Thursday, 5 October 2017

Boris Bailhache - Guest Posting.

Boris Bailhache

Political observers cannot help but have noticed that the national mainstream media have recently been (almost wall to wall) covering stories regarding the calls for the sacking/resignation of Boris Johnson. The calls are being made, seemingly, because he has gone "off message," is "ignoring collective responsibility" and "undermining the authority" of his Prime Minster Theresa May regarding Brexit.

Boris Johnson, it is firmly believed, is setting his stall for a leadership challenge against Theresa May by undermining her authority with his publicly made Brexit views and is making the PM into some kind of a laughing stock because she is unwilling, or unable, to reign her foreign Minister in.

But what about the Jersey situation with our Foreign Minister, Senator Philip (Boris) Bailhache, and leader Senator, Ian Abraham ,  (Theresa) Gorst? Senator Bailhache and his constant undermining of Ian Gorst, and the latter's attempts, not only to have a Committee of Inquiry (COI) into decades of Child Abuse, but to implement its recommendations. Not only has Boris Bailhache consistently attempted to derail the COI but is now attempting to derail senator Gorst and his attempts to implement the recommendation of splitting the dual role of the Bailiff. Senator Bailhache playing (as mentioned below) the old "tradition" card. Although he didn't play that card when he wiped out 500 years of tradition with the church. That obviously wasn't "traditional" enough to worry the public with.

While drafting this Blog Posting I was contacted by a reader and asked if I could/would publish a Guest Posting which, coincidentally, mirrored some of the points I was going to make so have incorporated it. Thankfully the reader HAS seen the similarities/comparisons between the Theresa May/Boris Johnson, Ian Gorst/Philip Bailhache sketch but can it be that not ONE of our esteemed professional local journalists have seen these similarities/comparisons? Do they not watch the national news?

Below the Guest Posting is senator Bailhache having yet another dig at Senator Gorst and yet another dig at the Care Inquiry. It came by way of an interview with ITV/CTV (who we credit for the recording).

Readers might recall that Sir Philip, with the help of ITV/CTV, managed to EXONERATE the then Jersey Dean Bob Key.

The Guest Poster has asked to remain anonymous.

Guest Post.

"They say that States Members start behaving strangely a few months before an election - some, who have otherwise been inconspicuous for the past 3 years have even been heard to speak, ask questions and even be critical of Government policy. When you are on a sinking ship, even the most loyal crew member will start eyeing up the life-rafts, knowing there may not be space for everyone.

This is standard practice, but what is going to be different about the May elections is that, for the first time in recent time, the fracture lines are starting to show - and in unusual places. Namely, there is infighting on the right. We saw the early signs of this in the fall-out over the innovation fund. Clearly, it was mismanaged. And whilst in times of success, various Ministers would line up to claim the positives as their own, or to take part in the traditional patting of each other's backs, this time, the knives came out.
The public wanted a scalp. The highly paid civil servants were shrewd enough to leave the scene (and the island) before the 'vraic hit the fields', and they would have been laughing all the way to the bank.

Senator Alan Maclean

Rightly or wrongly, Senator Ozouf was the one in the firing line for the failings of the fund and he had to go. The Chief Minister, on the other hand, strongly suggested that it was not his friend Philip who was to blame, so much as Senators Maclean and Farnham - the traditional right-wing of his council of Minister.

Skip forward a few months, and we see another prominent, canny politician who is fully aware that this Council of Minister's ship is heading firmly for the electoral rocks. The English-man Gorst and Phil'll Fix it have never been so unpopular. With the rise of Reform Jersey, and the decline of the neo-liberals, it is important that Senator Bailhache not only has a life raft (chauffeur-driven no doubt), but a ship of his own to captain when SS Vanity finally goes under. For that he needs a flag and a crew.

The 'flag' is tradition and the cause is the Bailiff. An uninspiring one, you might say and this is where the spin is needed. Remember the 2014 elections, which instead of being dominated by the real political issues and the Council of Ministers being held to account for their failings in Health, Housing, Social Security, electoral reform and Population control, the election was engineered to be little more than a side show about the Constables. Whilst younger people, unimpressed, showed their contempt for the political class by staying at home, the older voters took the bait - swallowing the hook, line and sinker too - believing that parish rates would go up if the constables were not in the States. The right (traditional and business class) were united in their efforts then, and saw off the unaligned independents, whilst the Social Democrats of Reform Jersey made no net gains, but maintained their seats.

This time it is very different. The rift between Gorst/Ozouf on the one hand, the 'progressive'-conservatives on one hand and the feudal-reactionaries on the other is palpable. Philip Bailhache, who never was one to toe the line (on the Child Abuse Inquiry, notably) has sensed the public mood and is making the separation of powers debate about something it is not. He knows it is a very simple matter - that Courts and Legislatures should be separate, and that Judges should stick to judging and politicians to politicking. So he needs a distraction and a bogey-man.

(1) POPULISM: This is a matter for the people. This is a constitutional matter, and - of course - constitutional matters should be put to the public (when it suits politicians). How dare arrogant politicians think they can make such a monumental decision without consulting you!

(2) BLAME THE IMMIGRANT. Gorst is an Englishman. He is just trying to make us like an overseas county of England. Look at the House of Commons, they are a complete shambles. We don't need an elected speaker like in England. Look at the mess they are in.

And the Jersey media go along with it.

In the recent Channel TV interview, (below) which was cloying in its deference to 'Sir' Philip, the story ran - Jersey could elect its own speaker like in the UK. But of course, it could have said 'like Barbados', 'like the Cayman Islands' or - how's about - 'like France.'

If there is an obvious parallel to be made with the UK it is the sharpening of knives from the likes of Boris Johnson and the would be pretenders for the lame-duck Theresa May's job.

Surely I am not the only one to see the comparison between Sir Philip Johnson and Boris Bailhache (with a little bit of Rees-Mogg thrown in for good measure)?"(END)

Thursday, 28 September 2017

Jersey Reform Day 1769-2017.

Tom Gruchy

On 28 September 1769 some reported 300-400 Jersey Islanders, headed up by an extremely brave man, Tom Gruchy, overthrew the corrupt Royal Court while, then in session, to demand substantial reform of the systems of justice, government and administration. We use the word "brave" because Mr. Gruchy, and his fellow protestors, risked being hung for their actions/protest. Hanged by order of the Royal Court and their properties confiscated. The properties of all those involved could have been awarded to the likes of the Lempriere family.

The Royal Court, made up of chosen/unaccountable judges/Rectors led by the Lempriere family were the Jersey government.

Tom Gruchy and a number of his fellow protestors were subsequently arrested and threatened with execution for sedition. For the sake of brevity, for this posting, the UK utilised its constitutional obligation, stepped in to restore good governance and the rule of law in Jersey. A pardon was granted by the King for  Tom Gruchy and his fellow protestors. Out of this protest came the 1771 code of laws for Jersey which is still referred to today.

Former Deputy Trevor Ptman

On 20th November 2012 the Island's government agreed to have "Jersey Reform Day" (28 Sept 1769) officially recognised. The proposition was tabled by the then Deputy Trevor Pitman. This proposition has an extensive account of the events of 1769 which can, and should, be read HERE. Unfortunately the government has not honoured its commitment to celebrate this historic event and appears to have buried this uncomfortable part of Jersey's history. (sound FAMILIAR)?

Despite these radical reforms in 1771 has anything changed and are we in the exact same place in 2017 as we were in 1769/1771? Who runs this Island? Is it a corrupt Royal Court as in 1769? The Bailiff as in 1769? The Attorney General/Solicitor General/Crown Officers as in 1769?

To acknowledge (since the government won't) this momentous historic day, VFC interviewed (below) local historian, Human Rights Campaigner, and Constitutional Expert Mike Dun. Mike's own BLOG is dedicated to Tom Gruchy and his cause.

Chief Minister Ian Gorst

Reform now, as back then, is very much on the agenda not least attempting to separate the Judiciary from the legislator by relieving the Bailiff from his duty of presiding over the Island's Parliament. This latest part of much needed reform has come by way of a proposition tabled by Chief Minister Senator Ian Gorst.

Million's of £'s have been spent on at least 3 reports (Clothier/Carswell/COI) which have ALL recommended the separation of powers. Yet the Bailiff/Deputy Bailiff STILL remain head of Judiciary and Legislator. He remains unelected and unaccountable yet presides over elected/accountable public representatives. He decides what questions can be asked (or not) in the Parliament. He decides what propositions/amendments can (or not) be debated in the Parliament. He (as judge) can decide which political dissidents can be locked up, or financially ruined. He can shut down political commentators/Citizen Journalists through his court just as was the case in 1769 and referred to in the below interview. He is able to do, whatever he does, with complete impunity, answerable to nobody.

Isn't this why Tom Gruchy, and his fellow protesters, stormed the Royal Court back in 1769?

Mr. Dun appears, in the video, as an 18th century Acting Bailiff. Could it/he be a 21st century Bailiff?

Thursday, 7 September 2017

Former Police Chief Statement to Wiltshire Constabulary.

Former Chief Police Officer 
Graham Power QPM

On the 12th of November 2008 Jersey's most senior Police Officer, Graham Power QPM, was (possibly illegally) suspended from duty during the biggest Child Abuse investigation Jersey has ever seen. The "real reasons" for his suspension remain as much a mystery today as they did back then some 9 years ago.

The then Home Affairs Minister, Deputy Andrew Lewis, told the Islands Parliament, in a secret debate where the transcripts/Hansard were never meant to see the light of day.......(BUT DID):

I have read an alarming report from the Metropolitan Police which led me to this decision (suspend the Chief of Police) in the first place.” Which any fair minded person would/should take to mean that he had "read an alarming report from the Metropolitan Police." Well, as regular readers will be aware, it means nothing of the sort (according to Deputy Andrew Lewis) It means he read a letter from David Warcup........The man who wanted the Chief Police Officer's job. Soon after the (possibly illegal) suspension Deputy Lewis stood down from politics and was replaced, as Home Affairs Minister, by former Magistrate, Senator Ian Le Marquand.

Former Home Affairs Minister
Ian Le Marquand

To cut a long story short, Senator Le Marquand realised how un-sound/toxic the original suspension was, and decided to suspend the Chief Police Officer, not just once, but twice more. And, as they say, for the purposes of this posting, the rest is history.

In this posting we want to explain the truth behind the much misrepresented report by the Wiltshire Constabulary known as "Operation Haven 1." There is a myth commonly repeated by ill-informed onlookers/protectors of "The Jersey Way"/those with something to hide/people to protect that Haven 1 is an "independent" report and shows that; "the end justifies the means" in that despite the apparent lies told by Deputy Lewis for his "reasons" for suspending the chief Police Officer, Haven 1 shows it was the right decision.

Firstly Haven 1 is NOT an "independent" report. It was a report commissioned for disciplinary purposes, it is better described as "the prosecution case" against Graham Power. What is contained in the report are "allegations." Allegations that Mr. Power should have had the right to defend but was denied that right because Haven 1 was such a debacle which missed numerous deadlines where it got to the stage that a disciplinary hearing could never happen as Mr. Power would have been long retired beforehand. The investigation was "strung out." 

As part of Haven 1, and the supposed Disciplinary Hearing (that was never going to happen) Mr. Power wrote a 94 page 62,000 word statement (below). A statement that was leaked to ALL the Island's mainstream media years ago but, despite reporting the prosecution case, have buried Mr. Power's interim defence case.

Deputy Andrew Lewis

Recently Deputy Andrew Lewis has sent the allegations contained in Haven 1 to all States Members, seemingly still trying to convince them that he did the right thing in suspending Mr. Power. Deputy Andrew Lewis is facing a VOTE OF CENSURE at the next States Sitting (Tues 12 September 2017) after the Privileges and Procedures Committee found that he breached the Code of Conduct for Elected Members by "failing to maintain the integrity of the States" when giving evidence to the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry (IJCI) and elsewhere. The IJCI also found that Deputy Lewis told lies both to the IJCI and to the States Assembly. An offence (the former) that could see a prosecution for perjury against any mere mortals but not inTHIS CASE.  In the interest of natural justice, if States Members are going to read the "prosecution case," (although it has nothing to do with the vote of censure) then they must also read the interim defence case.

Current Home Affairs Minister
Deputy Kristina Moore

The problem is that none of the mainstream media have published/boradcast any of it, the former Home Affairs Minister, Ian Le Marquand, despite telling Mr. Power that he WOULD publish the Interim Defence case, went back on his word and refused to publish it. The current Home Affairs Minister, Deputy Kristina Moore, has refused to publish it alongside the prosecution case which IS on the States website. It is very difficult to find on the IJCI WEBSITE so we felt that there needs to be a place online where it can be easily accessed since the mainstream media and Home Affairs Minister won't recognise natural justice, fairness and balance, and publish it. We must also be mindful that Haven 1 itself should never have been published and there is a risk that Ian Le Marquand broke the law when he did publish it and set a very DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. 

To understand fully how Haven 1 came about and the absolute (£1.5m plus) shambles that it is/was readers, and States Members should read THIS INTERVIEW with Mr. Power.

One of the very many significant segments of that interview;

"Q. What do you believe were the intentions of Wilts and their Report?

A. Whatever the intentions of Wiltshire Police, the practical effect of their activity has been to support the actions of those in Jersey who have used public funds to undermine the confidence of abuse victims and witnesses, and to persecute those who strived to bring abusers to justice. They should be ashamed of their involvement in this sordid affair and some of the sordid individuals behind it. After nearly two years and well over a million pounds of investigation I retired without facing a single disciplinary charge. All allegations against me were abandoned. I stand exonerated and remain proud of the part I played in breaking down the culture of abuse which existed almost unchallenged in the Island for decades. I remain grateful as ever for the past and continuing messages of encouragement and support I receive from Islanders, all of whom have my thanks and best wishes."

The fact is that Mr. Power is considered innocent of ALL allegations against him contained in the discredited Haven 1. There is no getting away from that fact as much as Andrew Lewis and others of his ilk would like to convince us otherwise.

Mr. Power's Interim Defence statement is the size of a small novel and we are conscious of the fact that most readers will not read it in its entirety. This is unfortunate because it dispels a lot of the myths peddled by the mainstream media and the likes of Deputy Andrew Lewis. The public, and States Members, have only been fed the prosecution case against Mr. Power in order to form their opinions. In order to have an "informed opinion" the Interim Defence case must also be read.

To quote Mr. Power from the ABOVE LINK:

"Both of my statements give a detailed and accurate account of events which is in sharp contrast to the “false history” which Ministers and their allies have attempted to construct. There is a strong argument that it is now in the public interest that all sides of the story should be made available for historians and other interested parties. The Jersey Authorities could of course take the initiative and release these documents now, although by doing so they would expose some of the myths which Ministers have sought to perpetuate about the abuse enquiry. This may of course be the reason why they have not been released so far."

After reading the below Interim defence case it becomes clear as to why so many people are so keen to keep it buried. The fact that the current Home Affairs Minister refuses to publish it alongside the prosecution case on the States website suggests "The Jersey Way" is still prevalent............

Statement made by Graham Power QP.M. Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police.

1.  I am the Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police. I make this statement at the request of Mr Brian Moore, who is the Chief Constable of Wiltshire. Mr Moore is the investigating officer for "Operation Haven." This operation is a disciplinary investigation initiated by Andrew Lewis the former Minister for Home Affairs. I understand its purpose to be the examination of my role in respect of "Operation Rectangle," which is an investigation into allegations of historic child abuse In Jersey. The statement was commenced on Sunday 23th June 2009. Mr Moore has provided me with details of points he wishes me to cover. I have also received disclosure of some of the documents relevant to the investigation. I will attempt to structure my statement In a way which addresses the points raised by Mr Moore, and where appropriate make reference to the disclosed documents. Where a particular fact or sequence of events is not covered In the disclosure documents I have completed the applicable part of the statement from memory. Other than the documents which have been disclosed, I am denied access to the relevant files and documents at this time. Consequently some of my recollections may be imperfect. However, that said, I believe everything in this statement to be a true recollection of all of the events described.

2.  The terms for the enquiry are set out in a thematic structure, as is the list of points I have been requested to cover. I will attempt to follow that structure wherever it is consistent with a coherent and reader-friendly narrative. The Investigating Officer will himself have noted that some of the themes and the evidence overlap. This is reflected in the disclosure bundles, where some documents and statements are duplicated under the different topics. Iwill however seek to consolidate some parts of the narrative under single headings where this appears to be appropriate. I will also cover some additional topics where I see them as being relevant. Issues around succession planning and the history of Mr Harper's relationships with some members of the political and legal community are examples

3.  Some Details of mv Career History.

I have been asked to discuss my previous working experience. I will cover the early history briefly, but will have more to say regarding my appointment to my current role, and the two subsequent extensions to that appointment.

4. I am not sure about the first date on which I entered the Police Service but recall that it was as a cadet in Middlesbrough Constabulary, and was probably in 1964. Iwas appointed to the rank of constable in 1966 and in that rank served in the Uniform, Traffic and C.l.D. departments. During my service in the Middlesbrough area the force was twice enlarged through amalgamations. The first was Into Teesside Police, and the second into Cleveland Constabulary.

5. In 1974 I was selected for accelerated promotion by way of the "Special Course" at what is now the Police Staff College, Bramshill. I returned to the force after a year in the rank of Sergeant and after six months was promoted to acting Inspector then Inspector. I had been awarded a Bramshill Scholarship at the end of the Special Course and in consequence, shortly after my promotion to Inspector, I attended Queen's College, Oxford, for three years, where I read Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, eventually achieving an M.A. with second class honours.

6. I returned to Cleveland Constabulary and served in a range of uniform operational postings until promoted to Chief Inspector and later Superintendent. Most of my time as a Chief Inspector, and around half of the time as Superintendent was spent in senior positions in operational support and planning roles. This had a high priority in Cleveland, which had at that time one of the world's largest petrochemical complexes sited close to heavily populated urban areas. The remainder of my time in the rank of superintendent was in sub-divisional commands in some of the inner-city areas of the force. 

7. In 1988 I successfully applied for a position as Chief Superintendent and divisional commander in North Yorkshire Police. I was initially commander of Harrogate Division, which encompassed the sub-divisions of Harrogate and Skipton. The division was later amalgamated with the neighbouring Richmond Division, which created one of the geographically largest commands In the U.K. It was when I was commander of these two combined divisions, that I was selected for the 1991 Senior Command Course. Before I had completed the course,  I successfully applied for the position of Assistant Chief Constable with Lothian and Borders Police.

8. I was allocated the role of "Assistant Chief Constable (Management Services)" responsible for a wide portfolio including recruitment, personnel, finance, l.T., planning and other support functions. During my time in that post I implemented a number of changes, including more objective promotion and selection processes, and in particular a much needed civilianisation of non-operational roles. My promotion to Deputy Chief Constable in 1994 was accompanied  by a planned re-structuring of the force executive. As part of this process my previous position was abolished, and a civilian Director of Corporate Services appointed. This is believed to be the first executive-level civilian appointment in the Scottish Police Service.

9. As Deputy Chief Constable I was in periodic command of Scotland's second largest force, and had lead responsibility for professional standards and major events. The latter included the 1997 Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, in respect of which I led the planning team, and was strategic commander during the event. During this period I was Assistant Secretary of the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (A.C.P.O.S.). Jn this role I oversaw the permanent A.C.P.O.S. secretariat, and often led on the development of policy. I was also a full time member of the Association's executive. During this part of my service !1 was awarded the Queen's Police Medal for distinguished service. It was a strong feature of the mandate of the Association at that time to preserve the distinctive nature of Scottish policing,
and to resist the encroachment of English policing practices, which were perceived to be process-bound, bureaucratic, and remote from the everyday concerns of most people.

10. In 1998 I was appointed Assistant to H.M. Chief Inspector of Constabulary, based in Edinburgh. I conducted inspections of Scottish Forces, advised Ministers and others on policy, and considered appeals against decisions in respect of non-criminal complaints.

11. In 2000 I successfully applied for the position of Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police. I note that my application for that position emphasised my experience In the development of policing under a devolved government, and the need to strike a balance between the strategic perspective, and the delivery of common-sense solutions. During the selection process the panel appeared to be interested in the fact that my senior policing experience had been gained in an environment detached from Home Office influence, and that I had an understanding of the significance of different legal systems, not only with regard to criminal justice, but in sustaining the distinct culture of a society.

12. Following further process required by law, I was sworn in before the Royal Court as Chief Officer of Police in December 2000, on a five year contract. The three unsuccessful shortlisted candidates were the then serving Deputy Chief Officer (D.C.O.) who was Roly Jones, and two senior A.C.P.O. officers from England. I will return to the questions of my contractual position, and the issue of succession planning later in this statement.

13. Soon after my appointment I had a number of meetings and briefings with key figures and learned more of the culture and attitudes which prevailed in the island. I became aware of a strong anxiety that the island's laws and traditions were being eroded by a process of "creeping Anglicisation." I have been made aware that this view has been prevalent to various degrees on different topics for a number of decades. I was made particularly aware of the suspicions which existed in respect of senior officials, of whatever department, who came from outside the island and who were sometimes accused of attempting to turn Jersey into a "part of Hampshire." I absorbed these messages and resolved to ensure that any changes for which I was responsible were responsive to local needs, and there would be no blanket acceptance of laws and practices originating from the countries of the U.K. or elsewhere.

14. Training Courses Undertaken.

The investigating officer has asked me to provide information on training courses I have undertaken during my career. I have already written of my attendance at the Special Course in 1974 and the Senior Command Course in 1991. I see from the documents provided that in addition there is a record of my attending a Public Order Ground Commanders' course in 1990, and one on the Management of Civil Disaster and Emergency the same year. I recall that when serving in the Scottish Police Service I attended occasional training days at the Scottish Police College, and was sometimes asked to be a speaker. I recall speaking on diversity issues, and on another occasion I chaired a session on ethics.

15. In Jersey I have attended the occasional management development day organised on behalf of the public sector. I am the representative of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man on the Association of Chief Police Officers (A.C.P.O.) Committee which deals with Terrorism and Allied Matters. As part of this role I have maintained an interest in the subject matter, and attend relevant seminars and conferences in the U.K. and elsewhere. I am also an assessor for the police service High Potential Development Programme in the U.K. This is a programme for junior ranking police officers who appear to have exceptional potential. I maintain my skills as an assessor by attending training days organised by the managers of the programme.

16. I suspect that the Investigating Officer may be interested in any courses attended relating to criminal investigation. As part of my initial training In 1966 I attended lectures on the criminal law, powers of arrest and the like. I have no recollection or record of receiving any formal training in relation to criminal investigation since that time. Against this background I would point out that since 1994 I have been at a rank in the service where the possibility of direct command or oversight of crime operations Is remote. In those circumstances I consider it legitimate to focus on broader corporate governance Issues at strategic level, and to seek advice from suitable experts in relation to more direct operational matters should that become appropriate. For the avoidance of doubt I have no current qualifications or training whatsoever in the investigation of serious crime, or in the oversight of such investigations.

