffer significant adverse consequences as a result of the resource impact of Rectangle.
194. The Allegations made by Senator Stuart Svvret Against the Attorney General and Others.
I have been asked to provide information regarding the relationship between the investigation and the Law Officers Department. I will do that in the next section of this statement. Before doing so I think it appropriate to write a section In respect of criminal allegations made by Senator Stuart Syvret in respect of people who at the time of the allegations held positions as follows: the Attorney General Mr William Bailhache (soon to be the Deputy Bailiff), the Deputy Bailiff, Mr Michael Birt,(now the Bailiff) and the Bailiff, Sir Philip Bailhache (now retired.) This information is offered because it is relevant to the background of the overall enquiry, and the relationship with the Law Officers Department. It also had a relevance to the relationship between the enquiry team and Senator Syvret, and the extent to which he was inclined to use his influence to persuade witnesses and others to trust the police and co-operate with the enquiry. Finally, my personal role in addressing the Syvret allegations also inhibited the extent to which I was able to participate actively in the relationship between the Law Officers Department and Rectangle while the Investigation was current.
195. For a number of years, possibly starting before my appointment, Senator Syvret had been outspoken in his criticism of the Jersey legal establishment, and in particular in the approach taken towards child abuse issues. He had given interviews and circulated papers on the subject. He alleged that the Law Officers and the Courts had used their powers to cover up abuse by States employees and public figures, The implications of his allegations were that there was an "old boys" network which conspired to prevent abusers being brought to justice. These allegations had been repeated in statements to the press and others, and circulated in emails among the political community. The Senator and others had copied some of this correspondence to me over the years.
196. I had always taken the position that the allegations as they stood were not supported by visible evidence, and until such time as they were made formally to the police I did not have to take any action. I did not regard the circulation of an email as a "report." At some stage the Senator became more determined and more focussed. This was at a time when Rectangle was gaining momentum and the issue was once again topical. Although I am prevented from having access to the relevant papers, I recall that at some stage the Senator entered into correspondence stating that he wanted to make a formal complaint. I recall I said this would require a police officer to take a written statement from him and he agreed to this. I recall that a statement was taken. I think this might have been done by a member of the Rectangle team.
197. My recollection is that the statement, when complete, made general allegations that the Attorney General, and his predecessor in that role who was by then the Deputy Bailiff, had a general propensity to direct that there should be no proceedings in abuse cases. He also alleged specific "cover ups" in the case of the abuse at Victoria College, and the case of the Maguires. I have referred briefly to both cases earlier in this statement. In the Victoria College case the Senator made much of the fact that the then Balliff,(who is the Attorney General's brother,) had been on the board of governors of the college during the period in which the offences took place, and had allegedly failed to take appropriate action in respect of the abuse. It was also said that key figures in the college at the time, who the Senator believed were responsible either for failing to prevent the abuse, or for impeding a full investigation when it came to light, had subsequently gone on to occupy senior positions in public life. He also appeared to allege that the decision of the then Attorney General (now the Bailiff) not to prosecute the Maguires, was motivated by an intention to protect key figures in the public sector.
198. I recognised that the allegations were significant for the island. They were effectively the "coming to the boil" of issues which had been brewing for some years. I discussed how the matter should be handled with Lenny Harper and Shaun Du Val (notebookO8/95 page 08.) We agreed that the complaints by Syvret should be addressed separately from Rectangle, and that it was appropriate for me to take personal control of the issue. I was assisted in this task by Shaun Du Val and other officers. I think however it is a matter of record that I took all of the major decisions. My first decision was that there would be no criminal investigation unless the "reasonable suspicion" test was passed. I was comfortable with this. I have seen too imany long and expensive enquiries launched without this basic question being asked. If there was no "reasonable suspicion" that a crime had been committed then there could be no justification for the use of police powers. At some stage I was in the presence of the Attorney General in connection with another matter. He told me that he had heard of the allegations and he wanted them investigated by a police force from outside of the island. I told him that this was for me to decide in consultation with the Home Affairs Minister should the issue arise, although I noted his view. I then told him that I was not proposing to have any normal police investigation undertaken unless the reasonable suspicion test was passed to my satisfaction. I think that this took him by surprise but he accepted what I said and we did not speak about it again.