17. Experience in the Management of Major Incidents.

I have been asked to provide information regarding my experience in the management of major incidents. I have already touched upon my experience in Cleveland where I undertook some command roles in relation to toxic emergencies and similar incidents, and when in North Yorkshire I was occasionally ground commander in respect of issues arising from "Acid House" parties, illegal festivals and the like. All of this was of course in the 1980s.

18. I have mentioned previously that I planned and commanded the policing of the 1997 Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Edinburgh, and in 1998 I prepared a public report relating to issues arising from a murder investigation in Aberdeen. During that enquiry I was supported by a strong team of specialist detectives.

19. Since taking up my present command I have encouraged and mentored local officers in the exercise of the responsibilities of command, whether in relation to anti-capitalist demonstrations, football related disturbances, or pop concerts. Once I am satisfied that a command structure is in place I normally assume a mobile role, visiting command centres, operational officers, and relevant local stakeholders. I am always alert to the problems which can arise when delegation is combined with interference. Additionally, I   am conscious that my operational skills in these areas are no longer current, and that others have been traineld to undertake the relevant roles.

20. Major Crime. Competency Issues Relating to the Force.

The readiness of the force to cope with the challenge of a major and unforeseen criminal investigation is raised at this stage, because it has been an issue, not just during Rectangle, but from the very beginning of my tenure as Chief Officer. My initial appointment as Chief Offiter of the Force was in the aftermath of a report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), published in 2000, which was highly critical of the management of the force and its performance. There were also recognised serious professional standards issues to be addressed. I also became aware of a lack of self-sufficiency in the investigation of murder and comparable crime. In its simplest terms, it appeared to be the established practice for the force to effectively "hand over" major investigations to Devon and Cornwall Police. I did not think that this was sustainable for a number of reasons. These included the vulnerabilities created by such a dependency, for example, the acknowledged fact that the priorities of Devon and Cornwall Police must Inevitably focus primarily on the needs of that force. In addition, visiting officers often found local law and procedures unfamiliar and it was necessary to provide them with guidance and support throughout an investigation. There was also the issues of local pride, the professional development of local officers, and the cost of mutual aid. There had inevitably been some local political and media criticism from those who could not understand why their local force was not undertaking a more visible role In major enquiries.

21. I addressed this matter on a number of levels. One involved a joint agreement with Devon and Cornwall which committed both parties to the specifics of what they would do, and in what circumstances. This also involved the permanent establishment, and periodic testing; of a H.O.L.M.E.S. 2 link in Jersey connected to the main Devon and Cornwall Computer. I also encouraged greater emphasis on the need to train and develop local officers by a variety of means, including secondments to U.K. forces.

22. A further opportunity arose when the officer who was Superintendent and head of Operations indicated that he intended to retire and it was known that the then Deputy Chief Officer (D.C.O.) would retire soon afterwards. I had a number of discussions with the then President of Home Affairs, (the name given at that time to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee) Alastair Layzell, and we agreed this created an opportunity to strengthen the local management team by recruiting a Superintendent and potential D.C.O. from outside the island. I told Deputy Layzell that we had a pressing need for a "heavyweight" detective who could take command in appropriate circumstances, and mentor local officers.

23. After candidates had been short listed, a selection panel was arranged. It is my recollection that the members were Deputy Layzell, Senator Wendy Kinnard, who was the Vice-President of the Committee myself and possibly a member of the Appointments Commission. Towards the end of the process two candidates stood out. Lenny Harper, who I believe at that time was a Superintendent in Strathclyde, was the strongest, and the second was a Acting A.C.C. in the National Crime Squad, John Pearson. I discussed the candidates with the panel. I pointed out that Mr Harper would be a bold choice. He was a man who would "lift stones and rattle cages." He was likely to be relentless on ethical issues. If we were to appoint him then we should be alert to these characteristics. We then discussed John Pearson. I drew attention to the fact that that although not as broad in his experience as Mr Harper, he was nevertheless the specialist "heavyweight" detective we needed badly.

24. Deputy Layzell responded bravely to this situation and said that he would agree to change the establishment of the force on a temporary basis to accommodate both officers. Harper would be designated at Chief Superintendent and D.C.O. in waiting. Pearson was made Detective Superintendent. This was a controversial move, both within the force and externally. We had to address criticism that local officers were being deprived of promotion opportunities. This is a recurrent theme in island policing, which persists no matter how unrealistic some local aspirations may be, and one which is continually used as a means to attack the professional and political leadership of the force. Its significance should not be underestimated. I will refer to this factor again later in this statement.

25. Not long afterwards the planned retirements occurred and both officers moved into their intended positions. To complete this part of the narrative, the former Superintendent was Trevor Garrett, who is a local person who is still living in Jersey. The former D.C.O. was Roly Jones who was a good and committed officer who believed that he had not always had the full support he deserved. He did not have a long retirement and died some years ago. I recall that it was not very long after the selection process that Deputy Layzell was unexpectedly defeated in an election and left politics. He was succeeded as President of Home Affairs by Wendy Kinnard.

26. The Nature of the Role of Chief Officer of Police in Jersey. 

It ls claimed by various authorities that the policing system in Jersey can be traced back over 800 years. There does appear to be evidence that something resembling the current honorary system was in place in medieval times, and there can be no doubt that in recent centuries there was a Parish-based system close to the one which exists today. Honorary police officers are elected by voters in each of the twelve Parishes. The senior figure Is the Connetable (or "Constable"), who is also head of the parish and a member of the States. The next most senior in rank are Centeniers, who are responsible for the charging and prosecution of offenders. Vingteniers are the next rank. Some of the administrative functions of that role have in more recent times passed to other bodies, but they remain senior to the Constable's Officers, who are the junior and often most visible rank of the honorary service. One Centenier in each parish is designated Chef-de-Police and has delegated day to day control of policing on behalf of the Connetable. There is now an island-wide Honorary Police Association, In which the policing interests of all of the Parishes are represented.

27. In recent centuries notable events have from time to time highlighted the need for the honorary police to receive a measure of professional support. In 1853 Loi sur laPolce Salariee were created to support the Connetable of St Heller, and·subsequently the Paid Police {Jersey) Law 1951 extended the provision of paid assistance for Connetables to the whole island. In 1974 the Police Force (Jersey) Law came into force. This changed the name of the force to the States of Jersey Police and brought some degree of legal definition to the relationship between the States and Honorary Police. However, some important distinctions and powers have been preserved. Most notable among these continuing powers are those which relate to the charging and prosecution of offenders. The States Police do not bring charges or undertake prosecutions. The role of the force is to gather evidence and present it to the relevant Centenier for consideration as to what action he or she thinks it proper to take. In serious cases Centeniers are advised by the Law Officers Department.

28. Under Article 9 of the 1974 Police Law the Chief Officer is responsible for "the general administration and the discipline, training and organisation of the force." This is a role sometimes described as the "administrative head of the Force." Article 7 of the Law sets a requirement for the States and Honorary Police to exchange information on occurrences in parishes. In recent years I have agreed with honorary police representatives a means by which this is done electronically in the majority of cases. In other respects the law does not intrude upon the established position, that the role of the force is to provide professional support to the Connetables in the policing of their parish. This is re-enforced by Article 6 which refers to a schedule of prescribed offences. For the purposes of this statement it is sufficient to say that the schedule contains a list of offences which are more serious than others, and in respect of which a degree of professional skills are likely to be required. When such an offence comes to the notice of a member of the Honorary Police, he or she is required to "request the assistance force." Even for example, in cases of homicide, the position under the 1974 law Is that the Force is to assist the member of the honorary police. There is no provision which allows the force to take command without the agreement of the relevant Connetable, or his or her delegate.

29. During my period in office I have entered into a variety of discussions and agreements, both formal and informal, which have sought to bring a measure of contemporary realism to these legal arrangements. This has resulted In a strong working partnership between the States and Honorary Police which has been of benefit to the island. During these discussions the honorary police have been well represented by a number of their senior ranks. In recent times the most active has been Malcolm P. L'Amy who is the Chef de Police of the Parish of St Peter. Should the investigating officer wish to verify my account of this relationship, or to obtain further information, it Is probable that Mr L'Amy would be willing to assist. His contact details are in the public domain.

30. The relationship with the honorary police also has implications for the type of laws and procedures which are appropriate for Jersey. Most honorary officers receive only a few days training, and some, little training of any sort. It follows from this that any policing procedure which is complex, or difficult for a volunteer force to absorb, can be seen as a threat to the honorary system. There are within the honorary service some strongly traditional and politically influential figures who have still not come to terms with the introduction of the "paid police.'' They can be suspicious and resentful of "foreign ways" which are seen as a threat to the survival of their traditional way of working, which is based predominantly on common-sense, local knowledge, and discretion, rather than any set procedure.

31. Such views are not confined to the older elements of the honorary service. They can be found, albeit in a more developed form, in the senior levels of government and the legal establishment where some notable figures favour an eventual severance of links with the U.K. and would see the ready acceptance of U.K. working practices as running counter to this agenda. I recall that in 2007 I assisted a small working group which included, among others, the Bailiff Sir Philip Bailhache and the Attorney General William Bailhache. The purpose of the group was to prepare a draft contingency plan for complete independence. I submitted papers to the group on the implications for law enforcement, and used some contacts from my previous role to offer suggestions as to who outside of the island, could assist in developing such a plan. I provided contact details of key figures in the Scottish Government and Administration including the Scottish National Party. I recall that some of the advice and contacts I provided were in an email I sent, probably In July 2007. This and other experiences reinforced my understanding that there was a tide flowing against closer association with the U.K. and a strong local agenda to develop working models and solutions within the island.

32. Over the years there have been attempts by myself and Wendy Kinnard, when she was Minister for Home Affairs, to address the issue of operational control and responsibility. The most recent of these being the failed attempt to introduce a new police law in 2008. The draft law sought, in a tentative way, to make the Chief Officer the person who was formally in operational command and control of the force. The law achieved some public debate and made it as far as a hearing before a Scrutiny Panel (a body similar to a Parliamentary Select Committee in England) before running out of time due to the approach of an election, at which the sponsoring Minister, Senator Wendy Kinnard, did not propose to stand. The panel hearings and other discussions make it clear that political opinion is divided on the matter of command and control of the police. Some wish to retain the legal primacy of the Connetables for the policing of their parishes. Others think that operational direction should sit with the Minister for Home Affairs. With the exception of Senator Kinnard, and possibly Andrew Lewis, there was no major lobby in favour of placing greater operational or command powers in the hands of the Chief Officer.

33. The duties of the Chief Officer of Police in Jersey are not confined to the running of the force and the management of the interface with the Honorary Police. In Jersey, the Home Affairs Department has no direct responsibility for policing, and only a marginal involvement in the development of legislation regarding the police. If there is to be any progress in this area then it normally falls upon the Chief Officer of Police to take the Initiative, normally in consultation with the Minister for Home Affairs, the Law Officers and the Law Draftsman's department. One example Is the recurrent attempts to achieve a modern police law, referred to above, and regulations dealing with complaints against senior officers. As I recall it was my predecessor who took the Initiative on the establishment of a Police Complaints Authority and the beginnings of a new Police Law. The Police Complaints Law was successfully implemented for most ranks of the service, but work stalled on the new Police Law and Senior Officer Discipline Regulations. After various frustrations I took on this work with Alison Fossey, who may have been a sergeant when the work began, and who Is now an inspector. We worked with the law draftsman's department and produced a draft which, as described previously, went out to consultation and then to the Scrutiny Panel. Civil service involvement was minimal.

34. As a Chief Officer I also sit on the Corporate Management Board, along with Chief Officers from other departments. Together we share a collective responsibility for the administration of the governance of the island and for providing advice to the Council of Ministers. Very little of the board's business concerns law enforcement. It would be quite usual for me to be expected to contribute to discussions on education or health policy, and assist in prioritising the government's capital programme.

35. In addition to these roles, I would frequently prepare briefs for the Minister for Home Affairs prior to meetings, or draft answers to questions she was required to answer in the States, along with suggested "lines to take" during political questioning. I would engage regularly with the media and advise the Minister on "lines to take" during media interviews. Against this background the Chief Officer's actual responsibilities for the command of law enforcement in the island, are obscured in a mixture of outdated laws, customary practice, and the practical requirements of policing in the modern world.

36. The role of the Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police is part police officer, part civil se'i"ant, part government policy maker and part ministerial advisor. I am not aware of any compalrable role within any police service in the British Isles. I will return to this topic later when I discuss the relevance of English and Welsh guidelines and the dangers of equivocation when discussing the responsibilities of a "Chief Officer."

37. The Accountability of the Chief Officer.

It might at this stage of the statement be of some value for me to set out the accountability of the Chief Officer, how this has evolved during my tenure, and where it appears to stand today. As stated earlier, the Chief Officer is accountable to the Minister under article 9 of the Police Law for the "general administration and the discipline, training and organisation of the Force." I know of no other relevant accountabilities which are attached to the post. It is to be noted that there is no mention of the Chief Officer having the responsibility for the operations of the force or for its performance.

38. The history of the accountability arrangements are set out in more detail in the affidavits filed in connection with my application for Judicial Review, which have been supplied to the investigating officer. In brief, at the time of my appointment there was a Home Affairs Committee, headed by a President and Vice President. The Chief Officer was accountable to the Committee and the normal rules of committee process applied. The President of the committee
was Deputy Alastair Layzell and the Vice President was Senator Wendy Kinnard. There was also a Shadow Police Authority, which had been set up by the States in response to a report from a committee headed by Sir Cecil Clothier (The report is commonly known as "Clothier One.) I was told at the time that the Shadow Police Authority would progressively assume full legal status and the Home Affairs Committee would reduce its direct role in relation to policing. 'I was content to accept my appointment as Chief Officer on that basis.

39. Once I had been appointed, none of these promised changes occurred. The Shadow Police Authority faded away for a variety of reasons which Included delays, and lack of overall political commitment. The States decided to move from a system of Committee Government to Ministerial Government, this change taking place In consequence of legislation passed in 2005. Before the changes to the system of government, the Chief Officer was accountable to some extent to two committees, namely the Home Affairs Committee and the Shadow Police Authority. After the change, he was accountable to a single individual, namely the Minister for Home Affairs. The first ever Minister for Home Affairs in Jersey was Senator Wendy Kinnard, who was the Minister in office at the critical time of "Rectangle."

40. The authority of the Minister for Home Affairs under the law appears to be unfettered. There is no obligation to consult with other parties, or obtain any approval for any action taken in exercise of Ministerial authority. During "Rectangle" both myself and the Deputy Chief Officer, met regularly with the Minister and updated her on developments. She also met with, and was briefed by the advisors appointed by the Homicide Working Group. I have no recollection or record of the Minister raising any matters of significant concern during "Rectangle." On the contrary, she appeared at all times, to be strongly supportive. 

41. There is one aspect of my accountability which does not fit neatly into any of the requested topics, and I will therefore mention it here. (REDACTION) On 10Th December 2007 I saw Wendy in my office in relation to routine business. During this meeting (REDACTION) I gave her some personal advice, then some additional advice of a professional nature. (REDACTION) and she should arrange for the Assistant Minister, Andrew Lewis, to assume
responsibility for political accountability in respect of Rectangle. (Notebook 07/358 page 39.)

42. As it was, Wendy Kinnard took some time to reflect on her position, and it was not until 29th May 2008 that she relinquished responsibility for the enquiry. The decision that she should do so was taken at a meeting on 23rd May 2008 attended by myself, Wendy Kinnard, the Chief Minister Frank Walker and the Chief Executive Bill Ogley. The meeting was not a harmonious event. During the course of the meeting Frank Walker expressed annoyance that the enquiry was continuing to generate unwelcome media interest in the island, and adopted a bullying and offensive tone towards Wendy Kinnard. He made threats of suspension against both myself and Lenny Harper. I believe that the term he used was that he "was under pressure to suspend the Chief and the Deputy Chief" He did not say who the "pressure" was from, nor did he give the impression that he was personally opposed to the idea. My notebook records that I made an email record after this meeting. (Notebook 08/95 page 34.) The Investigating Officer has subsequently provided me with a copy of the relevant email. It was intended for internal reading, and Its robust tone is designed to reassure the relevant people that I am seeking to fulfil my identified role, (which will be discussed in more detail later,) of protecting the investigation from political interference. I did not record the suspension threat relating to myself in the email as it did not concern the people to whom the message was addressed.

43. The investigating Officer may agree that the email was not written in anticipation that it would be read by persons other than those to whom it was addressed. It nevertheless provides support for my account of that meeting. The Investigating Officer may also note that in paragraph 18 of my first affidavit I record that a States Member unconnected to these events, had told me of an overheard conversation between Frank Walker and Andrew Lewis, in which they appeared to be discussing the use of suspension. The Investigating Officer will also note that the email contains a suggested media "line." My practice of suggesting media "lines" where appropriate will be discussed later in this statement.

44. A consequence of the delay in Wendy Kinnard relinquishing her Ministerial responsibility for Rectangle  (REDACTION) This had implications for the political leadership, and the representation of the Force in the States and elsewhere, during a time of significant challenge. 

45. Under the Police Law my sole line of accountability was to the Minister for Home Affairs, who at the relevant time was Wendy Kinnard. Nevertheless, I had Informal contacts with other Ministers on a regular basis. I have no recollection of any Minister raising any formal reservations regarding the conduct of the enquiry, other than in the meeting referred to above, and that was confined to a verbal outburst on the question of media attention from the Chief Minister, Frank Walker. I note that at a sitting of the Council of Ministers on 22nd May 2008 (the day before the meeting referred to above) the Council asked the Minister for Home Affairs for assurances that she was maintaining "effective political oversight" of the investigation by "being satisfied that the investigation was being undertaken in a professional and proper manner" and "being content that audit mechanisms in place to monitor the progress of the criminal investigation were suitably independent, professional and thorough." In consequence of these  assurances the Council of Ministers "reaffirmed its full support for the police enquiry." (Statement Frank Walker paragraph 24.) I have no knowledge of any contrary view being expressed by the Council of Ministers since that date.

46. I hope that the above section on accountability is sufficient for the investigating officer at this time. I will now turn to the management of the force.

47. The Force and its Management Processes.
The States of Jersey Police is the national police force for the island of Jersey. It is not part of any other force, or any other law enforcement organisation. It consists of around 240 police officers and 90 civil servants. The Force does not have full-time standing units in a number of key areas including armed response, public order, family liaison and the like. The successful performance of the force depends on the goodwill of officers who are willing to undertake additional specialist duties on a part time basis. The joint financial crime unit (joint In the sense that there are customs representatives In the unit,) is relatively large in relation to the overall size of the force. It is not unusual for that unit to be managing a number of investigations regarding serious and organised crime, and corruption, at any one time. That is not to say that such offences are necessarily Jersey based. More commonly the force is investigating financial crime issues which originate in other jurisdictions and are believed to have a Jersey link. The delivery of co-operation and support to an acceptable standard is important in maintaining the reputation of the island and the Force.

48. Overall, crime Is relatively low and force performance is high. The years since 2000 have predominantly been characterised by falling crime, high detection rates, and high public confidence. Reports by H.M. Inspectorate of Constabulary have been positive. The views of the community are regularly surveyed and assessed. It is common for survey returns to show satisfaction levels in excess of 90%. While it could be plausibly argued that in Jersey everyone is a member of a minority group, some minorities are more evident than others. The recruitment of police officers from minority groups is at a proportionate level, and recorded levels of confidence in the police service among minorities in the population commonly exceeds that of the population as a whole. 

49. The force executive consists of the Chief Officer, the Deputy Chief Officer, the Superintendent, who is also the head of operations, and the head of planning and research. Two members of the Home Affairs Department are also invited to executive meetings. They are a financial representative and the Head of H.R.

50. Corporate governance is exercised through a cycle of meetings which is as follows:

.  Short daily informal meetings at 0900 with the Chief Officer and such members of the executive, or their nominees, as are available.

The executive strategy group. This meets every 2/3 weeks. There is an agenda, advance circulation of papers, and a minute keeper. The group discusses policy issues at a strategic level. The minutes are available on the force Intranet and are copied to the Minister for Home Affairs and the Assistant Minister. Financial issues are a standing item.

The force management board. This consists of the executive and a broader membership including line managers and staff associations. It meets on average, every 2/3 weeks and alternates with the strategy group. Again, finance is a standing item and the minutes are widely available. 

Ministerial meetings. These are periodic but fairly regular meetings attended by the Minister and the Assistant Minister, along with the Chief Officer, the Deputy Chief Officer and the head of operations. Due to the operationally sensitive nature of some of the agenda items, attendance was restricted to those named above. Strategic level meetings with the Honorary Police. These are less frequent but are normally attended by 3 or 4 nominated representatives of the Honorary Police, the Chief Officer, and a relevant operational officer. Again, there is an agenda and minutes. Discussions usually revolve around local initiatives and legal developments which might impact on the honorary service. There is sometimes a need to dispel suspicion or rumour.

Any other operational meetings as are required to cascade any issues from the above meetings. Iwould not attend these unless specifically invited.

51. I have sought to operate this meeting cycle on a "one size fits all" basis. The meetings can cover a variety of topics, but are intended to bring management issues within a simple and transparent framework, hoping to achieve solutions which are collectively owned rather than driven from the top. I do not encourage proliferation of the meeting cycle. In a force of a few hundred staff, all of whom work from the same building complex, and who see each other several times a day, there is no need for people to spend undue lengths of time in management meetings, I also insist that meetings start on time, are focussed, and to the point. The meeting cycle is intended to support the work effort. It should not become a substitute for work.

52. The above arrangements have provided a foundation for an efficient and well run police service. It is my recollection that the force has, in my eight and a half years in office, always finished the year within its allocated budget and that there is a widespread acceptance of the Sta\es Police as a high performing and professional organisation. 

53. I note that in Mr Warcup's statement he describes at some length the processes for formulating and delivering policy in the police forces of England and Wales, and the powers to introduce codes of practice under the "U.K. (sic) Police Reform Act." I am not sure if I am expected to comment on that narrative at this time but if Iam then I am unable to do so. I have not lived or worked in England or Wales for close to 20 years and cannot speak with authority on how things are done in those countries. I am however satisfied that the corporate governance arrangements which I established for the States Police are suitable for the requirements of the force and the Island. Jersey is not part of the U.K. and is not bound by any U.K. legislation.

54. The Succession Plans.

The appointment of both Lenny Harper and John Pearson, achieved through the process I have described earlier, did much for the effectiveness of the force. John Pearson brought a wealth of experience as a senior detective and was effective In developing the skills of more junior officers. I will address the experiences of Mr Harper in a separate section of this statement. 

55. As my initial five year appointment as Chief Officer was drawing to an end I had some informal discussions with members of the Home Affairs Committee. It was clear that a majority hoped that I would agree to my contract being renewed. On balance, I was attracted to this but felt that it was now time to set a limit and have a clear view of the date on which I would eventually retire. After a period of reflection I agreed to remain for a further two years. I believe there was some discussion as to whether this period should be longer, but I was clear at that time that two years was the limit as far as I was concerned. My initial five year appointment was therefore extended to seven years and it was anticipated that would retire at the end of 2007. 

56. Some time in 2006 it became evident that there was going to be a continuity problem in the senior management structure of the force. I would need to check the records in some detail to work out how this arose, but I believe that along the way there had been some adjustment to the contracts of both Lenny Harper and John Pearson. They had also formed views of their own as to their probable departure dates. When the anticipated departure dates were known it became apparent that all three senior ranks were due to leave within, as I recall, the space of a year. There were then a number of discussions as to how this could be addressed. Lenny Harper said that he had retirement plans, and wanted to leave on the set date. I have a recollection that John Pearson expressed some interest in staying, but said that this ran counter to his intention to settle his small son in a school and a community where he could be sure that he could remain if he wished. Against this background "one more year" or something similar, did not fit in with his plans. Also, and significantly, there was yet again the issue that John Pearson appeared to be blocking the promotion of a local candidate, but the same could not be said at that time regarding myself or Mr Harper. I did some political soundings around this, and came to the conclusion that to extend John Pearson's contract would not achieve the necessary political support. The political agenda of achieving local promotion would override any considerations of his value to the force. That left me to consider if I should remain In post in an attempt to provide continuity until a new senior team could be In place. 

57. From my personal perspective there were two disadvantages with this. Firstly, it did not fit well with a number of plans and commitments, one of which was (and remains) family welfare issues in the U.K. The second was the obvious fact that my professional qualifications were clearly dated, and that there was, in my view, a need to bring in someone with a more contemporary background.

58. Over a period of time I worked with others to address these issues. This resulted in the production of a succession plan which offered a good prospect of resolving the problem. The first feature was for someone to understudy John Pearson closely, and spend a year or more shadowing him as his potential successor. The selected person would also benefit from secondments to U.K. forces and additional training. The person selected was the then head of C.l.D. Andre Bonjour, who seemed at that time to be the obvious choice. Initially things went according to plan, but then difficulties arose. The first setback was that as John Pearson was approaching retirement, Andre did not pass the assessment procedure for the rank of Superintendent, even though he was the only candidate. As I recall the selection panel consisted of, myself, Wendy Kinnard, Andrew Lewis (who was then Assistant Minister for Home Affairs,) and a member of the Jersey Appointments Commission. The background was that the position had been advertised internally, but only Andre Bonjour had applied. He had been set some written project work, some letters to answer and had undertaken psychometric tests. The panel met to consider the preliminary results before planning the next stage which was a presentation and interview. It quickly became clear that all members felt that the standard of the work seen so far did not justify promotion without competition, and the position should be advertised again, and other potential local candidates should be encouraged to apply. This happened and Shaun Du Val was successful, and promoted to Superintendent on John Pearson's departure.

59. Soon afterwards Information was received which suggested that Andre Bonjour had failed to take action in respect ofsome earlier reports of child abuse. The concerns were such that South Yorkshire Police were asked by Lenny Harper to conduct an Investigation. This effectively put Andre Bonjour's career on hold. It will be necessary to return to the matters investigated by South Yorkshire later in this statement.

60. Running alongside these events was the succession plan for my own position. Political soundings indicated that approval of a succession plan was unlikely unless it offered the prospect of local succession and promotion. At this stage I perhaps ought to explain that an external appointment to the force was not within the political remit of the Minister for Home Affairs. She could only begin the process by producing a written proposal. Approval was also needed from the Ministers who controlled Housing and Public Sector Employment, and it was probable that the States Employment Board and the Jersey Appcifntments Commission woulq need to be involved. Even if approved by all of the above, It would be open to States members to discuss the plan, and If dissatisfied, to seek to have it overturned. This is the reality of island policing. What the force actually needs in terms of skills and experience is relegated to a side- issue. The overwhelming consideration is what can be achieved politically, and this is heavily dependent on the extent to which any plan for management succession favours locally qualified candidates. I still thought we needed an experienced "heavyweight" detective but it looked unlikely we were going to get one. I did however make it clear to both Wendy Kinnard and Andrew Lewis that I hoped the new D.C.O. would have current skills in the oversight of major crime enquiries. I was concerned that having failed to bridge the gap caused by the departure of John Pearson we would be left vulnerable until more local development could take place.

61. I met with Wendy Kinnard and Andrew Lewis. We discussed a draft succession plan. Basically it involved my existing contract being extended by a further three years to a total of ten years. This duration was chosen because it can, in some circumstances, trigger certain entitlements with regard to residency, should that be a preferred option. I made no secret of the fact that I wished to leave earlier, but the ten year contract was seen as a safeguard against the unforeseen, or a change in personal plans. It was then envisaged that we would recruit a new DCO from outside the island, and he or she would be designated as the next Chief Officer, subject to the requirement that this would enable locally qualified officers to be promoted into the consequential vacancies. When it was felt that locally qualified officers were ready to be promoted into the positions of D.C.O. and Superintendent Iwould retire and the succession plan would fall into place. The most probable candidates for the internal promotions were seen as Shaun Du Val for D.C.O. and David Minty for Superintendent. This plan then went forward into the political process, and the repercussions began.

62. Wendy Kinnard was the only female to hold Ministerial office in Jersey, and in my view she appeared to be under constant political pressure. She sometimes made comments on what she saw as the oppressive attitude of some Ministerial colleagues towards her. Her political influence was not strong. Her position was not helped by the fact that she did not always cope well with unforeseen media and polltical questions, sometimes becoming "flustered" and appearing confused. On occasions I would see the need to give interviews which "explained" or "clarified" something she had said. This had the side effect of providing an opening for further critical comment which raised questions regarding the chain of accountability, and sometimes challenges as to who was actually in charge of whom. In my view this was a symptom of the totally unsatisfactory arrangement whereby the Chief Officer is accountable to a single Minister. In the absence of a Police Authority or a governing Committee there is no mixture of strengths and weaknesses, no balance of views and no corporate strength to fall back on when under challenge. I have addressed this matter in greater detail in my Judicial Review applicat on, a copy of which is with the Investigating Officer. Nevertheless, in spite of the imperfections f the system, I believe that I was always Joyal and supportive of Wendy Kinnard during her ti e as President and then Minister for Home Affairs. I admired her political integrity, her progressive values, and her courage as a female working in a male dominated environment.

63. As soon as the succession plan became known, the political debate started. There were difficulties with other Ministers on matters of detail, and threats from some States members to put forward a vote of "no confidence" on the basis that Wendy Kinnard had not planned for local succession to the rank of Chief Officer. I spent some time preparing briefs, presentations and answers to questions, as we responded to the criticism. For a while the matter hung in the balance but we eventually seemed to secure the agreement of all of the relevant parties. Then two things happened which threatened the whole proposal. The first occurred when the then Chief Minister, Frank Walker, asked the Chief Executive, Bill Ogley, to email me and ask whether Andre Bonjour had been on the Senior Command Course, and if not, why not? I took this as the revival of a recurrent proposal, sometimes repeated in politics and radio phone-ins by a range of individuals, that Andre should be the Chief Officer. Leaving aside the absurdity of what was being suggested this was an example of an agreed plan being undermined from within the heart of government. The second event happened when for some reason Wendy Kinnard was absent from the States during questions to Ministers, and Andrew Lewis answered a question in relation to the succession plan. In the process he unexpectedly departed from his script. He said that the position of Deputy Chief Officer and Chief Officer designate would after all be open to local officers. I later learned from a reliable source that he had apparently spoken to Chief Inspector David Minty and suggested that he apply.

64. All of this was completely unexpected. For some reason I learned of it while at the local airport. I immediately rang my P.A. (REDACTED) and dictated an email to the Chief Executive asking whether there had been a change in government policy. As it was, the email was drafted but not sent as I met Andrew Lewis at the airport and dealt with the issue face to face. I recall I pointed out that I had agreed to serve beyond retirement age in order to deliver an agreed succession plan which would ensure that the force had a person with relevant skills and qualifications in a senior position, and that I was not inclined to continue on any other basis. Andrew back-peddled. As I recall he said that he had been misunderstood. I then helped him draft a "clarification" in which he said, that what he had actually meant was that there were currently officers with Jersey residential qualifications who were serving in UK forces and that these officers may well apply(none did.)

65. After a few further difficulties we eventually began the process of advertising and selection. By then, more time had lapsed. I had been hoping for a long handover between the new DCO and Lenny Harper, It was even possible that had a successor been identified earlier, and had the right approach been made, Mr Harper would have agreed to bring forward his retirement to facilitate the succession. All of this was now less probable due to the arguments and delays. The whole process left Wendy Kinnard exhausted. She had managed to stay firm under pressure, but had required strong support from myself. At the end of the process I was clear in my mind that we could not go through such an exercise again in the near future. We had to operate with the management resources we had, and try to bring the new appointment forward if that was possible. I have rehearsed all of this because there are some fundamental points which emerged:

While others played a role, the succession plan was mostly my plan and it was my determination and drive to bring it to fruition which enabled it to survive. Without my input there would have been no external appointment of a D.C.O., no appointment of David Warcup, nobody at D.C.O. rank with the relevant experience skills and qualifications to be considered for the position of Chief Officer, and no "Operation Haven" either, as I would have walked away and retired earlier. 

At some stage when the command of "Rectangle" is discussed, I might be asked "Why didn't you just bring a senior officer in from the outside." The above account is offered in order to bring a touch of realism to that suggestion.

66. Finally, it might be of benefit if I reiterate some key issues around the succession plan, and my agreement to serve beyond the normal retirement age of 60. Everyone knew that I was past the normal retirement age for my position, everyone knew that I had agreed to serve on to bridge a gap until others were ready to move into more senior positions Additionally, although it was not greatly discussed, everyone knew that my training and qualifications were becoming dated. Ministers knew it, Civil Servants knew it, and other senior officers knew it. It was a decision taken and owned by a whole range of senior figures, all of whom went into the arrangement with their eyes open. I have since read in the press that in England some Chief Constables who have agreed to serve beyond their retirement dates have been paid a significant "retention fee." I do not remember this being discussed in my case.

67. Mr Leonard Harper's Background and Experiences in the States Police.
I have indicated earlier, that at the selection stage it was noted Mr Harper had high standards, and that these were combined with Intrusive tendencies. It was foreseen that the combination of these attributes could generate tension in some quarters. It is however fair to say that there was some acceptance that, with the Force still in the aftermath of the 2000 H.M.I. report, a degree of robust management of performance and ethical issues was seen as overdue. At this point it might be of value to give some details of events prior to "Rectangle" in order to provide a history of attitudes and relationships. It is important to recognise that the enquiry developed against a background of previous experiences. Some of these experiences influenced how people subsequently behaved.

68. As Mr Harper settled into his role as DCO it became apparent that his intrusive approach to professional standards issues was revealing more problems than anyone had anticipated. A full account is not necessary, but it needs to be recorded that a significant number of staff left the force as a result of investigations into their conduct. Some of these staff had used their position for personal gain, and not all were police officers. Proportionately, civil servants became subject to investigation at about the same rate as police officers, and some of the attitudes displayed were revealing. For example, one member of staff, having been found to have ordered electronic equipment on the force account and taken it home, protested that such actions were a recognised "perk of the job."

69. There were also a number of covert professional standards operations against police officers who appeared to be working in a relationship with drug importation gangs. These relationships involved, among other things, the leaking of intelligence from police systems. Mr. Harper conducted these operations entirely within the resources of the force. He developed a circle of officers he could trust, and worked on a strict "need to know" basis. In a small force with one operating base, this created some unusual situations. I recall seeing four constables taking their meal together in the canteen. All had served in the force for some years and must have been colleagues at various stages. I knew that three of the constables had for some time, been engaged in the covert investigation of the fourth.  Yet there never seemed to be any compromise.

70. My Harper was particularly strong on diversity issues. People left the organisation having been found to have been engaged in sexual harassment. We also had what is believed to be the first case of dismissal in Jersey for racial abuse in the workplace. This proved to be controversial, particularly as racial abuse in public was not illegal. Running alongside this was the political agenda of Wendy Kinnard. As a politician I think that she could be fairly described as "liberal left." Her political agenda overlapped with Mr Harper's professional agenda. She was involved in groups which had been established to try and bring discrimination laws into force in Jersey. It was not Illegal to discriminate on the basis or race or gender, and she hoped to change this. I gave her periodic discreet support with a number of initiatives but the task proved too formidable, and her efforts made little progress. We had a little more success in relation to racial abuse. I worked, again with Detective Inspector Alison Fossey as I recall, to draft a law based partly on the English Public Oder Act which would have addressed some public order issues but also provided powers to deal with racial abuse. The first attempt to introduce the law failed, having been criticised as "political correctness." However, a weakened draft was introduced a year or two later and eventually came into force.

71. I also had some engagement on the general issue of corruption, It was in relation to this matter that an apparent oversight by the Home Affairs Department had adverse consequences which to some extent carried forward into Rectangle. In order that the matter can be fully understood, it Is necessary to draw attention to the late Lillie Langtry (1853-1929) who was reported to be the mistress of Edward VII. Miss Langtry holds the distinction of being the only person known to have been convicted of corruption in Jersey, in a case which, if I have heard it right, involved the bribing of a customs officer in relation to a passport. The Langtry case set a precedent in respect of any future prosecution. Shortly after my initial appointment I attended a meeting with politicians and law officers who were considering drafting a Jersey corruption law. It was said that in order for Jersey to retain approval as an international finance centre it was necessary to have such a law. I do not remember anyone saying that such a law was a good thing in itself. I believe that discussions continued for three or four years. I remember making a number of representations concerning what I thought to be the weaknesses in the draft law but I do not remember these being influential.

72. Eventually the Corruption Law was adopted by the States on 25th October 2005 and was sanctioned by the Privy Council on 9th May 2006. It was registered by the Royal Court on 26th May 2006. It was against this background that Mr Harper received information which drew his attention to the fact that one tow-away contractor had a near monopoly of police business. This was said to be a consequence of him providing gifts and favours to police officers. These included such things as free fuel, hire cars and use of accommodation in Spain. To shorten the story, a type of amnesty was agreed and in consequence about 20 police officers made statements describing a corrupt relationship with the contractor, who was a Mr Roy Boschat. Mr Harper caused the conduct of Boschat, and some police officers who had not come forward, to be investigated.

73. For some politicians and public figures this was the last straw. A political and media campaign was waged against Mr Harper. The core of the argument against him was that the award of business in exchange for favours was a traditional part of Jersey life and that Mr Harper was an intruder who was interfering in the "Jersey Way." Prominent in these attacks was Senator Ben Shenton. Running parallel with this was a letter campaign and personal threats to Mr Harper emanating from Boschat and his associates. The documents disclosed to me also make reference to letters from a Mrs Mauger. She is Boschat's sister and effectively Boschat under another name. At some stage files were submitted alleging offences under the Corruption Law. Not long afterwards I learned that lawyers were trying to see if Boschat's conduct fell within the parameters of the Langtry case. When I asked why, I was told that although the corruption law had been through the legislative processes, nobody had brought forward an "Appointed Day Act" to bring it into force. I have since been told that the responsibility for this rested with the Home Affairs Department and for some reason the need for an Appointed Day Act had apparently been overlooked. The consequence was that Boschat was not eligible for prosecution for corruption and effectively no action was taken. Apparently prompted by these events the Minister for Home Affairs brought forward an Appointed Day Act which was lodged on 2nd February 2007. Soon afterwards the law came into force as the "Corruption (Jersey) Law 2006."

74. There was however one further episode which led to Boschat appearing in court. The way this happened had some influence on how some issues relating to the abuse enquiry were approached. The chain of events began when Boschat gave evidence In the defence of a police officer who had been charged with disclosing information from police computers. As I recall, it was believed that the police officer and Boschat had a mutual interest in vehicles with unusual number plates. The belief was that police systems were being used to identity the owners of such vehicles in order that Boschat could consider purchase. When he was giving evidence Boschat appeared to say that he had on one occasion asked the police officer to check a police computer for owner details. I recall that Mr Harper obtained a transcript of the trial and caused further enquiries to be made. These further enquiries provided some corroboration of what Boschat had said in evidence.

75. A file was submitted to the Law Officers Department and a member of that department directed that Boschat be charged. My recollection is that Boschat was in the custody area waiting to be charged when two States Members went to see the Attorney General Mr William Bailhache, and made representations on Boschat's behalf. The States Members concerned were Deputies Colin Egre and Sarah Ferguson (who has since been elected Senator.) The Attorney General then intervened personally, and directed that Boschat should not be charged and that the papers be referred to him. This was done and nothing was heard for some weeks. At some point a journalist became interested and addressed a question to the Attorney General. Shortly afterwards Boschat was charged and later appeared in Court. I believe that there are some email exchanges involving Mr Harper and the Attorney General which will corroborate this sequence of events.

76. To conclude the story; at Boschat's trial, the Magistrate ruled that the main evidence against him, was that which he gave himself on oath when he was a witness, and that Its use would infringe his rights against self incrimination. Accordingly, he was acquitted. Nevertheless, I know that this episode was influential in shaping Mr Harpers views of the relationship between the law officers and politics, and that it entered his thinking when he considered how issues of arrest, advice and charge should be approached during "Rectangle."

77. Running parallel with this was a series of complaints made by Boschat against Mr Harper, alleging abuse of authority and related allegations. This in itself raised interesting questions. The D.C.O. is appointed by the Minister for Home Affairs and appears to be ultimately accountable to the Minister. There is no disciplinary code relating to the Deputy Chief Officer. The complaints by Boschat therefore raised interesting legal issues, and the advice of the Attorney General was sought on how they should be progressed and what, if anything, anyone was entitled to do should they turn out to be substantiated. Eventually I asked Devon and Cornwall Police to investigate. As is customary when a U.K. Force is invited to operate in Jetsey I ensured that they were given designated point of contact in the force to assist them with local laws and procedures. I have been told since, that none of the complaints were substantiated. The issue of who, if anyone has disciplinary powers in relation to the D.C.O. was not, so far as I recall, fully resolved.

78. These occurrences led to a series of attitudes and perceptions which impacted on future events. In some sections of society, Lenny Harper, Wendy Kinnard and to some extent myself, became regarded by some elements in the political community and the media as dangerous radicals, interfering in the islands traditional ways and poking our noses into places where we were not welcome. To others, Lenny Harper was a popular hero who was rattling the cage of those with reactionary attitudes and interests, and bringing a welcome and challenging approach. Mr Harper sometimes spoke of these things. He was confident that he was carrying out his duties in a proper manner, but felt that large sections of the political establishment were out to get him. He also felt that support from the Law Officers was weak, and that there was no real appetite for a challenging approach driven by values of fairness and integrity.

79. I have been asked by the investigating officer to make specific comment on my view of Mr Harper's strengths and weaknesses. His strengths were evident. He was hardworking, tenacious, and committed to maintaining high standards of conduct and performance. He was active in maintaining the traditional role of the Deputy of the Force In protecting my interests, and acting as an effective sounding board and gatekeeper on difficult issues. I could depend on his loyalty, and had no reservations regarding him being in charge of the force during my absence.

80. In addressing his less positive qualities some may expect me to speak of his ability to work in partnerships and his approach to professional standards issues. But in this respect, all was not as it is sometimes alleged to have been. I found him to be active and committed in respect of those partnerships where he felt that there was corresponding commitment on the part of other participants, and where there was a worthwhile and progressive agenda. For example, on his own initiative, he at one time formed a group representing minority Interests in the island. I forget the title of the group, but the purpose was to establish links and to provide a sounding board for the force, and a voice for less visible elements of the community. I recall that he established contacts with the gay community and with people of Portuguese heritage. I am aware that Stephen Regal, who later became a member of the Independent Advisory Group, may have been involved at some stage. He appears to touch upon the matter in his statement. For an alleged "dinosaur" Lenny Harper was remarkably active on progressive issues. However, he was not one for maintaining the appearance of a relationship where he felt that his commitment was not being reciprocated. He was no diplomat, and his distain for those who he regarded as unprofessional or obstructive to progress was sometimes visible. Over time he came to have a negative view of a number of Jersey Politicians, many of the senior figures in the public sector, and the Law Officers Department. In those cases he tended to manage relationships in a rather formal and professional way. I do not recall him being deliberately offensive in those relationships but there was no visible warmth either.

81. On professional standards issues he was direct and robust. Together we had inherited a viper's nest of problems and set about them with determination. Island police forces can present some challenging issues. It needs to be remembered that in Jersey people of all characters, backgrounds and positions in later life, often went to the same school, and in some cases are related to each other. This can create a network of relationships between police officers and other sections of the community. Sometimes this works to the advantage of the Force but at other times it can lead to the risk of compromise and similar problems. There is only one significant base of police operations, and any other premises used by the Force are only a few miles away. Unlike larger forces, problems cannot be addressed by the transfer of personnel. Nobody can be given a "fresh start" in another division. There are no other divisions. Problems have to be addressed directly. They cannot be passed to another group of senior officers in another place. Against this background Mr Harper brought to bear what I think can be fairly described as a low tolerance level on conduct issues. This was particularly noticeable where he felt that a member of staff was not responding to his agenda for improvement. Nevertheless it was not within his power to impose significant disclplinary sanctions. Any sanction beyond advice and warnings was a matter for me. I applied my own judgement. Sometimes my findings in disciplinary matters would support his view. Sometimes they very clearly did not. That is a matter of record.

82. He was a firm believer in the rehabilitation of offending officers wherever that was possible. Keith Bray, who has provided a witness statement, is an example. Keith was a good officer who went through a period of difficulty and had a series of disciplinary problems, all of which Lenny Harper addressed by advice, warnings, and changes of duties. As soon as it was felt that Keith had recovered his position Lenny was keen to bring him back into the fold. Keith was made acting inspector for part of the enquiry and trusted with high levels of responsibility. Some officers admired what Lenny had done in improving standards in the force, others disliked him intensely, That is the nature of things, It is not the role of the Deputy in a police force to be always popular. If It is, I know of nobody who has achieved It. I never did.

83. Finally, I was sometimes asked if I thought that Lenny could be a successor to my own position. Leaving aside the issue of qualifications, I thought not. The Chief Officer's position demands wider skills. I have to maintain a working relationship with all manner or people, some of whom I neither admire nor respect. This requires degrees of tact and diplomacy which were not Lenny's strongest skills. He was plain, personal and direct. He was best suited to the position he held, and the job he enjoyed.

84. The Handover to David Wacup and Related Issues.
Before I move to the next stage it may be appropriate to deal with some peripheral items raised in the statements of witnesses, but not part of the core of the allegations. I think that they are worth covering at this stage for a number of reasons. It might for example assist the Investigating Officer in gaining a better understanding of the background to the main events. It might also assist with an assessment of the credibility of some of the witnesses. The investigating officer may feel entitled to conclude that if some witnesses are not speaking the truth in respect of some marginal issues, they may be less credible in respect of core issues.