199. A consequence of this decision was that I had to determine how the "reasonable suspicion" test would be applied and who would help me address this. I had previously discussed the matter with Stephanie Nicolle, who was retiring as Solicitor General. This first discussion occurred on 20th March 2008 (notebook 08/95 page 03.) She took a few days to reflect on the matter but later suggested that I take advice from the newly appointed Solicitor General who was Tim Le Cocq. I did as advised and together we agreed a plan. Advocate Robert Macrae, who was in private practice locally, and independent of the Law Officers, would be asked to provide advice. I agreed that the way forward would be to recover the case files in relation to Victoria College and the Maguires, and to select from storage a random batch of files in respect of which no action had been taken. Advocate Macrae would review the files and give a written opinion as to the decisions taken. As a form of double-check he would also obtain the written view of a U.K. Barrister based in London.
200. The outcome was that the review of the randomly selected "no further action files" recovered from storage indicated that while there were some marginal differences in view between the lawyers who were tasked with reviewing the files, and the earlier decision-makers, these fell within the parameters of normal judgement. The reviews of the Maguires and Victoria College cases were a little more complex. In the case of the Maguires it was concluded that the decision of the then Attorney General fell within the parameters of reasonable decision- making in respect of the information which the Attorney General had in his possession at the time. There might have been some issues around the standard of the information, but I cannot remember what they were. I do however remember that the file contained information to the effect that Mr Maguire was seriously ill with cancer, and not expected to live. This had apparently come from someone within the Force and had been accepted by the then Attorney General and others. As subsequent events have shown, it is likely that this information was false. It was not clear who was the originator of the information, and I saw no point in further enquiries in relation to that matter. In respect of the investigation at Victoria College, the legal advice which I received indicated there was some evidence that enquiries had been impeded by persons within the college, and that it would have been legitimate to consider the arrest and prosecution of other parties at the time of the events. However, I was also provided with legal advice which said that to do so now would be an abuse of process.
201. The question then arose as to how this information was to be communicated to Senator Syvret. One of the lawyers in the case drafted a letter for me to consider which was factual but also impersonal, direct, and unlikely to achieve closure. Shaun Du Val produced an alternative draft which was more suitable, but in my view still not appropriate In the circumstances. I wanted to communicate the difficult message that the allegations were going no further, but do this in a way which might be accepted and, importantly, would not be to the detriment of the understanding that Senator Syvret would continue to support Rectangle and encourage potential witnesses to have faith in the investigation. I spent about a week drafting the letter, which, by normal letter standards, is long and detailed. I did not receive a reply but subsequently heard that the Senator had accepted the contents, and was grateful for the effort made. The investigating officer may wish to view the letter and include it in the relevant papers accompanying his report. It is my definitive statement on how I feel about the allegations made by Senator Syvret. It also is yet another illustration of issues which I was managing alongside any oversight of Rectangle.
202. The Relationship with the Attorney General and the Law Officers Department.
I have been asked to comment on "The management of the relationship between the SIO and the prosecutorial legal team." I am happy to do this and intend to do so in detail. To begin with however it might be useful for me to make a simple statement of evidential fact in case it has been overlooked. Namely:
I note that members of the Law Officers Department, and lawyers involved in Rectangle have made statements. While these statements inevitably set out views which show some marginal differences between the lawyers involved. on one point they are unanimous. They all confirm that they were all given evervthing they asked for. Everv lawyer in everv statement describes a sequence of events which led to them being provided with every access and everv facility they requested. They are equallv unanimous that all of this was dellvered under my command. either by me personally or by subordinates instructed to do so on my behalf. I cannot find in the evidence a single word of dissent on this important evidential issue.
203. The statement of the Attorney General offers an account of many of the relevant milestones in the development of the relationship with the legal team. At this stage I acknowledge that the Attorney General appears to have tried to be fair, and gives an accurate account of some of the key events. I will set out a different interpretation of some of these events, and offer some new information which the Investigating Officer may see as relevant. The Attorney General has completed his statement with the benefit of access to records and notes. I will be relying on the disclosure documents provided by the Investigating Officer, and my recollection of what occurred and when. In order to give an account from my perspective, it might be best if I begin by summarising some of the issues which I felt Impeded the earlier development of the relationship between the investigation and the Law Officers Department. In no particular order they are as follows:
• The perception issues arising from the fact that Jersey does not have a prosecution service. Prosecutions for serious crime are undertaken by the Jersey Law Officer's Department. However, the main function of that department is to provide the island's government with legal advice. The department has some secondary functions of which being a prosecution service is but one. When a potential prosecution is focussed on a government department and its staff, a perception is created that the "government's lawyers" are the ones who will decide if there is to be a prosecution. This can undermine the confidence of victims, witnesses, and in some cases police officers, in the independence of prosecution decisions.