85. I see from my notebook that operations began at Haut de la Garenne on Tuesday 19th February 2008. The following morning I had my first face to-face meeting with David Warcup in my office at police headquarters. (Notebook 07/358 pages 78·80.) This had been preceded by a number of telephone conversations. Mr Warcup was a candidate for Mr Harper's position at the time, but already emerging as a person who was showing strong interest, and who appeared to have the qualifications and background suitable for the post. However, in reviewing his application at the short listing stage I had made notes and given advice in relation to the fact that he had only ever served in Northumbria Police. This was my only matter of concern at that time, but I saw it as significant. Having moved forces myself on a number of occasions I am aware of how unsettling the changes in culture and working practices can be, particularly when the new force is in a different legal jurisdiction. It is easy for a new-appointee to become unsettled by the change, and to retreat to the comfort zone of regarding the practices of their previous force as "the right way to do things" and everything in their new environment which is different as something which has to be changed. In policing terms Jersey is about as "different" as it is possible to get. I know that at various stages I alerted Mr Warcup to this danger and gave him examples from my own experience.

86. At our first meeting and In subsequent meetings and conversations, I spoke about the needs of the enquiry, and expressed the hope that succession could take place as early as possible. Once his appointment had been confirmed I encouraged him to think about how things could be taken forward after Mr Harper's departure, and consulted with him regularly when decisions needed to be taken in order to ensure that I was not acting in a way which was inconsistent with his intentions.

87. I offer one example at this time. Andre Baker, in paragraph 50 of his statement speaks of the need to discuss options with regard to who would be S.I.O after the departure of Lenny Harper. Paragraph 16.1 of the third Homicide Working Party report sets out a range of options. Paragraph 55 of Mr Baker's statement indicates that on 20th May 2008 I had a very open mind on the subject. Paragraph 71 of his statement speaks to events on 30th June 2008 when there was a meeting involving myself, David Warcup, and the Homicide Working Group. It can be inferred from the text that Mr Baker was expecting a discussion of the options. Instead he discovered that David Warcup was to take the strategic lead and that a S.I.O. was to be seconded from the U.K. He states "There was no further discussion on the options as he had made his mind up and was very strong about this." This is correct. I had consulted prior to the meeting with Mr Warcup and we had agreed that this was his preferred option. I then used the authority of my position to ensure that Mr Warcup got the management structure he wanted.

88. In all respects my handover to Mr Warcup was thorough and professional. It must be remembered that this was not an ordinary induction process. Mr Warcup had been agreed by Ministers as my successor. It was my understanding of the spirit of the succession plan that I should progressively withdraw from setting the policy for the force and allow Mr Warcup to gradually take the lead to the point where a handover could be seamless. I had no intentions of relinquishing my command in any formal sense, but I recognised that it would not be within the spirit of the plan for me to develop policy in a way which was not consistent with Mr Warcups longer term intentions. 

89. As soon as it became known that Mr Warcup was the successful candidate I began a series of contacts intended to facilitate his induction into the force. I asked if he could start as soon as possible, and take an early handover of the position of D.CO. (at that time held by Shaun Du Val in an acting capacity.) This would have enabled him to gain an early oversight of "Rectangle" and present me with plans to take it forward. He said that he could not do this, as his Chief Constable had commitments which required that he remain in Northumbria during his notice period. This was a setback. I felt that we were ready for a "fresh start" and an early handover would have been welcomed.

90. I nevertheless pressed ahead with a range of actions intended to ensure that he had a positive and welcoming introduction to the force. I arranged for the production of an induction programme which would allow him to visit key players in the force, the public sector and the wider community. My recollection is that my then staff officer, Jeremy Phillips administered this on my behalf, using templates which had been developed for previous newcomers. It was passed electronically between the forces until agreed by both parties. The induction programme should still be available to the investigating officer. I also gave a number of media interviews, making positive statements regarding Mr Warcup's background and achievements. I spoke to the Chief Executive to the Council of Ministers Bill Ogley regarding Mr Warcups role on the Corporate Management Board. Normally deputies and substitutes are not allowed. I made representations to the effect that an exception should be made in Mr Warcup's case given that he was my intended successor. After discussion this was agreed. I took him to a meeting of the Board and introduced him to key partners. Our joint presence should be recorded in the minutes.

91. Housing is always a difficult issue for newcomers to the island, Mr Warcup indicated that he preferred to rent a property. He also told me that there was a complication in that his wife had a dog to which she was attached. He had become aware that Jersey landlords normally specify that no dogs are allowed. On being told this I made use of local contacts and identified potential properties where the landlord may be willing to waive this consideration. I passed details to Mr Warcup. At some stage Liz Webster, who was the head of H.R. for Home Affairs approached me regarding a request she had received from Mr Warcup. She said that he had asked for his first three months rent to be paid by the force. The justification for this request being that Mr Warcup had said he had been unable to sell his house in England and would therefore be paying both mortgage and rent at the same time. I was told that this was not a usual entitlement but there was a degree of discretion, and if I gave my agreement then it could be done. I thought that the request was presumptive, and appeared to show an inappropriate attitude, but I nevertheless gave my agreement In the interests of good relations and a smooth transition.

92. A date was set for Mr Warcup to be sworn In at the Royal Court. I arranged positive media releases and media opportunities following the event. I accompanied him personally and introduced him to key individuals In the media and public life. I suggested "lines to take" which included maintaining the momentum of the enquiry. I recall that he used the material I had suggested during his Interviews.

93.At every stage during his induction I was positive and supportive. I made it clear that I regarded Rectangle as his operation, and although periodic briefings and updates would be welcomed, I would not interfere. I particularly assured him that I would not be giving any directions to Mick Gradwell. I would concentrate on the running of the force for the time being and would assess from time to time how the transition was developing and what advice, if any, I should give to the new Minister, when elected, regarding a possible handover of command. It may be remembered that Mr Warcup's induction to the force was taking place in August 2008. The elections for Senators and Deputies were due In October and November, and a new government would be appointed in December. The serving Chief Minister, the Minister for Home Affairs, and the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs, were not standing as candidates. Different people would be appointed to these key positions. It was therefore anticipated that in January 2009 there would be an opportunity to sit down with key individuals and discuss the future direction of the force, and the structure of its political and professional leadership. I took the view that no significant change of direction was appropriate in the meantime.

94. The working relationship with Mr Warcup appeared to be going well, but there were some negative signals. For example, he would persistently arrive late for meetings. It was my habit to insist that meetings would always start precisely on time. I believe that this is appropriate in a professional organisation, and assists in setting a businesslike tone. Mr Warcup seemed to make a point of being a few minutes late, and neither apologising nor offering comment. I tried not to take this as a deliberate slight and preferred to believe that he had formed this habit in a less professional organisation. I made the occasional comment but decided to wait a while before addressing the issue directly. I hoped at the time that he would gradually adjust to the requirements of his new environment.

95. There was one other negative episode which I remember well. This was the morning on which we were both booked to undertake our Officer Safety Programme (O.S.P.) training. I was conscious that my annual qualification was due for renewal and had asked for my own training to be at a time when Mr Warcup was available. So far as I recall, it was in his induction programme, and would certainly have been in his diary. While I am not familiar with requirements elsewhere, local procedures necessitate that officers are O.S.P. trained at all times, and particularly when undertaking uniform patrols. As Chief Officer of the Force I patrol in uniform on a regular basis, Including occasional night shifts, late night shopping, and special  events. During these patrols I attend operational incidents on the same basis as any other police officer. Over the years of my command this has led to an expectation in the community that their Chief Officer of Police will be visible and accessible. Such patrols also afford an opportunity for informal feedback from the community and States members. Patrols during the lunchtime break in States sittings can be a useful opportunity for chance encounters and informal meetings.

96. On the morning in question I had changed into my tracksuit and was ready to go downstairs to undertake the training when David Warcup appeared, He had not changed from his office clothes. He said that he had remembered another commitment and could not do the O.S.P. training after all. I then went ahead without him. This did nothing for his credibility as staff became aware of what had happened. By this time a picture was emerging of a somewhat bookish individual who was perhaps less comfortable with the visible leadership aspects of his role, Nevertheless, I still felt at that time that although his development needs were greater than anticipated, they were still capable of being addressed.

97. I now turn to some of the other negative comments which feature variously in the statements of Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell. Both seem to think that I do not work long enough hours. This is untrue. I am either at work or available for duty 24/7. I rarely take days off and hardly ever take "proper" holidays. During leave periods I am either available locally or attending to family matters in the U.K. I live a few minutes walk from my office and have created a small office in a spare bedroom of my home. That office was connected to police l.T. systems. I also kept a police radio at home. I sometimes prefer to study files and documents at home rather than in the headquarters environment. That Is not an unusual way of working. My notebooks show much of my recorded work activity. It can be seen that I frequently record the fact that I am undertaking clerical work on evenings, weekends, and public holidays. In most of those occasions I will also have used force l.T. systems, either to communicate, or to monitor operational events. The investigating officer will be able to verify this.

98. It ls also said that I pay frequent visits to the gymnasium at the police station. It ls true that I do this approximately three times a week. It is a good habit and I recommend it. Mostly it is at lunchtime but occasionally it is at other times. I do not take proper lunch breaks. Normally I have either a quick bowl of soup in the canteen, or, if I am busy, a sandwich in my office. I am a police officer. I need to maintain a level of fitness to carry out my duties.

99. Mr Warcup suggests that I allocated him a disproportionate amount of cover duties. He is missing the point. We are an island force. For the senior leadership there Is no time off, there are no days off, and there is no "off duty". I am permanently available when on the Island. I suggested that Mr Warcup took "first call" for a while in order that staff could become accustomed to dealing with him, and to enable him to establish a profile. I also made it clear that I would be available at the same time, and that he should speak to me whenever he felt the need, He did this when issues arose regarding Chief Inspector John Sculthorp. He set out a proposed course of action which I discussed with him. I recall that his plan was agreed with some minor changes. (Notebook 08/95 page 79.) In any event calls off duty are rare. Weeks can pass without a call being received. It is barely an imposition for an experienced senior officer.

100. Mr Gradwell suggests that I spend a disproportionate number of lunchtimes at the Rotary Club. (Presumably I do this when not in the gymnasium or when I have not gone home early.) He is wrong. The Rotary Club of Jersey has a meeting programme which includes one lunchtime meeting per month. About a year ago I received a warning letter for poor attendance. I ought to add that the club is active in supporting community initiatives in which the police are partners. My attendance at any time can be justified on that basis alone. The keeper of the club attendance register is Mr Chris Barney, who lives near La Rue de Samares. His full contact details are in the public domain.

101. Mr Gradwell says that I did not discuss the enquiry with him in detail. He is right about that. I made it clear that I would not cut across his line of management which was to Mr Warcup, with whom I was in regular contact regarding Rectangle and other issues. I did however ensure that I personally welcomed him and checked that we were doing all that we could to support his secondment. He confirmed that this was the case, and made particular positive comment regarding some extra travel arrangements which had been made to enable his wife to visit. I did warn him about the local sensitivities to high profile "outsiders,'' and gave him some general advice regarding the need to show respect for these sensitivities and local traditions. I also warned him that his presence as S.I.O. was a disappointment to the expectations of some local officers, and that he should not be intrusive beyond his allocated role. He had been seconded for a limited period to undertake a specific task and nothing more. That part at least fell on stony ground. He had not been seconded long when Superintendent Shaun Du Val alerted me to an email chain which referred to the need for the Law Officers to interview and select a Police officer for a secondment. I recall that the Law Officers Department had asked for a "representative of the force" to take part in the process and Mick Gradwell had, for some reason, allowed himself to be selected by the Law Officers Department for that role. This set a number of alarm bells ringing among the Operations Management team. The controversy which followed the appointment of John Pearson came to mind.

102. There was clearly a view within the force management team that this was evidence of a "plot" to retain Mr Gradwell in a senior position in the force to the detriment of local succession. I assured Shaun Du Val that I had no knowledge of the matter, and that there was no plot. Shaun made some contact with the relevant parties and smoothed things over. I recall that he later told me that it would be best if I did not get further involved. I believe that this episode showed that Mr Gradwell had not absorbed the simple advice I had given him. I cannot think how I could have made it simpler. Moreover, on reading his witness statement I see that he has not learned from the experience. At paragraph 33 he appears to say that he is joint third In seniority in the force. Unless something is going on which has so far not been made public, he is not a member of the force at all. He is a member of Lancashire Constabulary seconded to work temporarily in the Island for a limited purpose. If he persists in taking any different position it will be damaging to morale and lead to understandable tensions in the management team.

103. I now turn to one of the lighter features of the allegations, which is Mr Gradwell's assertion that I did not acknowledge or speak to him at a reception held prior to a community service at St Heller Parish Hall. Apparently he wishes to complain about this. I remember the event in question. I saw that Mick Gradwell was there, and I think that I acknowledged him across the room. It Is possible that I did not speak to him. This would be because I was circulating among the visitors and members of the public who were present. In my view events of this kind are too often characterised by groups of police officers huddled together, to the detriment of the purpose of the occasion. I did not see Mr Gradwell circulating. He seemed to be spending his time In close discussion with David Warcup. When the event started I chose to sit among people who were not police officers. As I recall I was seated close to the Dean of Jersey and his wife, with whom I had some conversation. I noted that Mick Gradwell was seated in the row behind. He was next to David Warcup. I consider Mr Gradwell's complaint to be childish, frivolous, and unbecoming of a senior police officer.

104. I now turn to a matter of more substance. In paragraph 515 of his statement David Warcup refers to the locked cabinet in my office and states "I established that Mr POWER refused to disclose the combination of the safe as a result of which I arranged for a locksmith to attend." It is untrue that I refused to provide details of the combination. I note that Mr Wayne Bonne was present when the cabinet was opened. I understand that Mr Bonne Is a member of the Wiltshire force and is assisting the investigating officer. By virtue of his presence he appears to be a witness in this matter. I am content for the Investigating officer to come to his own assessment of what implications, if any, this has for Mr Bonne's role in this enquiry.

105. The true facts, which can be supported by documents and witness evidence, are as follows. In early December 2008 I received notification that the combination for the cabinet had been requested. This request came to me by way of a telephone call from Liz Webster, who is my appointed contact with the Force and States Departments. I agreed at once to provide the combination. I provided a written authority for the cabinet to be entered for legitimate purposes, and asked that Advocate Lakeman, who was acting as a friend and advisor at that time, be present to represent my interests. On 15th December 2008 Mr Ian Crich, who had previously been authorised to communicate on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, wrote and confirmed that the arrangement was agreed and that a Mr Phil Wells would be the point of contact. I placed the combination in a sealed envelope and handed it to Advocate Lakeman. On 22nd December Mr Crich wrote again. He confirmed that there had been contact between Advocate Lakeman and Mr Wells but added that Mr Warcup was objecting to the agreed arrangements. On the 9th January 2009 Mr Crich wrote again and stated that Mr Warcup was not willing to proceed on the basis of the agreement which had been reached in our correspondence. This was in spite of the fact that Mr Crich had apparently been authorised to deal with the matter on the Ministers behalf. I sent a reply dated 12th January 2009 indicating that I was taking advice.

106. On 13th January 2009 my professional representative, Dr Timothy Brain, Chief Constable of Gloucestershire, wrote to the Minister confirming my continued willingness to assist in this matter and offering two senior police officers as possible alternative representatives to be present on my behalf. They were the Conneteble of St Helier and the Chef-de-Police of St Peter. The letter from Dr Brain was ignored. No acknowledgement or reply was ever received. I later learned that the cabinet had been opened and that no person representing my Interests had been present. In the light of these events it is my position that nothing in my conduct in relation to access to the cabinet was in any way unreasonable. I was professional and cooperative at every stage and certainly nothing done on my part amounted to a refusal to disclose the combination. I consider that the statement made In relation to this matter by Mr Warcup is deliberately false and misleading In a way which is calculated to misrepresent my actions, and damage my interests.

107. Finally, in this section of the report, I note that Mr Warcup states that I lack interest and motivation. He is wrong in that assessment. I have a longer experience in the police service than anyone I know, I do not get animated, I do not get excited and I never panic. I am calm, controlled and give good advice, particularly in respect of the complexities of managing a police service in Jersey. One of Mr Warcup's problems Is that he would not listen to my advice. Anyone who doubts my stamina and ability to deal with long and complex challenges has not been paying attention for the previous eight months. I will deal with other matters raised by Mr Warcup later in this statement.

108. Other Matters Relevant to the Reliability of some Witnesses.

I now hope to cover briefly some peripheral issues, which may assist the investigating officer In an assessment of the credibility of some witnesses. The first relates to the statement of Andrew Lewis dated 6th January 2009. The statement says a number of things which are not true. However, the claim which can most readily be checked is at paragraph 19 in which Mr Lewis states that I "dismissed" allegations of bullying and harassment made by customs and immigration staff working in the joint intelligence bureau. This is untrue. When I became aware of these allegations I caused them to be registered as formal complaints, and they were notified to the Police Complaints Authority. The allegations were fully investigated and one was found to be substantiated. One police officer was given formal words of advice. Deputy Lewis was updated on the progress and the outcome of these complaints during the course of the Ministers meetings with myself and senior staff to which he refers elsewhere in his statement. The investigating officer should have little difficulty in verifying this.

109. I now turn to the case of the documentation given to me at the time of my suspension, which has already been subject of correspondence dating back over eight months, and is currently subject of an appeal under the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982. Copies of the relevant documents are in the possession of the investigating officer. In their statements both Mr Ogley and Mr lewis taken together appear to claim that the letter notifying me that I would be subject of the disciplinary process was created on the morning of the suspension itself, namely Wednesday 12th November 2008, or at the earliest the previous evening, and was in consequence of information they were given on the 11th November 2008. Neither Mr Ogley or Mr Lewis make any reference In their statements either to the letter from the Minister to the Chief Executive which is required under paragraph 2.1.1, of the code in order to initiate the disciplinary process, or to the letter of suspension itself. However, both seem to claim that the decision to activate the disciplinary process was taken in consequence of information received on the 11th November 2008, and by implication, not before.

110. My initial views of these events are covered in more detail in my two affidavits copies of which are in the possession of the investigating officer. When I first examined the three documents I felt that they were not consistent with what I was being told about the sequence of events and the decision making process. Firstly, they are unusually legalistic and complex. They seem to be the product of significant thought and preparation. It is not immediately evident that they could have been produced within the timescale apparently claimed. Secondly, the suspension letter refers to a meeting earlier In the day which everyone agrees did not happen. No explanation is offered for this by anyone. It Is just left hanging in the air. There is also the question of the order in which the different documents were created. For example, was the letter confirming the suspension created before or after the letter initiating the disciplinary process? Even If it was afterwards, what was the gap between the two, and, what consideration took place during that period?

111. I have sought the disclosure of this material for a variety of reasons, one of which is to test the truthfulness of the official account of the decision to suspend. If key figures have lied about this, they may have also lied about other things. My attempts to obtain this information have proved to be challenging. Jersey does not have a freedom of Information law and the political culture is one which gives priority to confidentiality over transparency. There is a Code of Practice on Access to Information. It can, with effort, be found on the States website. Civil servants are not trained in its use, nor are they encouraged to use it. I have nevertheless sought this information under the Code, but at the time of writing the disclosure of the information continues to be refused, and nothing has been provided. It is of course a matter for the investigating officer to consider to what extent this issue is relevant to the credibility of some key witnesses. I offer the view that in the context of the determined refusal which currently extends over eight months, to provide basic information, it is almost beyond belief that there is nothing to hide. In my view the refusals and the evasions speak for themselves. Something occurred which is not consistent with the official account of the decision to suspend, and there is a determination at the highest level to prevent the truth being known.

112. It may be of assistance to point out that Mr Ian Crich appears to be a key player in both the issues over access to the secure cabinet, and the suspension process. I am told that Mr Crich is now working in the U.K. and therefore presumably beyond the influence of the Jersey authorities. The value or otherwise of Mr Crich as a witness may be something which the Investigating officer may wish to consider.

113. Equivocation in the Use of the Term "Chief Officer."

Collin's dictionary defines "Equivocate" as "to use vague or ambiguous language in order to deceive someone or to avoid telling the truth." Equivocation has a long history in the English language, and In religion and politics. During periods of religious persecution in the 15th and 16th centuries, it was taught and written about as a doctrine by means of which believers could provide misleading answers to questions without committing the sin of lying. In more recent times equivocation has been used by political speech writers, and sometimes lawyers, to construct misleading arguments. The skill in equivocation is to shift the meaning or a word or phrase in mid argument in order to justify a conclusion which "sounds right" but is in fact Invalid.

114. Equivocation does not necessarily Involve deception. There are a number of examples in popular speech which equivocation is used to convey a meaningful statement. A common example is the phrase "boys will be boys." Taken literarily, this statement is entirely tautological. "Boys will be boys," appears to be in the same category as "yellow is yellow" or "hot Is hot," that is, the phrase Is circular and provides no information. Yet when I say "boys will be boys" I am communicating a message. This is because I am equivocating. In "boys will be boys" the first use of the word "boys" refers to young men. The second use of the word "boys" refers to persons who are inclined to mischief. Thus by means of equivocation I am able to convey a meaningful statement without deception.

115. I now invite consideration of the following:

There are rules which apply to Chief Officers. 
Mr Power is a Chief Officer,
Therefore the rules apply to Mr Power. 

116. This statement, if made in the context of "Rectangle," would have many of the classic features of a deceptive argument based on equivocation. The equivocation is in the change of meaning of the term "Chief Officer''. The first time It is used It appears to relate to persons who are eligible to be a member of the Association of Chief Police Officers In England, Wales and Northern Ireland (A.C.P.O.). The second time it is used it appears to relate to the head of the Police Service In Jersey. They are two different things. The argument may appear at first sight to be valid, but when the equivocation is understood the argument collapses. It fails because it seeks to provide a single conclusion in relation to two separate categories of person. I will deal with the second of the two different meanings of the term "Chief Officer" first.

117. It has been explained earlier in this statement that the position of the Chief Officer of the States Police is a unique position, which ls not directly comparable to any corresponding position in the British Isles. The head of the force just happens to be called the "Chief Officer," There are two main reasons for this. The first is that "Chief Officer" is the term used to describe the executive head of a public service in Jersey. For example, the head of the health service is a "Chief Officer," the head of Education is a "Chief Officer" and so on. We meet as a group of "Chief Officers" to co-ordinate policy for the public sector. Another reason why I am called a "Chief Officer" is to avoid confusion with the role of the Connetables (or "Constables") who are elected representatives of their Parish, and are legally responsible for policing and prosecutions within their jurisdiction. 

118. For similar reasons the head of the police service in Guernsey is also called a "Chief Officer.'' In the Isle of Man the head of the force is called a "Chief Constable," and in Gibraltar he is called a "Commissioner." If I had been called a "Commissioner" then the comparison with the role of a "Chief Officer" would not appear to be quite so straightforward. Yet all that would be different would be the name.

119. I now turn to the term "Chief Officer" as it may be understood In England. As I understand It the term is applied to any police officer above the rank of Chief Superintendent, and
civilian member of staff operating at executive level with a direct line of reporting to a Chief Constable. (There may be some minor exceptions, but they are not Important for the current purpose.) Furthermore, it is commonly understood that when the term "Chief Officer" Is, used in the context of the conduct or oversight of significant operations it is nearly always addressed to Operational Assistant Chief Constables. In putting forward this view I find some suppport in the statements of Mr Gradwell and Mr Warcup.

120. For example, in paragraphs 9 and 10 of his statement Mr Gradwell speaks of major crime investigations and says "Dependant on the type of Investigation a Gold Group would be formed or I would report to a Detective Chief Superintendent. For example in relation to the Morecbmbe Bay Tragedy I would report weekly to a Detective Chief Superintendent and monthly to Gold Group.  The Gold Group would usually be chaired by an officer of Assistant Chief Constable rank."

121. David Warcup, who has never been appointed to head a police force states in paragraph 31 of his statement "As previously mentioned, I have almost ten years experience as a Chief Officer of Police before transferring to the States ofJersey Police.'' In paragraph 34 he states "As a chief  Officer of Police  I have had experience In ........ including the management and oversight of serious and organised crime investigation." He then goes on to list training and qualifications he has attained as a Chief Officer. The Investigating Officer may also note that his training in relation to major crime investigation took place in 2003, when he was an Assistant chief Constable,and two years before he was promoted to Deputy Chief Constable. There appears to be no record of any training in respect of criminal investigation since that promotion.

122. Equivocation in relation to the term "Chief Officer" Is used extensively throughout the evidence in Operation Haven. Three examples may suffice at this time. Mark Houze is apparently drawn into discussing the responsibilities of a "Chief Officer" in paragraphs 51and 52  of his statement. I am sure that his equivocation is unintentional but it is equivocation nevertheless. Bryan Sweeting equivocates throughout his statement. His criticism of my role would not work otherwise. Andre Baker, in his second statement, uses the term "Chief Officer" in an equivocal way but adds at paragraph 6 "It must be remembered that Lenny HARPER was also o Chief Officer."

123. For the avoidance of doubt my position is that I am a "Chief Officer" in Jersey, and nowhere else. The term "Chief Officer" has been applied to my post for purely local reasons. It has been used locally for more than 50 years. It is the local term for the head of a public service, and at no time has it ever been recorded that its use locally is intended to enable a comparison to be made with the duties of a person who may be called a "Chief Officer" in another jurisdiction. The term "Chief Officer'' as used in various guidelines which are said to apply to police services in England has a completely different meaning. For most operational purposes the term when used under English guidelines applies to Assistant Chief Constables; a rank I ceased to hold in 1994. I do not regard myself as a "Chief Officer" within the terms of the English guidelines nor do I regard it as fair or reasonable that such a direct comparison should be made. 

124. Operation Rectangle and its Significance to the Force and to the Island. 

I have been asked to write about "The significance and impact of OP Rectangle to the SOJP and the Island ofJersey." The belief that there have been cases of child abuse which have not been properly addressed, and "cover ups" to protect senior figures, has been a feature of island life for some years before I was appointed in 2000. I have direct knowledge of some of the events which have happened since that time. In respect of most of the earlier cases I can only repeat what I have been told, or, as I am currently denied access to files and records, repeat what I am able recall from my previous reading of the subject.

125. The issue has also been part of a major political divide. Prominent and active in this debate has been Senator Stuart Syvret. He also features in some of the witness statements. He is a controversial local politician, who is noted for his anti-establishment views. He has a significant number of supporters in politics and the wider community. From some of the evidence offered by witnesses who have provided statements during the course of this enquiry, the Investigating Officer may have felt that he was being encouraged to take a view that the Senator was some form of marginalised "crank" figure, whose opinions should be taken lightly. That would not, in my view, be an accurate assessment. Senator Stuart Syvret is the island's current longest serving politician. Although he has not faced an election in recent years, he sometimes claims, on the basis of historical results, that he is also the islands most popular politician. That might be arguable, but it could also be true. As a professional police officer I recognise that I should try to avoid expressing a view on a political figure. However, given that he is a common thread which runs through much of the background to this enquiry, I find that hard to avoid. In any event it might be appropriate be deal with this now and then move on to other things, While I cannot support many of the things which Senator Syvret says and does, I nevertheless see value in his contribution to the political process. He brings a spirit of challenge which is often lacking in local political debate. He is a determined, committed and interesting person, and a politician who most ordinary people, or individuals who are disadvantaged, would trust. In a community which is sharply divided into "us" and "them" he is apparently seen my many people as one of "us."

126. In the interests of transparency I disclose that I have been on friendly terms with Senator Syvret and his partner, Deputy Carolyn Labey. She ls also a hard-working and dedicated politician. Some time before "Rectangle" became a big Issue Carolyn Labey invited my wife and I to a small social event held at the farmhouse where they both lived. Stuart Syvret was present. Nothing of a sensitive nature was discussed. Since I have been suspended both Stuart and Carolyn have initiated contact. I have told them that it would be best if this contact ceased for the time being. Shortly after my suspension I met with Senator Syvret in my capacity as his constituent. The meeting took place in St Helier Parish Hall and the Connetable of St Helier was present as a witness. We discussed issues relating to the suspension and my representations to have it overturned. Neither at this meeting, nor at any other time have I discussed operationally sensitive matters with Stuart Svvret. There have been no "leaks" and no secretive contacts. My dealings with him have been either entirely professional, or have constituted a
legitimate exercise of my common-law right to communicate with my elected representative.

127. Shortly after I was appointed as Chief Officer I remember being told about a case of abuse which had resulted in the conviction of a member of staff from Victoria College. This establishment is a boys' school which is regarded by some as the "Eton College" of Jersey. It is where many of the future leaders of the Jersey establishment are educated. The offences involved a male teacher who was sexually abusing students. Some of the abuse was said to have taken place on a boat at sea. The sexual abuse of boys in boats at sea was to be a common feature in many of the allegations preceding and surrounding "Rectangle." The teacher was convicted, and so far as I know, sentenced to imprisonment. I later learned that some Police officers involved in the Investigation claimed that they had been denied resources and support during their enquiries. There were stories that evidence and notes had gone missing, and that senior officers may have been obstructive towards the enquiry. It was also said, and I think I have seen a report to that effect, that the College authorities had not been cooperative, and some police officers had been shocked at the attitudes to abuse which they had encountered. It was alleged that the abuse of boys had been described by one person as a "perk of the job" or some phrase of that nature. I believe that the South Yorkshire Police enquiry, commissioned by Lenny Harper, touched upon some of these issues, and some of the officers involved in the original investigation have provided statements to that enquiry.

128. There were also rumours regarding a couple known as the Maguires. Some years before my appointment they had been charged with the physical abuse of children In a States run home but charges had been dropped. The case re-surfaced during Rectangle. On one occasion I received information which caused me to speak to the Attorney General. I told him my information (which had been provided to me In consequence of an overheard conversation in a departure lounge at Gatwick) was that a camera crew and journalist were on their way to Jersey to do some background work on the Maguires. They then intended to travel to France and "doorstep" Mr and Mrs Maguire. The Attorney General told me that they would find Mr Maguire difficult to doorstep as he had been dead for years. He had been seriously ill with cancer when the charges were dropped, and had died not long after. It is fair to say that the Attorney General was not the only person to hold this belief. It was accepted "common knowledge" that Mr Maguire was dead. The appearance not long afterwards of a rather fit and angry looking Mr Maguire on television, came as an interesting surprise. I was later told the Maguires had been working as caretakers in France. Their "caretaking" apparently Involved 
looking after the second homes of some Jersey residents.

129. I recall a case which occurred a few years after I was appointed. It involved a senior civil servant who was suspected of accessing child pornography on the internet. The civil servant was a person who was seen as a rising star In the public sector, and a potential Chief Officer. He was also a senior member of the local sea cadets. This caused some "need to know" Issues due to the fact that Chief Inspector Andre Bonjour was also a senior member of that organisation. A warrant was executed, but It was found that the suspect's computer had been wiped the previous evening. Nevertheless, after some detailed computer forensic work he was convicted. There were other enquiries relating to alleged abuse within the sea cadets, but Ido not have the details. I was however told that there was one other case in which a computer had been wiped, shortly before an arrest. I cannot remember more about that case.

130. In the period following my appointment I periodically had occasion to be concerned regarding standards and performance in what was then called the "Family Protection Unit" or something of that nature. it was the unit which dealt with child protection issues, and Is now known as the Public Protection Unit or P.P.U. Around 2006 these concerns Increased, following a number of reports and incidents. I can only remember one in any detail. I recall that a parent wrote to me complaining that her child had been abused, and that the unit were taking too long to deal with the case. I ought to add that, at the initial phase, I deal personally with all correspondence addressed to me. This is possible in a small force. There were also allegations that phone calls to the unit from the writer of the letter, had not been returned. Rather than go through the chain of command, I rang the unit direct. Iasked for an update on the case and was told that this was not available as the Detective Sergeant was on leave and only he would know about it. This alerted me to the fact that there did not seem to be any case tracking system in the unit. A later report on the management of the case revealed issues which were dealt with either by Mr Harper or line management.

131. I was clear that this was an area in which we were vulnerable and I therefore initiated a series of events which led to the re-structuring of the relevant areas of the C.l.D, and a decision to place Alison Fossey in charge of Public Protection and some other units, on her promotion to Detective Inspector. I see from his statement that David Minty expresses some dissatisfaction with these changes and appears to feel that his position as head of C.l.D. was not respected. I can understand why he may feel that way, but it is my view that he had a solution imposed upon him because he had failed to deliver a solution himself. I would also add it is my recollection that the whole re-structuring proposal went through the normal policy process and was later approved by the Minister for Home Affairs, who at that time was Wendy Kinnard, in consequence of a written paper which I submitted to her. I also recall that the position was advertised and that only Alison Fossey, who had a background in that type of work, applied for the post.

132. D.I. Fossey was asked to self-inspect the department using a template obtained from H.M.l.C. The results were very negative. There was no effective workload management, and an absence of formal Information sharing agreements with partner agencies. I supported her in making the necessary changes and assisted with drafting and then signing-off the relevant partnership agreements.  

133. The lesson I took from this was that the Force had been part of the problem. The widespread belief that there was "no point" In reporting child abuse in Jersey applied not just to cynicism regarding the criminal justice system, but also to the police. There were legends and rumours that cases had been "buried" by the police, prosecutors, and the Courts. I also realised that once D.I. Fossey had put her changes in place and gained trust and credibility, then the number of reported offences might increase. They did.

134. As soon as it became clear that the police would take abuse issues seriously and deal with them in a professional manner, the number of reports increased. The latest figures that I have seen, which were published in late 2008, indicate that following "Rectangle" this increase was recorded as being 152%. I have not had access to figures on the number of reports prior to Rectangle, but I imagine that the difference since then will be significant. I will return to Alison Fossey's early tenure in the department and what it revealed later in this section. 

135. I now turn to a case which had a fundamental effect on relations between the Force, government representatives, and the leadership of the public sector. This was a case in which two local men had abused a boy who was also a sea cadet. As far as I am aware the men did not have a direct connection with the sea cadets as an organisation, but they owned or had access to a boat. I do not recall that I had any knowledge of the case during the time that It was current. I think I first became aware when a Serious Case Review (S.C.R.) report was circulated. I did not think the S.C.R. document was a very good report. It raised more questions than answers and skimmed over the really difficult Issues. I was not surprised when Senator tuart Syvret, who at that time was the Health Minister, criticised the report and raised a number of questions. Some of these were directed at the police and were of a critical nature. I was not troubled by this. I thought that the way to deal with his questions was to provide honest answers. I recall that I asked for Information and a response was sent to the Senator. I soon learned that those in charge of the island's government did not intend to take the same approach.

136. What happened thereafter is touched upon in more detail in my first affidavit. In brief, a plan was formed, apparently in the Chief Minister's Department, to respond to Senator Syvret's questions by removing him from his position as Health Minister. This began in what was effectively a "pincer movement", which commenced on Wednesday 25th July 2007. Two groups met at the same time in different government buildings. One was a sub-group of the Corparate Management Board, at which I was present, and the other was a meeting of the Child Protection Committee, at which Alison Fossey was present. Neither of us was aware of what was intended. 

137. It was put to both groups that it would be appropriate for us to express "no confidence" in Senator Syvret as Minister. This would enable the Chief Minister to ask the Council of Ministers to take a similar line before referring the matter to the States as a whole. I objected to what was being proposed and refused to become involved. I was asked by the Chief Executive to leave the meeting. On doing so I discovered that Alison Fossey had left her meeting on similar grounds. We both made notes soon afterwards. (Notebook 07/120 pages 51-58) To complete this account, the Child Protection Committee did in fact pass a vote of "no confidence" in Senator Syvret as Minister for Health and Social Services. I am not aware of any similar resolution passed on behalf of the Corporate Management Board. However, following a subsequent "no confidence" vote by the Council of Ministers, the matter was put to the States as a whole and Senator Syvret was removed from office. I recall that he was succeeded by Senator Ben Shenton.

138. This was one of a series of events which contributed to tension between the force an:d the political leadership of the island. We did not agree on how the build-up of allegations and concerns regarding abuse issues was to be managed. I was, and still am, very clear that the only way to bring the growing crisis to an end was to Investigate what was being alleged, and to take enquiries to a point where there was nothing more to be done. My Impression of those in government was that they just wanted the whole issue to go away, I have thought in some detail about this divide and what lies beneath it. Ithink it is cultural. The police service has, In recent years, placed heavy emphasis on operating in a way which is ethical and defensible. I mentioned earlier in this statement that I had some marginal involvement In these developments. On the other hand I do not think that ethics plays a big part in Jersey political thinking. Apart from discussions with Senator Wendy Kinnard, I cannot remember ever having a discussion at senior government or public service level which had an ethical dimension. I cannot remember anyone ever arguing for or against a particular policy because it was right or wrong. Discussion always seems to be about delivering to an agenda on budget and "protecting the reputation of the island" (usually meaning the reputations of those engaged in the discussion.) Jersey political life sometimes appears to be obsessed with reputation. It was against this background that "Rectangle" began to take hold.

139. I cannot remember the exact day "Rectangle" started. If the date is in the large folders of documents provided to me then I apologise for not finding it. In the context of some of the investigations conducted by the force it was not a major event. Alison Fossey felt that there were a number of linked reports relating to the Sea Cadets and to Haut de la Garenne. She was given authority to explore further. At some point the operational name "Rectangle" was allocated. I suspect that the operational name will initially have been for budget purposes. The enquiry had a potentially significant impact if details became public, but so did a lot of other enquiries running at the time. I have written earlier about the high level financial crime investigations in which the force has a role. Some are highly sensitive, and have potential major implications for international finance and politics. In some cases meetings are held with the major intelligence agencies in the U.K. and with law enforcement and similar agencies from around the world. We manage all of these enquiries in the same way. Somebody has lead responsibility and a line manager exercises oversight. If there are developments which I need to know about, or which need to be discussed, this is usually done in a closed session after the daily 9 a.m. meeting. We do not have "Gold Groups" or "Strategic Oversight Boards" or anything of that nature. We are a small force. We all know each other and speak to each other every day. If we have problems we sort them out by personal contact. I have described the force meeting cycle earlier in this statement. It is sufficient for the needs of the force. We do not need complex paraphernalia designed for forces twenty times our size.

140. At some stage Alison Fossey brought to my notice reports and statements relating to the abuse case which had led to the Serious Case Review and the eventual dismissal of Senator Syvret as Minister for Health. She drew attention to evidence which indicated that when under investigation, the offenders had been in text contact with a former senior detective, and that the contact seemed to be intended to obtain information regarding police enquiries. The former detective had never been interviewed about this matter. The case was by then about a year old or even older. A decision was taken to ask the former detective to attend the police station for interview. He attended, but would not answer questions. Not long afterwards it was learned by legitimate means that shortly after the interview he made a long telephone call to a former senior officer. Both persons are known members of the yachting fraternity. I understand that the failure ta interview the farmer detective when the opportunity first arose was one of the issues covered in the South Yorkshire enquiry.

141. This and other emerging evidence brought a new dimension to the enquiry. Alleged offenders were being named by victims and witnesses, and some were former police officers. Others were persons In senior positions in the public sector. This was discussed with Mr Harper and It was agreed that he should maintain oversight of the enquiry, and that the "need to know" principles which had applied in previous professional standards enquiries, should be applied to Rectangle. This of course had the negative side effect of isolating some of the force management team from the enquiry. It was felt at the time that this was unavoidable, Until there was a clearer picture of who may be accused or compromised by the growing number of allegations, the enquiry would have to be closely managed between Lenny Harper and Alison Fossey.

142. "Rectangle" continued to be a confidential enquiry, and its impact on the wider community was therefore negligible. I had at various stages provided confidential briefings to the Minister for Home Affairs, Wendy Kinnard, the Chief Minister Frank Walker, and the Chief Executive Bill Ogley. The content of these briefings outlined that the Force was exploring some historical reports to see if there were matters which needed further investigation. As time passed the briefings became more detailed. Some of these briefings took the form of prepared statements previously agreed with Mr Harper. Examples are to be found in notebook 07/358 pages 20 and 24. It may be of note that the second of the two briefings which occurred on l5th November 2007 was intended to be received by the Chief Minister Frank Walker. However, in spite briefing having being arranged in advance he did not attend. (Notebook 07/358 page 24.) When I asked where he was I was told by the Chief Executive that Senator Walker was attending a lunch reception in another part of the building, which he did not wish to leave. This confirmed a view which I was forming, that the Jersey Government was showing a lack of recognition of the inevitable public and media interest which would occur when the enquiry became more widely known. I had from time to time encouraged an appreciation of the fact that handling the issue would prove to be a challenging task, and that the island's government needed to plan and prepare. I appeared unable to convince the Chief Minister of this, and I saw no significant evidence that the Chief Executive had a plan, or even that he had given significant thought to how a more public phase of the enquiry would be managed. This lack of recognition and preparation had significant consequences In 2008 when the level of media interest exceeded all  expectations, and the islands government became exposed to criticism and challenge.

143. Nevertheless I think it important to emphasise that Rectangle was a fairly long-running operation before it became highly visible. I had maintained contact with it throughout 20007, by means of regular briefings and conversations with key staff and partners. Alison Fossey was S.I.O. She was trained, competent, and well in control of the Investigation. Lenny Harper was providing strategic oversight of both Rectangle and the professional standards issues which were being Investigated alongside Rectangle. Even at the beginning of 2008, although there was evidence of enhanced media interest, this was largely local and manageable. Nobody foresaw, or had any reason to foresee, that a local enquiry based in a small island most people have barely heard of, would suddenly become world news. Nobody was really prepared for that. When It happened the impact was substantial. Every agency was caught off-balance and reactions had to be improvised. Deep rooted political and social divisions were brought into focus as the international media spotlight turned an the island. Later in this statement I will argue that much of the media interest was driven by issues outside the remit of the police, and how government and others, sometimes with good Intentions, added significantly to the challenges the force and the island was facing. This was not just a police problem. It was a Jersey problem.

144. On the morning ofTuesday 19th February 2008 I attended St Martins Parish Hall where I met with the Connetable, Silva Yates. I had arranged the meeting some days before on the basis that I wanted to discuss a "Parish Issue." I told him the Force was about to start some exploratory work at Haut de la Garenne, and this was part of a search for evidence in relation to the abuse enquiry. I said that we would hope to keep the work discreet, but we might be there for a couple of weeks. There might be some media interest or some questions to him as Connetable. I took this conversation to be a discharge of my responsibilities under Article 7 of the 1974 Police Law. The Connetable thanked me for the information, and said he did not intend to become closely involved. I took these comments as a request for "assistance" under article 6 of the Police Law. (Notebook 07/358 page 78 refers.) He said that we should ask if we needed any help, and in fact he was of considerable assistance in the weeks which followed, supporting the use of Honorary Police on the cordon and related duties.

145. As Is now well known the U.K. media became aware of the work at Haute de la Garenne, and the whole enquiry became the subject of Intense media and political interest. The political interest was both external and internal. Long-standing political rivalries were re-ignited and challenging questions were raised regarding the constitutional position of the island and the ability of its institutions to deal with issues of this nature. I will address some of these consequences later in this statement.

146.     "The Standards the SOJP Work to. with Particular Reference to ACPO/NPIA Guidance."

I have been asked to make comment regarding the above. Most of what I have to say is not really a matter of my own or anyone else's opinion. It is a matter of law. Jersey is an independent legal jurisdiction. It has its own laws, its own courts and its own police services. It is bound by nobody else's laws or procedures. There are thirteen police forces in the island. Twelve are elected volunteer forces which largely operate within their Parish. The thirteenth Force is the States Police, which now has jurisdiction throughout the island to patrol and to gather evidence in relation to alleged offences. The States Police do not charge or prosecute offenders. Any suspected offences have to be reported to the honorary police in the relevant parish. A Centenier will then decide what action, if any, is to be taken with regard to a suspected offence. In taking decisions Centeniers refer to guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Should it be felt that a Centenier has taken an apparently perverse decision the Law Officers are able to intervene. Nevertheless, the discretion of the Honorary Police is considerable. The States Police have no powers to charge or prosecute any offender for any offence. That is the law. Some might think it a strange business. It is however Jersey's business. It is nobody else's business.

147. All thirteen police forces are obliged to operate in accordance with the laws of the island and any statutory guidelines or procedures approved by the competent Jersey authorities. That is how it is. No other laws and procedures apply or have any jurisdiction in the island.

148. On some occasions a situation arises where there are no relevant local laws or procedures. When that occurs It is considered acceptable to look and see what might be done in a similar situation elsewhere. Sometimes Jersey looks to England for guidance. Sometimes it looks to other countries in the U.K. I am aware for example that the local fire service is inspected and takes its lead in relation to working practices and standards, from the Scottish Fire Service Inspectorate. When Jersey was seeking to develop a "joined up" criminal justice database, work was done on the basis of a model which was viewed in Northern Ireland. The development in Jersey of the scrutiny panel system benefited from considerable input from representatives of the Scottish Parliament. The current emergency planning officer was recruited from a position in the Welsh Assembly, where he had been developing procedures in that jurisdiction. As a community we are free to choose where we obtain our advice from, and how we react to that advice. It is for Jersey to decide. Nobody else can impose any laws or working practices without the agreement of the island's governing authorities.