• He should submit a written duty report on the incident.
• All relevant press statements will be cleared with the Law Officers before release.
245. The Role of the "Gold Group."
Rectangle. If we do not follow U.K. procedures we may be accused of failing to follow !"best practice." If we do follow U.K. procedures we may be accused of unnecessarily importing foreign practices and undermining local autonomy.
"Getting Information out allowed the investigation to take the lead in press handling at an early stage, while allowing the rest of the investigation to progress. Furthermore, it was argued that early initial communication with the press limits the degree to which they formulate their own accounts of what happened and begin their own investigations"
I have described earlier In this statement how, following the events surrounding the arrest of (279, 281) In late June 2008 I had less contact with Lenny Harper and for most of the time worked directly with Detective Inspector Alison Fossey. I was also in regular touch with David Warcup. There was however one matter which Mr Harper and I periodically discussed. This was the need to "put the record straight" after the misleading media coverage earlier in the year. I have stated previously how we had become concerned at the gap between what we were saying to the media, and what the media were reporting, and how our concerns were compounded by the difficulty which some people in government had in distinguishing between the two. Some of the misleading reporting was a consequence of journalist seeking out and interviewing victims and witnesses, but some seemed to be pure invention. There had been repeated attempts at the time to communicate a more accurate line, but success had been limited. For example, I note that in his statement Frank Walker refers to an announcement that a full homicide enquiry could not be justified, which was made on 13th April 2008. (Statement Frank Walker paragraph 21.) Other similar announcements were made around that time but did not seem to receive adequate exposure.
324. The calmer atmosphere of this period allowed Lenny Harper to give a number of media interviews which served two purposes. Firstly, he was able to give updates on the forensic finds, and describe the emerging forensic picture. Secondly, he could make a further attempt to dispel some of the wilder stories.
325. The investigating Officer may wish to do his own research. However, I have viewed a report of an interview dated 31st July 2008 on the B.B.C. website which appears to me to be representative of some of the media work done at the time. In the interview Mr Harper makes it clear that there is no murder enquiry as a result of the Investigations at HDLG, and he gives an analysis of the forensic findings up to that date. He then offers the conclusion that there is no basis for a murder enquiry to commence. The B.B.C. website summarises the item as "Jersey murder inquiry 'unlikely.'" The Investigating Officer may wish to contrast the calm, balanced and professional manner in which Mr Harper deals with this subject, with the sensationalist style in which the same news was presented again by Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell almost four months later on 12th November 2008.
326. The Build-Up to the Events of 12th November 2008.
The publicity which had accompanied Mr Harper's retirement soon faded away, and I do not recall any significant media reports concerning him in the months which followed. I made media comment on Rectangle from time to time. This would rarely be during an interview concerned entirely with the enquiry. Most commonly it would be tagged-on to the end of an interview about other issues. A large number of media interviews in Jersey are structured this way. My consistent "line" was that the enquiry was progressing in a calm, thorough and professional manner and that I could not comment on matters of detail, as a number of cases were now being considered for prosecution.
327. Mr Gradwell did not start work as the S.I.0. until 8th September 2008 and for reasons I have given earlier I did not have a great deal of contact with him during his settling-In period. I did however have regular contact with David Warcup from the date of his appointment. Occasionally we would talk about the media aspects of Rectangle. I remember there were occasions when I thought that his beliefs about what the force had said during the enquiry were too heavily influenced by some of the media reporting. This was understandable during the phase when he was still familiarising himself with the details of the enquiry. From time to time I emphasised the difference between what the force had said, and what had appeared in the media. He spoke of recent forensic results and how a clearer picture was emerging. He said that on his reading of the forensic results to that time, there was no basis for commencing a murder enquiry. This was consistent with the earlier findings and media interviews of Lenny Harper during July 2008 and the preceding months. It was clear that Mr Warcup was not an admirer of Mr Harper's style of policing. They were different personalities with different professional backgrounds. I did however point out that Lenny Harper appeared to be no longer active in the media and that we should now concentrate on achieving a seamless transition from the old management arrangements to the new. I made it clear that I would not be party to any deliberate "rubbishing" of Lenny Harper's work. That would be counter productive. It would re-ignite old issues, and distract from the calm and evolutionary changes which were now taking place. It also had to be remembered that Lenny Harper had a loyal following among victims and witnesses, whose commitment could be undermined by any visible rift. I recognised there would be a need for further changes in the style of the enquiry, and anticipated these would follow the receipt of the report of the review of the investigation, which was being prepared by the Metropolitan Police.