149. Sometimes guidelines and working practices developed in other jurisdictions can form the basis of local procedures. The best way to illustrate this might be to refer to a real issue which is relevant to this enquiry. That is, the concept of a "critical incident." I took an Interest in this about three to four years ago. One afternoon I was in my office when I made a routine computer check on live incidents. I read one entry which said that there had been an incident involving a police vehicle and two people were dead. I went to the control room and established that a police car on its way to an incident had been involved in a collision with another vehicle. It later transpired that only one person was dead and the other badly injured. I realised that this would have significant implications. I established a separate command and control for the incident and allocated different people to lead on the different areas or responsibility. These included contact with the Law Officers, the Minister, the Media and the Jersey Police Complaints Authority, as well as the customary actions regarding scene management and related issues. As the dust settled I began to wonder what would have happened if I had not been there. Would the staff on duty have known what to do, and did we have operating procedures which would cope with such a situation?

150. I remembered that in my contacts with colleagues in England they had spoken of something called a "critical incident" and that when something was given this name, a particular process was activated. I discussed this with colleagues and, so far as I recall, brought the matter to a meeting of the Executive Strategy Group (E.S.G.). I thought that we should gather more information about a "critical incident" and whether it involved a process which could usefully be adopted locally. Someone was allocated to undertake the necessary research. There should be a record in the minutes of the Executive Strategy Group relating to this. This type of project would have followed a familiar process. When we identify a deficiency in local policy and procedure somebody is allocated to prepare a paper. This would involve research into how things are done elsewhere. It is possible that A.C.P.O. procedures might be examined. The person responsible might take A.C.P.O. guidelines and amend these to take account of local law and procedure. It might also be necessary to translate any A.C.P.O. guidance Into a a more reader-friendly language. 

151. What spoils the story to some extent in this case is that I do not recall if the work was ever finished. It might be that the person given the task left, or moved on to other things. I just do not remember. However, had the paper been completed this is how it would have moved forward from that point. It would have been circulated to members of the Executive Strategy Group (E.S.G.) for preliminary comment and suggested amendment. When we thought that it was ready to come to the table we would list it as an agenda item. It would then be subject of a formal discussion. Once a draft was agreed, It would go to the Force Management Board (F.M.B.) for a wider discussion. When a draft had been approved through this process I would have to decide whether there was a need for political ownership. In the case of the force adopting English guidelines for use locally this would probably be the case. I would therefore have tabled it for a Ministerial meeting with the Minister for Home Affairs and the Assistant Minister. In my experience Ministers are most likely to be interested in any potential for political challenge, (in this case I would have thought that there was probably none,) and also any financial or training implications. If financial implications were present then this would be an impediment, and they would be enough on their own to prevent a policy being accepted. Training implications could probably be approved provided that they could be met within budget.

152. As I have stated earlier, the proposal to adopt the concept of a "critical incident" did not make it through this process, and therefore did not become part of Jersey's police procedures. The same can be said of any other police procedure from another jurisdiction which has not been through the process I have described.

153. The status of guidelines which have not been adopted locally is that they constitute advice, which is there for the information of the Force, and for the officer dealing with a particular case. They can be used or not used as the force or the officer in the case sees fit. That is not an opinion. It is just a statement of the Law. If Ministers are not content with this position then they could seek to change it through the political process. A proposal to adopt English policing guidelines en-bloc could be progressed either through a recorded Ministerial decision, or by means of a debate in the States. So far Ministers have chosen not to do this. That is a matter for them. It is not a matter for me. I do not think that I am able to assist further with this subject.

154. The Involvement of the A.C.P.O. Homicide Working Group. 

I have been asked to comment on the Involvement of the A.C.P.O. Homicide Working Group, the contents of their reports, and the implementation of their recommendations. Their role was vital to the conduct of the enquiry. I will argue elsewhere that when a fairly discreet and local enquiry turned overnight into a world event it was too late to re-think command structures and roles. We had to remain focussed and work within the management resources we had. But we needed expert help and guidance. I personally had lost touch with where "experts" were to be obtained from in 2008. Fortunately Lenny Harper had done some groundwork, and through this I learned about the "Homicide Working Group," who apparently could be activated in our support through John Stoddart, who was Chief Constable of Durham, and who led for A.C.P.O. In the appropriate business area. The relevant contacts were made and the Homicide Working Group (H.W.G.) was asked to assist. I do not think that I had heard of the HWG prior to them being recommended as a source of expertise for Rectangle. 

155. The HWG were led by Andre Baker, who is a Deputy Director of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA.) I had met with Mr Baker a number of times previously in his SOCA capacity. Details of Mr Baker and his career history can be found on the internet. I believe he can be fairly described as an internationally recognised expert on the Investigation of serious crime. The HWG were part of a plan to provide expert guidance, and oversee the Investigation through to the time when a new management team could be in place. We had, for reasons previously described, failed to retain the services of John Pearson, who was a senior and experienced detective, on the management team. We were however already actively engaged in the recruitment of a new D.C.O. with the relevant background. There were two leading candidates. One was Andre Baker who was effectively already on the ground, and the other was David Warcup who had already visited the force and who was in regular telephone contact. We just needed to bridge the gap. I hoped to close the gap by bringing forward the appointment of the new D.C.O, and by using the H.W.G. to guide the investigation in the meantime. I was also mindful that D.I. Fossey would soon be returning to the Force, and that when some of the outstanding professional standards issues had been resolved, it might be possible to achieve closer involvement with members of the Force management team. In this respect I thought that David Minty, who was head of C.l.D, might be able to play a greater role. I also believed, as did everyone else, that the work at Haut de la Garenne was a brief episode which would soon be over. With hindsight it is now known that is not what occurred. One find led to another, and as the exploration of one scene within the complex was finished, there were forensic Indications which led to another.

156. I have seen statements in the disclosure file which speak of the limitations of the mandate of the H.W.G. These are interesting but well informed by hindsight. What I was told at the time regarding the role of the Homicide Working Group is what is set out in their terms of reference and reports. I note that the terms of reference state that they will "quality assure the investigation." I relied heavily on the H.W.G. to guide me and others as to what we should be doing and how. The analogy is not perfect, but during this period Andre Baker assumed something of the status of the A.C.C. (Crime) which we needed but did not have. I relied heavily on the H.W.G. for expert advice. And I was resolved to take their advice. If for example they had advised that there was a serious deficiency which could only be solved by a change in key personnel then I would have tried to do that. I was not given such advice and therefore I did not do it. I note that in his statement John Stoddart speaks of the supervisory role of a "Chief Officer" In such circumstances and says "I am however acutely aware that Mr Power was the only other chief officer and that this may have presented him with some real difficulties. He then goes on to consider how these difficulties might have been addressed and suggests "extra resilience at ACPO level." For reasons given earlier, such a solution was impossible under the rules under which the Force is required to operate. Accordingly I did the next best thing and relied on the senior expert who was available. In managing the situation which existed at the time, I acted on my own authority, but in doing so was heavily guided by Andre Baker and his team. Andre Baker was an experienced and seasoned ACPO officer who was either present on the ground, or in regular contact throughout the key events. I valued his support.

157. The reports of the HWG speak for themselves. They describe an investigation which heeds some "tweaking" but is generally on course. Some of the language is complimentary. For example there are references to the "correct approach" and "good practice." In the groups second report at paragraph 7 they state "The States of Jersey Police are to be commended for their positive reception of the (previous) report and for their extremely prompt response in implementing the recommendations." I met with members of the group on a regular basis and toured locations in their presence. When it was not possible to meet, I would speak to Andre Baker by telephone. This included a period when I was on leave and dealing with family matters in the U.K. I made arrangements for the HWG to meet with Ministers, when neither myself nor any other member of the Force were present, so that the HWG could give a candid view of our  performance in the investigation, Following these meetings I would have conversations with Ministers and it was clear that no concerns had been raised. I studied all of the HWG reports in detail and asked for, and received from the Rectangle team, action plans addressing the recommendations. I do not know what else I could have done to maximise the value of the H.W.G. I was guided by their views and gave priority to their advice and recommendations. Whatever might be said now, there is nothing in any of their reports which raises major concerns. No crisis is identified. No drastic action is called for. There are the anticipated recommendations in respect of procedural and policy issues, and reassuring messages regarding the action taken in response to what they have recommended previously.

158. I note that the feedback given to the Minister for Home Affairs was even more positive. In a statement dated 7'h May 2009 Andrew Lewis speaks of his briefings by the H.W.G. and states in paragraph 8, "When I received their report with the recommendations, I was told by Andy Baker that the Investigation was a 'shining example' of how an Investigation of this type should be run and that they were satisfied that the S.l.O. was doing a good job."

159. There are some issues later in this statement where it will be necessary to refer back to the HWG reports. However, I can at this time think of nothing more to be said regarding the "Involvement of the A.C.P.O. Homicide Working Group."

160. Comments in Relation to the Metropolitan Police Serious Crime Review. 

I have been asked for "Your comments in relation to the reports by the Metropolitan Police Serious Crime Review." I take this request to refer to the review of Rectangle which I requested on the advice of Andre Baker. I will address that aspect in more detail later in this section of the statement. In response to the question I will offer some comments regarding the background and other issues associated with this report. The Minister for Home Affairs has stated that the report itself is "out of play" (transcript of the suspension review meetings.) He indicates that this is because the Metropolitan Police will not agree to its use for disciplinary purposes. I am not surprised. The commissioning of review reports is recognised good practice, and reviewers are often encouraged to be challenging. Their reports are valuable in setting an agenda for the future of an investigation. Their use for a disciplinary purpose would have widespread implications for the future of this process. Senior Officers might be reluctant to commission such reports, and reviewers might be inhibited in what they said. The stance taken by the Metropolitan Police is in the interests of the service, and is also very much in the public interest. I support the position that the Metropolitan Police have taken. I hope that the investigating officer is able to come to the same view. It follows that in support of the position taken by the Metropolitan Police I will not be commenting on the contents of the review report.

161. During the major stages of Rectangle I was aware that it was customary for comparable enquiries to be subject to a review, although I was less sure what was normal in respect of frequency and timing. For this reason I took advice from the HWG. The advice which I was given appears to be well covered in the statement of Andre Baker paragraph 71. I recall much of the discussions around this issue, and my recollections broadly accord with what the statement says. We talked about the need for a review and its timing. We both thought that a review report would be useful in setting the agenda for the new management structure I was in the process of implementing. I asked Andre Baker to make the necessary arrangements, and he said that he would. The issue was discussed between Andre Baker, myself and David Warcup when we met at the Radisson Hotel on 21st July 2008. We were there for the purpose of interviewing the shortlisted candidates for the position of S.I.O. Apart from the selection process itself, it was an opportunity for the three of us to get together and have a full discussion regarding the enquiry. Andre Baker is right when he says that "We had a general discussion on the selection process, strategy for the enquiry and timescales." I felt it Important that the future of the enquiry was fully owned by the senior people involved, I recall that the matter of a review was discussed with candidates during the selection process, and certainly with the successful candidate who was Mick Gradwell. We all appeared to agree on the position. Taken overall I believe that I am entitled to state that the decisions in relation to the nature and timing of the Metropolitan Police review were supported by all of the relevant senior officers, and that in agreeing how this issue was to be addressed, I was acting on sound expert advice.

162. I will now touch briefly on some aspects of the statements of the reviewing officers. For reasons already given I will not address the content in detail. I note from their statements that the reviewing officers are Mr Bryan Sweeting and Mr Terrence Britton. One of them is a Superintendent and the other is a retired police officer. Neither has any experience in the management of a Police force at a strategic level. I see from their statements that we met briefly on 29th October 2008. My impression at the time was that they were competent practitioners in an urban environment, but perhaps not familiar with the unique issues of island policing. To some extent this is corroborated by their statements. Mr Britton appears to believe that Jersey has a "Police Authority" (paragraph 7) and sees relevance in the advice of the "Crown Prosecution Service" (paragraph 20.) In his statement of 30th April 2009 Mr Sweeting indicates that he has apparently looked for any evidence that I "delegated" my superyisory responsibility for Mr Harper, and can see no evidence that I did. It would be fascinating to know where he searched for this evidence, and to whom he thinks I might have made such a delegation in a force in which the only two Chief Officer ranks were Mr Harper and myself.

163. I do not think that I can make any further useful comment in respect of the review by the Metropolitan Police.

164. Mr Leonard Harper as Senior Investigating Officer.
I have been asked to comment on "The appointment of Mr Harper as SIO or the continued acceptance as SIO when the opportunity arose to make changes." I am not sure what is meant by the latter part of this question, or whether it implies that the questioner knows something which I do not. I have described earlier in this statement the long and exhausting battle that had to be endured in order to obtain authority to advertise and recruit a new D.C.O. from outside of the island, and how that left the Minister for Home Affairs in a position in which she could not realistically make a further approach for permission to fill another senior post externally. I have also described how, when the enquiry became major news, we were already part way through the process of replacing Mr Harper as D.C.O. and how leading candidates for that position were already engaged with the force and updating themselves on the enquiry. I have also written about how there was a clear plan to "bridge the gap" by using the HWG to advise Mr Harper, while simultaneously attempts were being made to bring forward the appointment of his replacement. I have also acknowledged that I did not foresee, and neither did anyone else, the complexity and duration of the search at Haut de la Garenne.

165. I think that I have also explained the background of political and cultural resistance to the importation of senior public sector staff from outside the island and how this is reflected in a range of legal processes relating to employment and housing. The difficulties caused by the housing and employment laws are not a side-effect of those laws. They are the main point of the laws. For constitutional reasons Jersey is not able to operate immigration controls. Immigration is controlled indirectly by restricting the right to work and the entitlement to occupy most categories of housing. Every case for the importation of key staff has to be evidentially justified. Sometimes this involves going through the futile exercise of advertising locally and engaging in a selection process merely to demonstrate that there is no local candidate available. I recall that this happened when we recruited the current forensic manager, Vicky Coupland. I believe that her recruitment took over a year.

166. Sometimes this process can be by-passed by the use of a temporary secondment. A person who is seconded remains a member of their own force. They are not allowed to live in qualified accommodation and their secondment is expected to be restricted to a period which is no longer than necessary. The authority to authorise a secondment to the Force rests with the Minister for Home Affairs. The process used in order to enable secondments for Rectangle, was for the Minister to write to the Lord Chancellor asking for U.K. assistance. When agreement had been given, individual forces and officers could be approached. At the time Mr Gradwell's secondment was authorised in July 2008 the political ground was more fertile than it had been In the early part of the year. There was a new Minister for Home Affairs (Andrew Lewis) who I had persuaded that the management model which I had developed involving a new D.C.O. and S.I.O. was an essential package. This was not the case in 2007/2008. Wendy Kinnard was exhausted by her efforts to gain sanction for my plan to recruit a new D.C.O. She was also a supporter of Lenny Harper and his approach. They were close in the professional and political sense. So much so that there were occasional rumours that their relationship was more than professional. Jersey is fertile ground for rumours. I was aware of the rumours and considered them to be without foundation. Most Jersey rumours are totally false. I know because I have been the subject of a few from time to time myself. They are not true either.

167. Finally on this particular aspect of the question, I note that Andre Baker states that the decision to recruit an S.I.O. from outside of the island was confirmed at a meeting on 30th June 2008 (paragraph 71.) Although I do not have access to the relevant records, this would have been followed by an approach to Andrew Lewis as Home Affairs Minister for his agreement. Mr Gradwell states that he commenced duty as S.I.O. on 8th September 2008 (statement paragraph 31.) He then had to begin familiarising himself with his new role, and read through the statements taken up to that date. Thus, the time period from deciding to appoint an S.I.O. from outside the island to the selected person starting work was over two months. At that point the new S.I.O. would begin a process of familiarisation with the existing evidence in order to become effective. In other words, it cannot be done overnight. It is not an instant solution.

168. I now return to the role of Lenny Harper as S.I.O, although much of what there is to be said should be apparent from some of the earlier parts of this statement. I have described how, in the earlier stages, Rectangle was an enquiry running alongside a number of others being carried out by the force. D.I. Alison Fossey was the S.I.O. and Lenny Harper was maintaining strategic oversight. It was decided that Lenny Harper would have this role for reasons which included the professional standards elements and, to put it plainly, some uncertainty regarding who in the force could or could not be trusted at that time. I know the position on that question is a lot clearer now, but it was far from clear then. In normal terms, the scale of the enquiry has been assessed by Mr Britton, who participated in the review by the Metropolitan Police, as one which a Detective Inspector ought to be capable of dealing with under supervision. (Witness statement T. Britton, paragraph 6.) I agree that in normal circumstances this would be the case. What made this enquiry different were the potential political implications, and the professional standards issues. There was also the probability that media interest would intensify (although nobody foresaw the extent to which this would happen,) and that there would be the customary political attempts to Interfere or score points. Alison Fossey was a good investigator, but relatively new to her rank. She was not skilled in dealing with political challenges, and not confident in a hostile media environment. She was also undergoing some domestic issues at that time which were placing her under pressure. Some of these matters could have been comfortably addressed in a U.K. force where choices of skilled senior personnel are available. We are an island force outside of the U.K. We operate with what we have. Only in the most exceptional circumstances can we do otherwise.

169. I would need more access to files to discover when Lenny Harper moved from having strategic oversight to being S.I.O. I know that when this happened nothing much changed in reality. He still worked as D.C.O. and carried out any functions in relation to Rectangle on a part-time basis. Alison Fossey was in effect the full time head of the investigation. Initially I saw Lenny Harper's appointment as adding strength and authority to the investigation, to protect Alison from interference, and allow her to concentrate purely on investigative matters. In so far as any U.K. guidelines were relevant in that situation, Lenny Harper was a "Chief Officer" for the purposes of those guidelines.

170. At some stage, after consultation with others, I took a decision which affected this working relationship for a period of time. This involved an International Female Commanders' Course which was being run at the Staff College and which D.I. Fossey had qualified to attend. The course is normally for officers of Superintendent rank, but she was assessed as having the relevant level of ability, (as it happened she proved to be the outstanding student of the course.) I recall this was to take place In early 2008 and would involve her being away for around ten weeks. Throughout my service I have seen promising officers effectively punished for being of high value in a particular position, and therefore hard to release when career opportunities arise. I am conscious of the long term damage this can cause, and try to avoid it wherever possible. I discussed the situation with Alison Fossey and Lenny Harper and we agreed that she should be released, and cover would be provided by others "acting up."This did of course bring Lenny Harper's role as S.I.O. into greater focus. It was clear that his day-to­ day leadership would be more "real" than It had been up to that point.

171. I note that one of the periods during which the HWG were present in Jersey was from 29th February to 2nd March 2008. They subsequently completed a report which drew attention to the fact that Mr Harper was undertaking the duties of S.I.O. on a part-time basis. They recommended that he should become full time, and that another person undertake the duties of D.C.O. I reflected on this and saw the sense in this recommendation. The only realistic candidate to be acting DCO was the third in command of the force, who was Superintendent Shaun Du Val. Shaun was a suitable person to act up, and in my view had potential to move permanently into that rank following appropriate development. This was a decision which would have required Ministerial approval. Without access to the relevant files I do not know how this was done. It might have been in a Ministerial meeting, or it might have been agreed verbally. In any event, it was approved. Shaun was made acting D.C.O. and David Minty Acting Superintendent. This was also a good opportunity for David. He had demonstrated potential as Chief Inspector and I had him in mind as a future Superintendent.

172. It might now be appropriate to digress a little, and discuss who in the force other than Lenny Harper could have been S.I.O. and why this did not happen. The problem overshadowing any internal solution to the issue of who should be S.I.O. was the continuing professional standards issues, and uncertainty as to who may be the next person to be implicated in allegations concerning the "cover up" of abuse. From the distance of time it all appears clear. In the midst of the initial deluge of reports and allegations it was not possible to predict who would be the next person to be "named." The reports from the HWG describe backlogs of incoming information and actions. At the relevant time, we knew that we did not know the full picture of what was alleged against whom, and in the initial rush of reports and allegations which followed the publicity around Haut de la Garenne, the picture that we had was changing daily.

173. Running alongside this was the undoubted fact that Lenny Harper had, within the space of a few hours, become established internationally as the public face of the enquiry. His candid and robust style of delivery, accompanied by his unconcealed distancing from the Jersey government and establishment, inspired confidence in victims and witnesses, and in the media. It should be remembered that at this time Jersey was going through something near to a constitutional crisis. There were high profile demands, from within the island and elsewhere, for the enquiry to be taken out of the hands of the Jersey authorities, who were being portrayed by many in the media and U.K. politics, as secretive, sinister and untrustworthy, and placed under the control of independent prosecutors from the U.K. I held the view that all of the abuse allegations could be managed within the Jersey Criminal Justice System; although later in this statement I will describe some of the frustrations in attempting to persuade the Law Officers and others to recognise and address the adverse perceptions which the investigation was attracting.

174. Almost overnight we had moved to a position in which any replacement of Lenny Harper as S.I.O. would have been world news. At one point, frustrated by what he perceived as constant political sniping, he told me that if political actions interfered with his role as S.I.O. he would "not go quietly." I was conscious from this, and other parts of the background of the case, that if the position of S.I.O. was not handled carefully it could trigger a "tipping point" which could have far reaching legal, political, and constitutional consequences. In any event, any change in Mr Harper's status could only be undertaken with the support of the Minister for Home Affairs, who at that time was Wendy Kinnard. I have described previously that she appeared to be a strong supporter of his approach, and from what she told me, she was also sympathetic to the demands for independent prosecutors and judges. A change in S.I.O because Mr Harper was about to retire, or even a change in consequence of an "early handover" were one thing. To change him in mid-flow for no better reason than the absence of current qualifications or similar reasons, might make sense in the upper levels of the police service, but would not be credible elsewhere, and could have had far reaching consequences.

175. Nevertheless, I gave thought to how we might develop a "plan B," and be in a position to phase-in a new leadership should that be appropriate. The plan involved David Minty who was a Chief Inspector and head of the C.l.D. By that time some of the early confusion had cleared, and it was emerging that the "cover up" allegations did not appear to have implications for David. On one occasion when we were together I spoke to David Minty and Mr Harper about the need for continuity and the preservation of corporate memory. I said it was logical that the head of C.l.D. should undertake this role, and that David Minty should begin shadowing Mr Harper and become more visible in briefings and media events. I recall that this happened for a while but then became less noticeable. I see from his statement (paragraph 26) that David says this was in consequence of him being made Acting Superintendent and head of operations. I think that this is a thin excuse. He was given an opportunity, and should have grasped it. Most other people were by then, doing two jobs at once. He should have made more effort. I asked Lenny Harper about David Minty's role, and he said that he had shown interest in the career opportunity of being associated with the enquiry, but less Interest in the hard work Involved. I accept that there will be more than one side to this account, but this is all of the information I have access to at the time of writing. 