328. In his statement David Warcup refers to "Operation Adrian," which relates to an investigation into the leak of a police document. This was a report by Mr Harper into aspects of the arrest and release of (279, 281) The report came initially to me, and I forwarded it with a covering letter to the Attorney General. I note from his statement that the contents of Mr Harper's report featured in an article in the "Times" newspaper on 14th August 2008 and it later appeared on the internet "blog" of Senator Stuart Syvret. I think it is fair to say that from the beginning it was suspected that the leak had come from Lenny Harper. Most people seemed to suspect that he had retained a copy of the report, and leaked it after his retirement. That does not mean these beliefs are true. It was however the case that many people believed it. I thought that it was the most probable explanation, but I had no evidence to support that belief.
329. My attention was drawn to the Times article by means of a phone call from the Attprney General (notebook 08/95 page 78.) I recall that shortly afterwards I discussed the matter with David Warcup. This would have been during one of the frequent discussions on Operational and Professional Standards issues recorded in the subsequent pages of the same notebook. I was very clear that this was something which needed to be independently investigated. I said that he should ask a U.K. force to investigate the matter. I also commented that he should bear in mind that I may have to be interviewed, as the report had crossed my desk on its way to the Law Officers. He said that he did not think that would be necessary. I see from Mr Warcup's statement that Inspector David Burmingham was asked to make some enquiries within the force relating to the matter. My recollection of this is not precise, but I believe that David warcup and I agreed that it was necessary to preserve evidence, and prepare an internal audit trail of the preparation and movements of the report. We also needed to know whether anyone else had accessed the report on the relevant IT. system. I offer this Information because it seems to be implied in Mr Warcup's statement that he was acting on his own initiative in this matter, and I was in some way an absent figure. That was not the case. I remember being particularly strong in my insistence that if Lenny Harper was a suspect for the leak then an enquiry by an outside force was the only way to address the issue. To date, I have not been interviewed about the alleged leak of the by from Lenny Harper, or asked for a statement about when I received it and what I did with it.
330. I see from my notebook that during August and September I conferred from time to time with David Warcup on the progress of the enquiry. It was during this time that our views began to differ. From my perspective he had an inappropriate focus on "picking faults" with the work of his predecessor. I have mentioned earlier in this statement that, unusually for a person of his rank, David Warcup had no experience of moving from one force to another. Virtually his entire working life had been in Northumbria Police. In my own career I have moved force and taken up new positions, several times. In my experience it is normal for a new appointee to want to do things a different way from his or her predecessor. This is quite normal. The skill which is required in these situations is to achieve the necessary changes in a seamless and non-disruptive manner. Rubbishing the work of someone who has retired is a "cheap shot," and counter productive to the smooth working of an organisation. I tried to encourage Mr Warcup to concentrate on moving matters forward rather than focussing on the past.
331. At some stage during this period David Warcup floated the idea of a press conference to "put the record straight" regarding then enquiry. I definitely saw this as a bad idea. I was aware of nothing significant which had not already been addressed during the final weeks of Lenny Harper's service. If subsequent forensic results were changing the picture, as it could be expected that they would, then my recommended approach was to gradually feed these into the public domain through a series of short statements and interviews, possibly tagged on to other media issues. We had spent months restoring calm to what had been a difficult situation, much of which had not been of our making. It was not the time to set the whole issue alight all over again. There was another reason I was against David Warcup engaging in the type of press conference he envisaged. I did not think that he had the necessary skills. I thought that he would be comfortable reading a prepared statement, but he would struggle to cope well with challenging questions under pressure. I think the transcript of the actual media briefing shows I was right in that assessment.
332. On 1st October 2008 I had a conversation with the Chief Executive Bill Ogley as an aside to a meeting of the Corporate Management Board. This was after I had been in the U.K. for a few days on police business, and I was still catching-up with developments. I was surprised that he seemed to be better informed than me regarding David Warcup's intentions in respect of the media, and quite set in his own mind that there should be a press conference at which the police would "admit to mistakes" in respect of the Investigation. This was the first indication I had that "something was going on behind my back." It was clear that Bill Ogley had been engaged in discussions regarding the matter with Mr Warcup, probably during my absence, and that he had a strong line to which he was committed. Following this conversation I sent an email to David Warcup asking to discuss the issue. My notes indicate that this discussion occurred on 2nd and/or 3rd October 2008. (Notebook 08/95 pages 91-92.)
333. I said that I thought the best way forward was for me to take responsibility for the whole matter and to do the job myself. I suggested I do this by way of further questions during planned media interviews on unrelated issues in November 2008. (Statement of David Warcup paragraph 256.) I had no anxieties regarding this. I have no difficulties with the local media and am quite comfortable with live interviews on policing issues. This is normally regarded as one of my strengths. Mr Warcup did not seem to take this suggestion seriously. I said that I would need a brief from him on any new information he wanted me to put into the public domain, but he seemed reluctant to provide this. I was also concerned that in spite of being in the post for over two months he did not seem to have a full grasp of the facts. He still seemed to think that the force had claimed there had been murders at HDLG, and that this was something which needed to be corrected. (Statement of David Warcup paragraph 257.) I encouraged him once more to look at what Lenny Harper had actually said. If he thought that Mr Harper's statements in July and at other times, making it clear that there would be no murder enquiry, had not taken hold in the public perception, then it would be proper to undertake further media work which "drew attention" to what had been said already. I came to a point where I did not think that I was making any progress in these conversations, and began to think about what would be the best way forward.
334. It was against this background that on 8th October 2008 I met with Mr Matt Tapp who was introduced to me as a media consultant. (Notebook 08/95 page 94). I rarely employ consultants, believing that Chief Officers should be competent in their roles without the need to be supported by expensive advisors. I am aware that others think differently. I met with Mr Tapp at the request of David Warcup. The meeting did not begin well. He said we needed a plan to announce the fact that "the murder investigation had finished." (Statement of Matt Tapp paragraph 14.) Given that there had never been a murder investigation, and that the decision there was not going to be one had been announced over two months previously, this was not a good start. I was beginning to see his "sales pitch." He was talking up a crisis, then presenting himself as the person who could resolve it, no doubt for a large fee. I thought about ending the discussion there and then, and with hindsight it is clear that it would have been better if I had. Instead Is pent some time trying to improve his understanding of the position. I now see that this was futile. His mind was closed and he did not absorb what I was telling him.
335. I told Mr Tapp that most of the news he was referring to was already out in the public domain. All that appeared to remain was some adjustment in consequence of recent forensic results, and, in some cases, to draw attention to information which had been released previously but which might not have fully registered. I explained that the police were treading a difficult line in trying to hold together an alliance of opposing factions for the general good of the investigation. We had to maintain a working relationship with the Law Officers and the Jersey Establishment, while at the same time maintaining the confidence of the wider community, many of whom shared a common perception that there was widespread corruption and cover ups in relation to child abuse and other issues. It was one thing to say the evidence did not support the view that there were murders. It was quite another to say we did not believe that there had been any murders. Beliefs are a personal matter, and it was probable that many people would believe that murders had occurred, but had accepted the assurances from the force that the evidence did not enable the relevant lines of enquiry to be taken further. This delicate balance had to be treated with care if unnecessary tensions were to be avoided. I repeated the course of action I had urged David Warcup to support, which was to release incrementally those things which we needed to release, and where possible decline further comment on the basis that prosecutions were now pending. I agreed that the public had been misled, but pointed out that we had not been responsible, and had in fact done much to put the record straight. Misleading and sensationalist media reports had raised expectations and a great deal of hard work had already been done to restore calm and reality. The situation could not be improved by provoking the resurrection of the "media circus" which had followed the behaviour of politicians, and other events associated with the early forensic work at HDLG. By the end of this conversation I felt that Mr Tapp and I were not going to agree and I wished him a pleasant journey. I see from his subsequent statement that he has not reacted well to my reluctance to engage his services.