176. In spite of the difficulties, I persisted in considering an internal appointment of an S.I.O. at the appropriate time, and David Minty continued to feature in those deliberations. In paragraph 55 of his statement, Andre Baker describes a discussion we had during a break in an unrelated meeting in the U.K. Although my recollection of the details of what was said differs from his, I note he confirms that on 20th May 2008 I still saw David Minty as the favoured option to take over from Lenny Harper as S.I.O. I had discussions on this issue with David Minty and I recall that at my suggestion he completed a report setting out his willingness to undertake the role, and his qualifications for doing so. The investigating officer may wish to see if this report can be located. The appointment of David Minty as S.I.O. was one of the options I took forward to my discussions with David Warcup. Had this option been agreed it would of course have enabled a much earlier phased handover of responsibility, However it emerged that Mr Warcup preferred to have an independent S.I.O. from the U.K. I cannot remember the details of my discussions with David Warcup, but they must have involved consideration of the need for the enquiry to be seen to be fully independent of local political considerations, and how the appointment of a long-serving Jersey officer might impact on this. 

177. I was not in disagreement with the decision to appoint an S.I.O. from the U.K, but was aware that this presented me with further challenges in managing the delayed handover between the two management regimes, and also the need to address the disappointment of David Minty. It also created a need for me to obtain political agreement for what was proposed. By way of partial corroboration of these events I see that on 9th June 2008 I made a note that I had discussed succession for Rectangle with Shaun Du Val. (Notebook 08/95page 37.) I know that on another occasion when I was meeting with David Minty In relation to another matter, I took the opportunity to explain to him why he had not been chosen for the role. I am unable to find a note of this discussion.

178. While I was addressing the delicate matter of how to phase out Lenny Harper's command of the enquiry, and the appointment of a new management structure there were the predictable demands for Lenny Harper to be given an extension to his contract and retained as S.I.O. These were led by Senator Stuart Syvret, but there was little doubt that he was also speaking for others. It was known that some witnesses and victims had confidence in Lenny Harper, and some understandable fears as to whether the independence and integrity of the investigatlon would be maintained in his absence. In the Interests of completeness I should also add that the retention of Lenny Harper as S.I.O. was one of the options identified by the HWG. (Third report. Paragraph 16.)

179. The local demands to retain the services of Lenny Harper were for the most part directed at the then Minister for Home Affairs, Andrew Lewis. I encouraged the Minister to hold firm and to be clear that there would be no extension to Mr Harper's contract. I was determined that there would be a fresh start under new management. I felt confident that David Warcup would not want Lenny Harper "under his feet," and that in consequence, Mr Harper's retirement plans should be allowed to run their course. I recall that I rang David Warcup and confirmed that I had his support on this point. At some stage Andrew Lewis began to bend under the pressure. He said that it would be helpful if I could say that Lenny Harper did not want an extension to his contract. I said that I could not say this because it was not true. I had not mentioned the subject to Lenny Harper and did not know his views. He said that I should therefore speak to Lenny Harper and confirm that he did not want to stay on. I then asked what we would do if Mr Harper said that he actually wanted an extension. I got the impression that Andrew Lewis had not thought this through. I said that the best thing to do was to say nothing to Mr Harper. However, I reminded Andrew Lewis, not for the first time, that we were supposed to be working to a succession plan agreed by the States Employment Board and the Appointments Commission, and that it was not within the mandate of either of us to change that plan. I said that we should emphasise this point in any exchanges, and minimise any impression that we had discretion in the matter. I was aware that sticking to an agreed plan was not a conspicuous feature of Jersey politics, but felt that it was important that we did so on this occasion. Some of these exchanges took place by email.

180. So far as I can recall that is the full account of the history of Lenny Harper as S.I.O. for Operation Rectangle and of my involvement in this matter. During all of this period I was also running the Force, and there were all of the normal operational and staff issues to be addressed. The understanding always was that Lenny Harper would concentrate on Rectangle, and I would concentrate on running the force, and acting as a buffer between external influences, usually politicians, and the enquiry. I estimate that about 80% of my time was given to running the force and most of the other 20% was spent dealing with issues related to Rectangle. 
In the first report of the HWG there is an item headed "Governance of the Investigation" which states: 

"Other than from a supervisory and responsibility standpoint Mr Graham Power, Chief Officer for the States of Jersey Police, is not involved In the actual Investigation. He is and has been, responsible for attending to any issues of a political nature or in an advisory capacity to the Chief Minister, ministers and politicians. It is very important that this continues to protect the investigation and allow for the Investigation to be independent and unfettered by any demands." 

Recommendation 13 of the same report states:

"That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the Investigation and any demands of politicians."

The second report at paragraph 44 states:

"Governance - the Chief Officer retains the Independent position to advise the politicians and wider community. This not only protects the enquiry from political interference but allows the 510 and team to focus on the enquiry."

181. The role described above is expressed in diplomatic terms but is nevertheless clear in its intention, and the actions which it is designed to support. The Chief Officer was to act as a buffer zone to protect the enquiry from "interference." This is a role which may be unfamiliar to officers with a U.K. background. In Jersey there is no universally accepted doctrine of constabulary independence, and the concept of policing without "fear or favour'' is not as widely respected as It may be in other jurisdictions. Views on the issue vary, but it is fair to say that there were, and still are, some elected representatives who struggle with the idea of an operationally independent police service. They prefer to see policing as just another public service comparable to Health, Housing or Education, where it is the role of politicians to decide how issues are to be addressed, and for public servants to implement the political will. It is fair to say that many thinking politicians recognise the problem, and have sought to address it through the establishment of an independent police authority or something similar. However, all such discussions seem to run into difficulty on the issue of who is in control of police operations.

182. It is against this background that I spent my time trying to defend the independence and the integrity of the enquiry, and address the issues of S.I.O. succession in 2008.

183. The Strategic Parameters for Operation Rectangle. 

I have been asked by the Investigating Officer to comment on "The establishment of strategic parameters for Operation Rectangle." In the interests of brevity I will also use this section to address the related question of any formal written strategy for Rectangle. At the risk of appearing difficult, I would point out that whatever direct involvement I had in Rectangle was for a brief period during the transition between two management regimes. By the time I had any significant role, Rectangle was a well established and relatively long running operation. It was one of a number of significant criminal investigations running within the force at that time, indeed at any time. It had a line management structure supported by staff trained in major crime investigation, as well as oversight by a "Chief Officer" who was the D.C.O. of the force. When I came to have a degree of personal responsibility for the enquiry I did not see myself as being obliged to go back to the beginning, and audit to what extent strategic parameters and things of that nature were in place. I had responsibility for managing the force and in dealing with what was happening there and then. Historical research was not part of the agenda.

184. I did however do what I could to check that everything was as it should be. I visited the Major Incident Room (M.I.R.) on a regular basis. These visits are documented in my note books. I checked that the contingency plans which I had previously developed with Devon and Cornwall Police were being implemented, and that the Devon and Cornwall commitment to provide the relevant key staff was being fulfilled. I always sought out the person who appeared to be in charge, and asked them if they were being properly supported in terms of welfare and accommodation, and if they had everything they needed. I would also ask questions along the lines of "is the system running as it should be?" I do not know how Major Incident Rooms work in detail, but I do know that they operate according to the requirements of the H.O.L.M.E.s. 2 computer system, to which I had negotiated access at the beginning of my tenure as Chief Officer. I relied on the reasonable assumption that this system will have mandatory fields for such things as strategic parameters, and that skilled operators would be alerted to any field which has not been properly completed. I say this because in my experience this is how Police systems work. All of my questions relating to the operation of the M.l.R. were answerd in a positive way. Although I have not viewed the document for some time I recall that the agreement with Devon and Cornwall envisages that they will manage and operate the M.I.R. They have the relevant skills and qualifications and the States of Jersey Police do not. I am aware of no local obligation to supervise or audit their work. I personally did not go into the system and attempt to discover what was and what was not there. That is not my role and I would not know how to do this.

185. I have noticed some reference to strategic parameters in the reports of the Homicide Working Group. I suspect that there might be other references in the disclosure material. For example the second HWG report at paragraph 19 states:

"The team has asked the SID to define the parameters of the investigation. He has confirmed that it includes: the homicide Investigation at Haut de la Garenne; tl1e historical child abuse investigations at Haut de la Garenne; a confidential a/legation in respect of a high profile member of the community; any suspect who worked at Haut de la Garenne who then went on to work in child care and allegations relate (sic) to that subsequent role; any victim at Haut de la Garenne who was relocated into alternative child care and further abused; and any offence that occurred with a connection to Haut de la Garenne, e.g. day trip boot rides. It does not include any a/legations of cover up, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by a public official or any other unrelated homicide or a/legation or child abuse" 

Paragraph 6.1. of the first H.W.G. report states: 

"Policy decision 2 details the investigation thresholds of 'serious indictable offences.' This is good practice at an early stage which allows the team to focus on the most serious offences and not be diverted by minor assaults that could have amounted to the 'moderate correction of a child."

Paragraph 6.1 of the third H.W.G. report refers to the remains found at Haut de la Garenne and states: 

"The SID has intimated that if the children died post war a homicide investigation will be undertaken. The SID will then review the resource requirements to conduct both the homicide investigation and the on-going complex abuse allegations."

186. The first H.W.G. report paragraph 7.3 states: 

"The SIO is responsible for the strategic direction of the investigation. He makes and records the decisions."

If this was the case at the peak of the enquiry then it was certainly the case in the formative stages, when Lenny Harper was the "Chief Officer" with strategic oversight of the enquiry. The fact that he has retired and is no longer available for disciplinary investigation does not mean that I am culpable in his absence.

187. I can think of nothing further I can offer in relation to the question asked in respect of the strategic parameters of operation rectangle.

188. The Meeting Structure between Myself and the Senior Investigating Officer. 

I have been asked to comment on "The lack of a formal meeting structure between yourself and the SIO." I have described earlier in this statement the meeting structure of the force and how this is used to cover a range of issues. I have also made it clear that in a small force, with a handful of key players who are in daily contact with each other I see no need for the range of meetings, groups and working parties which often characterise the management of larger forces. However, once Lenny Harper assumed the full time role of S.I.O In addition to his existing role as a "Chief Officer,'' I recognised that I needed to maintain regular contact in order that I could be effectively positioned to carry out my own agreed role of acting as a "buffer'' between the S.I.O. and external distractions. I also needed to be well informed in order that I could discharge my own media role of supporting the enquiry, and to continue to provide strategic level information to the media and government. I will write more about that later in this statement. There were other reasons why I needed to be regularly briefed. These included my need to know of any developments which appeared to compromise police officers or senior figures in the community, in order that I could consider any management or professional relationship issues. There was also the obvious advantage of me being able to act as a sounding board for Mr Harper, to learn of his intentions, and to engage in dialogue regarding any proposed action which might not have my full support, or which may have implications which he may not have foreseen.

189. These meetings were regular, face-to-face, candid and direct. At the height of the media interest they usually took place on a daily basis, and took place regularly thereafter. They took place at police headquarters, at Haut de la Garenne, and elsewhere. When we could not meet face-to-face we spoke by telephone. We were in contact during evenings, weekends and leave periods. I kept a note of the meetings in my notebook, and where appropriate, generated emails or other messages in consequence of what had been said at the meeting. If someone wants to call these meetings "informal" then I beg to differ. They were fit for purpose, and nothing more elaborate was required. I might add that the style of meeting I had with Mr Harper would be quite characteristic of how things are often managed in Jersey, and I suspect other small communities.

190. While the subject matter of the meetings varied, a typical meeting would involve Mr Harper updating me on the latest developments in the enquiry, and his anticipated actions for the days ahead. I would discuss any issues which I had "fielded" on his behalf, and perhaps bring him up to date on the general running of the force. We would frequently discuss the media coverage of the previous 24 hours, and any feedback I had received from within the political community. He would usually respond by expressing frustration at the nature of the reporting, and refer to the record of what he had actually said. I will make more comment on media issues later in this statement.

191. The Management of the States of Jersey Police Day to Day Business During Operation Rectangle.

I have been asked to comment on the day to day management of the force during operation Rectangle. The Jersey public has become accustomed to high standards of police service with an emphasis on visibility, and a focus on the concerns of ordinary people. Crime levels have consistently fallen and levels of public confidence, by various measures, have often exceeded 90%. It was clearly a challenge to maintain this level of service and public satisfaction during the exceptional demands posed by the abuse enquiry. The Force does not have the luxury of a large senior management team, and it is often necessary for key Individuals to play duel roles. In addition there was the added complication of the professional standards aspect of the investigation. Enquiries Into the possible Involvement of serving or retired police officers in cases of abuse, either directly as abusers, or in respect of failing to act on reports of abuse by others, were still live and it was not possible to predict where those enquiries would lead. The Operations Management Team is a close-knit group, which has a common email address. The decision, described earlier, to keep the key aspects of Rectangle on a "need to know" basis, impeded the corporate style of working which normally characterised the management team. I have described earlier how it was agreed at an early stage that I would concentrate on the running of the force, and how I sought to give around 80% of my time to that activity. For most of this time I was well supported by Shaun Du Val in his role as acting D.C.O. 

192. There were the inevitable tensions between Operations Management and Rectangle in matters relating to resources, This was not only In respect of numbers of staff, but also in terms of local expertise. While Rectangle was being supported by temporary staff from outside the island, there was nevertheless a need for local officers to be closely involved, in order to retain local ownership and provide advice on local laws and procedures. These tensions are to some extent reflected in the observations of the H.W.G. Paragraph 13.4 of their third report states: "The Ops Management have asked for States of Jersey police officers to be returned from Operation Rectangle to other duties in the island. They suggest that as staff from the U.K. are deployed on the operation, their own staff should be made available for deployment on other Jersey policing requirements. The request is understandable but key roles on the enquiry must be from Jersey. They know the powers, the systems, the processes and can meet the long term requirements of such a complex enquiry. It is particularly important as they move to the arrest phase."

193. These issues were managed through the force management process, and through daily contacts and meetings. It was a difficult period, but with a few exceptions, the performance of the force was maintained, and the wider community did not suffer significant adverse consequences as a result of the resource impact of Rectangle.

194. The Allegations made by Senator Stuart Svvret Against the Attorney General and Others.

I have been asked to provide information regarding the relationship between the investigation and the Law Officers Department. I will do that in the next section of this statement. Before doing so I think it appropriate to write a section In respect of criminal allegations made by Senator Stuart Syvret in respect of people who at the time of the allegations held positions as follows: the Attorney General Mr William Bailhache (soon to be the Deputy Bailiff), the Deputy Bailiff, Mr Michael Birt,(now the Bailiff) and the Bailiff, Sir Philip Bailhache (now retired.) This information is offered because it is relevant to the background of the overall enquiry, and the relationship with the Law Officers Department. It also had a relevance to the relationship between the enquiry team and Senator Syvret, and the extent to which he was inclined to use his influence to persuade witnesses and others to trust the police and co-operate with the enquiry. Finally, my personal role in addressing the Syvret allegations also inhibited the extent to which I was able to participate actively in the relationship between the Law Officers Department and Rectangle while the Investigation was current.

195. For a number of years, possibly starting before my appointment, Senator Syvret had been outspoken in his criticism of the Jersey legal establishment, and in particular in the approach taken towards child abuse issues. He had given interviews and circulated papers on the subject. He alleged that the Law Officers and the Courts had used their powers to cover up abuse by States employees and public figures, The implications of his allegations were that there was an "old boys" network which conspired to prevent abusers being brought to justice. These allegations had been repeated in statements to the press and others, and circulated in emails among the political community. The Senator and others had copied some of this correspondence to me over the years.

196. I had always taken the position that the allegations as they stood were not supported by visible evidence, and until such time as they were made formally to the police I did not have to take any action. I did not regard the circulation of an email as a "report." At some stage the Senator became more determined and more focussed. This was at a time when Rectangle was gaining momentum and the issue was once again topical. Although I am prevented from having access to the relevant papers, I recall that at some stage the Senator entered into correspondence stating that he wanted to make a formal complaint. I recall I said this would require a police officer to take a written statement from him and he agreed to this. I recall that a statement was taken. I think this might have been done by a member of the Rectangle team.

197. My recollection is that the statement, when complete, made general allegations that the Attorney General, and his predecessor in that role who was by then the Deputy Bailiff, had a general propensity to direct that there should be no proceedings in abuse cases. He also alleged specific "cover ups" in the case of the abuse at Victoria College, and the case of the Maguires. I have referred briefly to both cases earlier in this statement. In the Victoria College case the Senator made much of the fact that the then Balliff,(who is the Attorney General's brother,) had been on the board of governors of the college during the period in which the offences took place, and had allegedly failed to take appropriate action in respect of the abuse. It was also said that key figures in the college at the time, who the Senator believed were responsible either for failing to prevent the abuse, or for impeding a full investigation when it came to light, had subsequently gone on to occupy senior positions in public life. He also appeared to allege that the decision of the then Attorney General (now the Bailiff) not to prosecute the Maguires, was motivated by an intention to protect key figures in the public sector.

198. I recognised that the allegations were significant for the island. They were effectively the "coming to the boil" of issues which had been brewing for some years. I discussed how the matter should be handled with Lenny Harper and Shaun Du Val (notebookO8/95 page 08.) We agreed that the complaints by Syvret should be addressed separately from Rectangle, and that it was appropriate for me to take personal control of the issue. I was assisted in this task by Shaun Du Val and other officers. I think however it is a matter of record that I took all of the major decisions. My first decision was that there would be no criminal investigation unless the "reasonable suspicion" test was passed. I was comfortable with this. I have seen too imany long and expensive enquiries launched without this basic question being asked. If there was no "reasonable suspicion" that a crime had been committed then there could be no justification for the use of police powers. At some stage I was in the presence of the Attorney General in connection with another matter. He told me that he had heard of the allegations and he wanted them investigated by a police force from outside of the island. I told him that this was for me to decide in consultation with the Home Affairs Minister should the issue arise, although I noted his view. I then told him that I was not proposing to have any normal police investigation undertaken unless the reasonable suspicion test was passed to my satisfaction. I think that this took him by surprise but he accepted what I said and we did not speak about it again.

199. A consequence of this decision was that I had to determine how the "reasonable suspicion" test would be applied and who would help me address this. I had previously discussed the matter with Stephanie Nicolle, who was retiring as Solicitor General. This first discussion occurred on 20th March 2008 (notebook 08/95 page 03.) She took a few days to reflect on the matter but later suggested that I take advice from the newly appointed Solicitor General who was Tim Le Cocq. I did as advised and together we agreed a plan. Advocate Robert Macrae, who was in private practice locally, and independent of the Law Officers, would be asked to provide advice. I agreed that the way forward would be to recover the case files in relation to Victoria College and the Maguires, and to select from storage a random batch of files in respect of which no action had been taken. Advocate Macrae would review the files and give a written opinion as to the decisions taken. As a form of double-check he would also obtain the written view of a U.K. Barrister based in London.

200. The outcome was that the review of the randomly selected "no further action files" recovered from storage indicated that while there were some marginal differences in view between the lawyers who were tasked with reviewing the files, and the earlier decision-makers, these fell within the parameters of normal judgement. The reviews of the Maguires and Victoria College cases were a little more complex. In the case of the Maguires it was concluded that the decision of the then Attorney General fell within the parameters of reasonable decision- making in respect of the information which the Attorney General had in his possession at the time. There might have been some issues around the standard of the information, but I cannot remember what they were. I do however remember that the file contained information to the effect that Mr Maguire was seriously ill with cancer, and not expected to live. This had apparently come from someone within the Force and had been accepted by the then Attorney General and others. As subsequent events have shown, it is likely that this information was false. It was not clear who was the originator of the information, and I saw no point in further enquiries in relation to that matter. In respect of the investigation at Victoria College, the legal advice which I received indicated there was some evidence that enquiries had been impeded by persons within the college, and that it would have been legitimate to consider the arrest and prosecution of other parties at the time of the events. However, I was also provided with legal advice which said that to do so now would be an abuse of process.

201. The question then arose as to how this information was to be communicated to Senator Syvret. One of the lawyers in the case drafted a letter for me to consider which was factual but also impersonal, direct, and unlikely to achieve closure. Shaun Du Val produced an alternative draft which was more suitable, but in my view still not appropriate In the circumstances. I wanted to communicate the difficult message that the allegations were going no further, but do this in a way which might be accepted and, importantly, would not be to the detriment of the understanding that Senator Syvret would continue to support Rectangle and encourage potential witnesses to have faith in the investigation. I spent about a week drafting the letter, which, by normal letter standards, is long and detailed. I did not receive a reply but subsequently heard that the Senator had accepted the contents, and was grateful for the effort made. The investigating officer may wish to view the letter and include it in the relevant papers accompanying his report. It is my definitive statement on how I feel about the allegations made by Senator Syvret. It also is yet another illustration of issues which I was managing alongside any oversight of Rectangle.

202. The Relationship with the Attorney General and the Law Officers Department. 

I have been asked to comment on "The management of the relationship between the SIO and the prosecutorial legal team." I am happy to do this and intend to do so in detail. To begin with however it might be useful for me to make a simple statement of evidential fact in case it has been overlooked. Namely:

I note that members of the Law Officers Department, and lawyers involved in Rectangle have made statements. While these statements inevitably set out views which show some marginal differences between the lawyers involved. on one point they are unanimous. They all confirm that they were all given evervthing they asked for. Everv lawyer in everv statement describes a sequence of events which led to them being provided with every access and everv facility they requested. They are equallv unanimous that all of this was dellvered under my command. either by me personally or by subordinates instructed to do so on my behalf. I cannot find in the evidence a single word of dissent on this important evidential issue. 

203. The statement of the Attorney General offers an account of many of the relevant milestones in the development of the relationship with the legal team. At this stage I acknowledge that the Attorney General appears to have tried to be fair, and gives an accurate account of some of the key events. I will set out a different interpretation of some of these events, and offer some new information which the Investigating Officer may see as relevant. The Attorney General has completed his statement with the benefit of access to records and notes. I will be relying on the disclosure documents provided by the Investigating Officer, and my recollection of what occurred and when. In order to give an account from my perspective, it might be best if I begin by summarising some of the issues which I felt Impeded the earlier development of the relationship between the investigation and the Law Officers Department. In no particular order they are as follows:

• The perception issues arising from the fact that Jersey does not have a prosecution service. Prosecutions for serious crime are undertaken by the Jersey Law Officer's Department. However, the main function of that department is to provide the island's government with legal advice. The department has some secondary functions of which being a prosecution service is but one. When a potential prosecution is focussed on a government department and its staff, a perception is created that the "government's lawyers" are the ones who will decide if there is to be a prosecution. This can undermine the confidence of victims, witnesses, and in some cases police officers, in the independence of prosecution decisions.  

Differences of opinion with the Attorney General regarding the need to address perception issues by appointing a high profile, specialist, and independent "special prosecutor" or similar person to work with the police. 

Confusion as to the "chain of command" in the Law Officers Department and who was in a position to provide advice and decisions.