336. Over the following days, by various direct and indirect means, it became apparent that David Warcup had built up a broad alliance in favour of the major media conference event which he favoured. This is corroborated by the statement of Matt Tapp, who describes how, following his meeting with me, he networked with, and briefed a number of key figures including the Chief Executive Bill Ogley and the Chief Minister Frank Walker. This was on 8th October 2008. I also became aware indirectly that the Attorney General was committed to the Warcup line. I therefore gave the matter more thought. By then It was approaching mid-October. I had some leave pending in the near future and my last working day was 5th November 2008. This leave had been arranged so that I could attend to some urgent family matters in the U.K. which could not wait. I came to the view that whatever I said or did, my absence on leave would be used as an opportunity to press ahead regardless of my wishes, and that this was a course of action which would be supported by the Attorney General and Ministers. I was also conscious that David Warcup had been appointed to his position on the understanding that he would to take the strategic lead in Rectangle, and that it was intended that he would provide continuity for the enquiry after I had retired. I therefore took a decision. I told David Warcup that I would not stand in the way of the press conference, but wanted a chance to influence the content, in the hope that the damage which I anticipated it would cause could be reduced,.This was in the second half of October. David Warcup passed this news to the other relevant parties. (Statement of John Edmonds paragraph 30.)
337. In spite of repeated requests, I was given nothing by way of material for the press conference during the rest of October, or the first four days of November. Considering that Mr Warcup had been determined to stage the event for some weeks, he gave the impression that he had done little preparation. I was eventually given a draft script and other papers on 5th November 2008, literally a few hours before the commencement of my leave. I was concerned with the nature of the content, which appeared to be poorly thought through, confrontational with the media, and too ready to be definite in respect of some evidence which remained ambiguous. Additionally, it did not provide a sufficient line of retreat should further evidence emerge which indicated that there had been murder or similar crimes. In one respect however it was encouraging. It contained a definite statement that "It has never been suggested by the States of Jersey Police that child murder took place at Haut De la Garenne." This was entirely consistent with the line which Lenny Harper, and myself, had been taking for months. I took this statement as an indication that Mr Warcup had by then achieved a better grasp of the true nature of the media statements made on behalf of the Force. Other encouraging aspects included confirmation that the police were not behind the story regarding the "shackles," and a reiteration of the earlier police statements to the effect that everything which had been found could have had an innocent explanation. Emphasis was also given to the fact that the media had been given access to the "cellars," and therefore by implication, nobody had been misled regarding their size and nature. (It is also of note that after the Chief Minister Frank Walker had visited the scene with his wife, and viewed things for himself on 31st March 2008 he was content in addressing the States, to describe the areas he had viewed as "cellars.") (Statement of Frank Walker paragraphs 19 and 20.)
338. The papers and notes accompanying the draft, which I not unreasonably took to be part of the intended briefing material, also contained references to the fact that the Force received scientific opinion on 7th March 2008 apparently confirming that the first find was a piece of skull and that it was not until 29th March that the first doubts emerged. By that time the item had been ruled out of the enquiry on the basis that the layer in which it had been found pre-dated the parameters of the investigation. The briefing notes indicated that the precise identity of the item remained unknown. A section of the notes dealing with the teeth, made reference to the local expert opinion given at the time that "they were unlikely to have been shed naturally."
339. In the very limited time available to me I made some hurried notes in the margins of the draft. I discouraged the use of confrontational statements such as "We hope that the presentation of these facts will enable members of the Media to report accurately about this ongoing case in the future." I also encouraged language which presented a message of an evolving forensic picture, in which earlier statements to the media were being amended as more detailed scientific findings came to light. I passed all of this back to David Warcup and left to make arrangements to travel to the U.K
341. On Tuesday 11th November 2008 at some time not long after 5-30p.m. I was at home having arrived on the Clipper ferry from the U.K. The fact that I was at home at that time was an unusual thing. The Clipper usually travels from the U.K. to Jersey via Guernsey, and arrives in Jersey after 7p.m. For some reason on this date It sailed directly to Jersey, and so I arrived home a couple of hours earlier than would be normal. I received a call on my mobile phone from Andrew Lewis, who was then Minister for Home Affairs. He said that he was sorry to be ringing me when I was on the ferry, but he wanted to see me the following morning. I said that I was not on the ferry I was at home. The first time I said this it did not seem to register, and he made another reference to the ferry so I repeated that I was at home. He seemed taken aback by this information. I could not work out why at the time. He had obviously taken some interest in my travel arrangements, but had not spotted the unusual change to the timetable. I wondered why he was apparently unsettled by the fact that I had arrived home early. I realise now that Andrew Lewis had expected I would be at sea when the briefing to Ministers was being held, and the fact that I was at home took away any excuse for me not being asked to attend the briefing to Ministers and others. He asked me to meet him in the office of the Chief Executive at 11a.m. the following day. He said that this was in consequence of a briefing which he and others had received. This was the first I had been told of any briefing. To complete this part of the account, it is now a matter of record that I attended the office of the Chief Executive as requested and was suspended from duty. This occurred without notice of the purpose of the meeting, without a hearing, and without representation. I now move on to what I know about the media conference, which was held at Police Headquarters, while my suspension meeting was taking place elsewhere.
342. Before leaving home on the morning of 12th November 2008 I watched Sky News. There was extensive advance coverage of the press conference. I now know that this was in consequence of advance information which had been put out by the Force ahead of the scheduled media briefing. The media coverage was high profile, sensationalist, and contrary to almost all of the assurances I had been given by David Warcup. I have since seen the advance media release issued on his direction, it states "Statements which were issued by the States of Jersey Police suggested that serious criminal offences had been perpetrated against children and also that there was a possibility that children may have been murdered, bodies had been disposed of and buried within the home." This statement is almost the exact opposite of that contained in the draft script I had been shown before I departed for my leave. Equally, it later emerged that the actual release had changed significantly the presentation of information in relation to the cellars, the teeth and the alleged shackles. On the evidence available I can only conclude that I was seriously and deliberately misled by David Warcup as to the intended content and style of the media conference on 12t h November 2008.
343. Unsurprisingly the media were enlarging on what was being released by the Force. I heard a reporter on Sky News refer to something along the lines of "previous police claims of mass murder and burial." As recently as about three weeks ago, I heard a report on Channel News which referred to "previous police claims of mass murder" or words to that effect. As I have discovered more about the press conference on 12th November 2008, the more it is evident, that it was deliberately sensationalist, intended to gain maximum coverage, and designed to portray Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell as the "good guys" putting right the failings of their predecessors.
344. Before attending the meeting with the Minister I went briefly to my office to deal with correspondence and other routine tasks. I saw that the police main car park was full of satellite vehicles linked to major media organisations. For the rest of the day, and on the days which followed, the story filled the news. Journalists were not likely to admit that they had previously exaggerated the situation, or that they had fabricated stories in order to compete with one another. It was more comfortable for them to claim that they had been misled by the police, and that became their consistent line. I had spent months moving the investigation into a position from which It could progress in a calm and low profile manner. I saw it all undone in a single morning. Jersey was once again world news.
345. In the weeks and months which followed, the delicate coalition of views and interests which had been held together in 2008 began to break apart. Senator Syvret has moved from being a supporter of the enquiry to being an outspoken critic, thereby bringing a negative influence to bear on potential witnesses. There have once more been allegations of "cover ups." Mr Harper, who had retired to the West of Scotland, and by November 2008 had become inactive with the media, appears to have felt sufficiently provoked to make a number of public statements criticising the integrity of the Jersey system of justice. I have seen at least two articles in "heavyweight" newspapers which imply a lack of impartiality and integrity in the island's justice system. Political wounds have been re-opened, and the enquiry is once again the subject of angry exchanges in the island's Parliament. My own suspension has proved to be high profile and divisive. I was told by reliable sources that in the days which followed my suspension a number of victims contacted the enquiry team and expressed concerns that the independence and commitment of the investigation was being undermined. The chances of Jersey convincing the world that these matters have been investigated and resolved in a fair and politically impartial manner have diminished, as have the chances of achieving final closure of these events. It may take Jersey a number of years to recover from the consequences of the media conference of 12th November 2008. As Chief Officer of the Force I accept a degree of responsibility for this. In my defence I point out that I was seriously misled by David Warcup as to the intended content and style of the media briefing on 12th November 2008 and accordingly, could not have anticipated the damaging consequences which would follow.