• The baggage of previous cases, including the Boschat case, described earlier in this statement, which had created relationship and confidence issues.

• Issues around the availability and workload of Advocate Stephen Baker who was engaged to assist the Attorney General.

• Reports which may not have had any basis in fact, which necessitated a discussion with the Attorney General regarding the suitability of (Redaction) to undertake a high profile role.

The poor handling by Simon Thomas, a barrister from the U.K, of the initial relationship with the police team and the problems arising from his handling of the legal advice with regard to the case of (279,281) 

Claims by Lenny Harper that he was receiving confidential information from within the Law Officers Department and the nature of that information.

Reports that the Attorney General had been seen playing golf with one of the leading suspects.

My personal involvement in the investigation of the allegations made by Senator Syvret against the Attorney General and others, and the necessity that I seek to maintain a distance between myself and the Attorney General during the time that Investigation was current.

204. It may have been suggested that Operation Rectangle progressed through its earlier stages without the benefit of a partnership with the Law Officers Department. The disclosed evidence accords with my own recollection that two members of the Law Officers Department were assisting the enquiry in its earlier stages. They were Lawrence O'Donnell, who was a full-time prosecutor, and Bridget Shaw, who I think worked as a part-time prosecutor and is now the Assistant Magistrate. This is referred to in paragraph 9 of the Attorney General's statement. The second HWG report, under "Recommendation 9" refers to a meeting between the S.I.O. and  Lawrence O'Donnell on 15th March 2008 to discuss the Wateridge case. 

205. It was clear that before long, this established partnership with the Law Officers would need to move to a higher level. My own view, which was expressed at every stage and never changed, was that this would be best achieved by the appointment of an independent specialist lawyer, who could work full time on the investigation, and be a single point of contact for the Rectangle team. I thought the Attorney General should delegate as much of his authority as the law allowed to that person, and step back from direct involvement in the enquiry. I did not just think that the force needed this. I thought that Jersey needed it. I made this point to Ministers, to the Attorney General and, as an aside to another issue, to the Bailiff. I repeated this message at every opportunity. I linked it to my own vision of how Jersey was to recover from the difficult experience we were going through. Like it or not, the Criminal Justice system was approaching a controversial and sensitive enquiry in a climate of distrust, and accusations of conspiracy and cover-up. There were vocal demands for external intervention, and evidence that the relevant U.K. authorities were showing what was regarded as an intrusive interest in the island's affairs. I was very clear in my own view of the route out of problems we were experiencing and frequently summarised it as follows:

• There was only one possible solution to the situation that the island was in, and that was one which entitled Jersey to say that all of the allegations had been examined thoroughly and that everything which was capable of being taken to court had been to court. If we did not bring closure to these issues in Rectangle, they would forever be returning to cause division and conflict.

• Jersey's Criminal Justice system was capable of doing this and doing it well, but that would never be enough. We also had to convince the world that we had done it well, which meant that we had to manage issues of perception. A good way to start would 
have been for some senior figures to recognise that they had to think about perception at all. The dismissal of dissenting views in a way which appeared to be high handed or arrogant, even If accompanied by the right decisions, was not what the situation required. What people thought about the criminal justice system mattered almost as much as the effectiveness of the system itself. 

206. I was immodest enough to think that my letter to Stuart Syvret was an example of how some of these Issues should be handled and explained. Iensured that it was seen by senior figures in the legal establishment. 

207. I have explained earlier in this statement how Lenny Harper's experiences in Jersey had not led to him becoming an admirer of the island's laws or prosecution processes. Nevertheless I thought that he handled the necessary relationships in a professional way. However, as Rectangle began to gather pace he began to speak of information he was receiving from within the Law Officers Department. He spoke of dissent within the department on the issue of the appointment of an independent prosecutor, and he alleged that the Attorney General had been heard to say that a prosecutor would not be needed as none of the cases would be going to court anyway. I did not give this a lot of credibility at the time, but gave it more weight later when Wendy Kinnard told me that she had been approached by a member of staff from the Law Officer'sDepartment who had expressed similar concerns regarding the proposed arrangements for prosecution. The investigating officer may see value in Interviewing Lenny Harper on the issue of this alleged information, and in seeking to establish whether its authenticity can be verified in any way.

208. It might be useful to offer some comment on the role of Stephen Baker. Mr Baker is a highly regarded lawyer who is experienced in working with the police. He is liked and respected by police officers. From his evidence the impression may have been given that he was a lawyer dedicated to Rectangle whose efforts at engagement were frustrated. This is not entirely the case. He is a busy criminal lawyer with a heavy and varied workload. I see from the disclosure documents he was first appointed to the case in late January and had some involvement in issues around the charging of the accused Wateridge. I will return to that matter in more detail a little later in this statement. The point I wish to make at this time, is that in the period which followed his appointment the force was having exchanges with Mr Baker of an entirely different nature. He was at that time representing a man called Curtis Warren who had a few years previously,been described as theU.K.'s leading criminal. Warren was in custody locally, having been arrested in Jersey following a covert operation by the force. Warren, who at one time appeared in the Sunday Times Rich List, was reported to have substantial criminal wealth, which he had successfully hidden from the various agencies which had sought its recovery. This led to an interesting exchange of correspondence between David Minty and Stephen Baker. David asked if Baker was being paid for his services, and if he was, whether he proposed to make a disclosure to the financial crime unit. I think that this was eventually resolved in favour of Baker, who successfully argued that he did not have to do so.

209. Warren's defence relied heavily on attacking the process used to gain covert evidence. This involved some authorisations which I had approved. There were extensive disclosure requests, and a number of senior officers, including myself, were required to give evidence. I recall that I had to delay a planned period of leave in order to do this. The point I am making is that at a key stage in Rectangle, the relationships between the force and Stephen Baker's firm were mostly adversarial and in relation to the Warren case. He was by no means the dedicated full-time prosecutor we badly needed.

210. A short time afterwards I was presented with a professional and ethical dilemma and consequential distractions, by the appointment of (redaction) I am aware the Investigating Officer for Operation Haven is in possession of notebook entries which make reference to this matter. (Redaction) I personally know nothing to his detriment. At first I welcomed his appointment and saw no cause for concern. Then I remembered the intense media interest which there had been present in the earlier stages of the investigation and anticipated that U.K. journalists might assemble for the trials (assuming there were any.) They would be looking for sensationalist angles in their reporting. About the same time I remembered stories I had been told regarding (Redaction) At the risk of being repetitious, I do not know if any of the stories are true, I just know that they exist, and that a number of people think that they are true. Any story relating to a known figure in Jersey has to be considered in the context of a local cultural tendency to invent and spread rumours regarding people in public life.

211. In brief, it appears that some people maintain that (Redaction)  has a reputation for the sexual harassment of female staff. One story, which came to me from more than one source, is that he is alleged to be responsible for a case of harassment of a junior member of staff when working in the (Redaction)  According to the story (Redaction) dealt with the matter without any formal action, and that the victim left her position and was now working elsewhere (Redaction) It was alleged that some other staff members felt that the harassment had been "covered up." The name of the alleged victim is known to me. One of her work colleagues spoke to me and told me that the victim had a dossier in relation to (Redaction) and she had seen it. The dossier was said to contain copies of compromising emails. It was said that the dossier was being kept for possible future use. I thought about what I should do with this information, and after a while I arranged to see the (Redaction)  I did this because I felt that he should be aware of the potential risk should any element of the media attempt to run a "sex pest" type story should (Redaction)  in Rectangle. In raising this matter I had In mind both the interests of the enquiry and those of (Redaction) himself.

212. I spoke to the Attorney General on 30th April 2008. He said that he had no good recollection of anything of significance, but there might have been something in 2003 which Stephanie (Stephanie Nicolle the recently retired Solicitor General) had dealt with. He went on to say that he would research the matter and give it some thought. (Notebook 08/95 pages 26-27.) I did not press him further nor did I offer any view about what he should do. I just told him I thought that there was a risk of intrusive media interest whether the stories were true or false. I said that I thought that the risk was less than 10% but it was still a risk. I had no intention of raising the matter with anyone else. Iwas just informing him because I thought that he ought to know and I was leaving the issue with him. That was how the matter ended. I think (Redaction) continued to have a role in Rectangle but I do not think It was a very visible one. This was an awkward Issue, and the outcome meant that a possibility of an effective one-to-one relationship with a (Redaction) had been lost.

213. In the initial stages of the working relationship with the Law Officers there were difficulties in relation to prosecution and charging issues. One related to the decision to charge a man called Wateridge, who had previously worked at HDLG and was accused of indecency offences involving children. I see from the Attorney Generals statement that this event took place on Wednesday 30th January 2008. Some of Mr Harper's reasoning for not wanting to arrest and then release any suspect in order to await legal advice, involved a perceived need to maintain a momentum, and to strengthen witness and victim confidence in the authenticity of the enquiry. I was told from time to time that some witnesses with important evidence were speaking to the police verbally, but lacked the confidence to commit their evidence to writing. The charging of a suspect would be a symbolic act which might inspire confidence in the justice system in the minds of many who were still sceptical. If my recollections are correct, then the Wateridge arrest will have been after the unrelated arrest of Boschat referred to earlier. If that is the case then Mr Harper would have also wished to avoid a repeat of the "Boschat experience" described earlier in this statement, whereby the gap between arrest and charge could provide an opportunity for political attempts to interfere in the process. It is probably fair to point out that I did not see this in the same way as he did. I thought the events around the Boschat case were peculiar to that case, and unlikely to be repeated. However I was aware that the experience had affected the way in which Mr Harper was then approaching his relationship with the Law Officers, and his own preferences in respect of issues of arrest and charge. He had discussed his intentions with me some time previously. I understood that it was his wish to convince potential witnesses that this time it was "for real" by bringing charges early in the enquiry, and I supported the idea that he should move forward on that basis in liaison with the Law Officers Department. This discussion would have occurred when he was working with members of the Law Officers Department who were based in Police Headquarters. They were Lawrence O'Donnell and possibly Bridget Shaw, but I am not able to recall whether he said that he had discussed it with them. It would be surprising If he did not. I see from the statement of Stephen Baker that all of the relevant email exchanges relating to the arrest of Wateridge had been copied to Lawrence O'Donnell. It may be that he had been the person giving advice up to that point. The investigating officer may see value in exploring this whole issue with Mr Harper. 

214. The core of the story is that Wateridge was in the process of being charged, when Stephen Baker attempted to intervene but apparently was too late to change matters. My notebook for that day records that in my briefing from Mr Harper I was told that there had been an "issue regarding charging." (Notebook 07/358 page 68.) Stephen Baker's intervention came at a time about which he states "At that stage I knew nothing about the cases." (Statement of Stephen Baker paragraph 7.) He had clearly been retained by the Attorney General to work on the abuse enquiry. He knew that, and obviously the Attorney General knew that. I see from his statement that the Attorney General wrote to Lenny Harper to inform him of the arrangement on 17th January 2008. No claim is made that there had been any contact with Mr Harper from Stephen Baker or Cyril Wheelan, or that any meeting had been arranged to activate the relationship. One interpretation of these events could be that the police investigation was running ahead of the engagement by the Law Officers appointees, who were attempting to catch up with the enquiry at short notice, without having first established a working relationship or familiarised themselves with the details of the enquiry. This was not a positive episode in the working arrangements with the Law Officers Department and It led to some exchanges relating to how matters could be taken forward in a more corporate manner. I note that the Attorney General states that shortly after this episode a meeting was arranged between Lenny Harper, Stephen Baker and Cyril Whelan. The reports of the Homicide Working Group indicate that this meeting took place on 28th March 2008.

215. I recognised the need to build a closer working relationship the Law Officers Department and asked Andre Baker for advice on the best way to approach this. He said that the integration of a lawyer into the team would be a positive move and that "a step approach may be the best way to achieve such." (Statement Andre Baker paragraph 44.) It was with this advice in mind that I approached the meeting of 22nd April 2008 with Stephen Baker, Cyril Whelan and Simon Thomas. I had previously had some professional involvement with Baker and Whelan but it was the first time I had met Simon Thomas. We had an amicable discussion, during which I made it clear that although the working relationship with the Law Officers department had experienced a bumpy start, I was determined to overcome this and achieve full integration with the legal team. The introduction of Simon Thomas to the enquiry was the first move in the "step approach" I was being advised to take, and I hoped that this would lead to the building of a successful and growing relationship in the near future. I see from his statement that after the meeting with me he had a "friendly" meeting with Lenny Harper and was provided with the necessary access and facilities.

216. Before moving on to the case of (279,281) and how this affected the relationship with the  Law Officers, I will touch upon another aspect of the meting of 22nd April, which related to a theme which I had been pursuing throughout the enquiry, namely the chain of command in relation to legal advice, and the need for clarity in respect of who the police were working with, and who was able to give authoritative advice and decisions. I recall that I raised this and was told by those present that Simon Thomas was working directly with the police, but that he was employed by Stephen Baker. I was told that Cyril Whelan was also working with Stephen Baker, and that the working relationship would be in Jersey, although either at this meeting or in a subsequent conversation I was told that a specialist lawyer in England would be receiving some statements by fax and giving advice. However, the Attorney General would remain in control, and would be taking the key decisions, although he would not be directly involved in the working relationship. At least I think that is what I was told. I later asked the same question directly to the Attorney General. He had to give the matter some thought, but then offered a similar analysis.

217. This was not the type of arrangement to which I had been accustomed in my previous working experience. I had been engaged in a number of enquiries in my previous force, mostly relating to professional standards issues, where a working relationship with prosecutors had been important. This relationship was always arranged the same way. At the commencement of an enquiry the Crown would appoint a single Procurator Fiscal with full authority to take all of the relevant decisions. The working relationship was between the one Procurator Fiscal and the one senior police officer. In my view this is how it should be. The arrangements applied by the Law Officers to Rectangle almost needed a flow-chart to be understood. They were fertile ground for inconsistency, mixed-messages, and misunderstandings. Things were difficult enough as it was, without the added burden of complex and confusing arrangements for legal advice and prosecution.

218. Nevertheless, following the introduction of Simon Thomas to the team I maintained an interest in how the arrangement was progressing, by asking Lenny Harper directly, and by chatting to staff when I was on "walkabout" in the Major Incident Room (MIR) and elsewhere. I recall it was during this period that I met some junior lawyers who were in the MIR. They told me they were working on some disclosure files on behalf of Stephen Baker. Generally speaking, I was picking up positive indications and became quietly confident that the "phasing in" of the legal team was going to plan.

219. I now turn to the arrest of (279,281) and the events which followed. There are different accounts of this incident, but I believe that there is common agreement on some key core facts. These are as follows: 

There had been discussions between Simon Thomas and the officers in the case, in the days prior to the arrests. These appear to have taken place on 17'th and 20th June 2008. No written record of these meetings has been produced. 

Simon Thomas gave legal advice. This appears to have been verbal. No written record has been produced. 

On the day of the arrests Simon Thomas was in England and gave further advice to police officers by mobile phone.

220. These events took place against a background of a decided policy of the S.I.O, described earlier, of seeking to charge suspects on the day of their arrest. The reasons for this policy are given earlier in this statement. The exchanges around the arrest and charge of Wateridge will also have alerted Stephen Baker to the views of the S.I.O. in this regard. I was later told by Lenny Harper that Simon Thomas was well aware of his intention to charge (279,281) on the day of their arrest and that Thomas agreed to that course of action. I am aware this is disputed by Simon Thomas.

221. Whatever the truth of the matter, it appears to be beyond dispute that confusion was allowed to develop. Simon Thomas knew full well that we were engaged in a "bridge building" exercise after a period of difficulty. In these circumstances he had a duty to be precise in his advice, and to be available at key moments in the enquiry. This did not happen. What happened may have been a genuine misunderstanding as to the way forward, but the actions of Simon Thomas contributed to the problem. I felt then, and I feel now, that he let me down and he let the Law Officers down. A carefully planned phased transition towards the full integration of the legal team into the enquiry had suffered a serious setback. I will now describe how I was alerted to this and what action I took.

222. I arrived at work on the morning of 25th June 2008 and was met in the outer foyer of my office by my then Staff Officer, Jeremy Phillips. Jeremy was good at sensing "trouble" and he would often speak to me directly if he saw a problem developing. On this occasion he indicated that he wanted to speak to me before anyone else, and before I got distracted by other things. He showed me the press release that Mr Harper had issued the night before regarding the release of (279,281) I read it and recognised that it would cause problems. In short, the press release stated that (279,281) had been arrested on the basis of legal advice that they were to be charged after their arrest. It claimed that the legal advice had then been challenged and in consequence they had been released. The media statement had generated significant interest.

223. I may have had some brief discussion with Lenny Harper on the media release during the earlier part of the day, but if I did it is not recorded. I do have a note that I spoke by telephone with David Warcup and discussed how the matter was to be handled. I also have a record that at 1355 hours I attended a meeting at the Law Officers Department with the Attorney General and Andrew Lewis who I believe was Assistant Minister for Home Affairs at that time. (Notebook 08/95 page 47.) The Attorney General was angry regarding the events surrounding the arrest and release of (279,281)  and I could understand why. At the appropriate time I steered the conversation towards the need for a recovery plan. I emphasised that I was in the process of introducing a new management team to the enquiry and I had spoken that morning to David Warcup and obtained his agreement that the future of the enquiry would be structured around the concept of a "mixed team" of police officers and lawyers. (Notebook 08/95 page 47. Day book 25th June 2008.) I told him I proposed to direct that there should be no further arrests for the time being and I hoped that he would agree that any future legal advice would be in writing. I said that I planned for Alison Fossey to report directly to me over the next few days, and that she would be tasked with preparing the ground for the new management regime and the new working partnership. I also took the opportunity to repeat my long standing request that he appoint a single lead lawyer with delegated authority and full time commitment to the investigation. I later confirmed all of this in a letter. John Edmonds was present at that meeting. I had not met him before but learned that he was new to the island and had a
background in criminal prosecution. I recall it was not long afterwards that I had occasion to speak to the Attorney General on another matter and I took the opportunity to ask if John Edmonds was a suitable person to be our single point of contact. The Attorney General seemed surprised at the suggestion and I heard nothing more of it.

224. Following the meeting with the Attorney General I had a face to face discussion in my office with Lenny Harper about the media release. He told me the investigating officers were sure that Simon Thomas had agreed that (279, 281) be arrested and charged on the same day. The media had been aware of the arrests, and had asked for updates. Before (279, 281) could be charged Simon Thomas had made a mobile phone call from a location in England, as I recall Mr Harper said that it was from a railway station, and had directed that no charges be brought at that time. Mr Harper said that this put him in a difficult position with the media as they wanted to know what had happened, and he did not want the police to be blamed for the confusion. I told him that nevertheless his actions had created something of a crisis which I would now have to manage. 

225. I instructed him as follows and later confirmed what I had said by email: 

• He should submit a written duty report on the incident.

• There should be no further arrests without specific written advice from the Law Officers.

• All relevant press statements will be cleared with the Law Officers before release.

226. I told Mr Harper that I would be engaged in further discussions with the Attorney General on the management of the problems arising from this event. I acknowledged that he was approaching the end of his service and was about to take a period of leave, before returning to conclude his role in relation to Rectangle. I said that I had been engaged in discussions with his successor who would have oversight of the enquiry and that it was clear that Mr Warcup preferred a close integration with the legal team, and that this was likely to be the direction in the future. It would be helpful if he did not impede that transition. I also said that I would be asking the Deputy S.I.O. Alison Fossey, to report to me daily, and it was probable that I would be asking her to do some preliminary work to secure the level of integration I envisaged for the future. At the end of this discussion Mr Harper left my office. (Notebook 08/95 pages 47-48 and follow-up email.) My notebook records that following his return from leave I had a small number of brief contacts with Lenny Harper during the period when he was "clearing his desk,'' ready to hand over to David Warcup. I did not see Lenny Harper in the final 10/11 days of his service and have had no contact with him since.

227. Shortly after (279, 281) incident I began my regular meetings with Alison Fossey. At an early stage I said that she should arrange to see Stephen Baker, find out what he wanted from the enquiry in terms of access and information, and tell him that he could have it as soon as it could be arranged. I then concentrated on giving David Warcup the support he needed to implement the necessary changes, and in focussing on previous experience in joint working as a key factor in the selection of the new S.I.O. 

228. I have since seen a report in the Jersey Evening Post dated 25th June 2009 which quotes from the Attorney Generals Annual Review. In the report there is reference to the issues around Rectangle, and the Attorney General is quoted as saying "However, some of the faults must have been on the side of the law officers, whether of communication or otherwise. Whatever the cause, the result was that the law enforcement agencies did not work together as they should."

229. I will now attempt to deal briefly with some of the lesser issues relating to the relationship with the law officers. At the beginning of this section I have touched upon my oversight of enquiries into criminal allegations made by Senator Syvret concerning the Attorney General and others. This has been dealt with in more detail in the previous section of this statement. I do not think there is much I can usefully add, other then to re-state that although I could not totally avoid the Attorney General during this period, my responsibility for the enquiry into the Syvret allegations was an inhibiting factor in respect of our working relationship.

230. I have also mentioned earlier the allegations that the Attorney General had been seen playing golf with a leading suspect, who was named as (Redaction) I know one report came through Wendy Kinnard, when she was Minister for Home Affairs. I have a brief note which may indicate that this conversation with Ms Kinnard happened on 23rd June 2008 (notebook 08/95 page 46). I was also aware there were said to be reports from other sources. I recall that enquiries were made and the person who was supposed to have witnessed the event either could not be traced, or was overseas and could not be contacted. For a while this story was "doing the rounds," and it seemed that lots of people knew someone who knew someone who had seen this incident. I think that at some stage the story was put to the Attorney General and he said that he did not know if it was true or not. I was told that the Attorney General and (Redaction) are (redaction) and It is possible that they may have (Redaction).

231. Personally, I see this as an issue which is in some respects typical of situations which arise in island jurisdictions, where key individuals live and work together in the same community. I am personally willing to accept that if the Attorney General played golf with (Redaction) 100 times he would still be willing to prosecute him or not, as the evidence required. The stories did however impact badly on Issues of perception, fed the imaginations of conspiracy theorists, and damage victim confidence. It would of course not have mattered much at all if the Attorney General had agreed to my request to appoint an independent prosecutor and step back from the whole enquiry. But that request was not acted upon.

232. I have been asked to comment on things I am reported to have said in the context of managing the relationship with prosecutors, concerning the imminent retirement of Lenny Harper and the impact this might have had on issues relating to the practical control of his actions. Anything I said around this will have been against the background of handling the transition to the new management regime. It was clear that both the Attorney General and Andrew Lewis were eager for change. I tried to persuade them to be patient and to allow the succession plan to take its course. I held strongly to the view that any direct intervention in Mr Harper's role during the final weeks of his service would ignite a media frenzy and distract from the smooth transition we were trying to achieve.

233. I was conscious that Mr Harper was under some pressure. The investigation had been demanding, and he had been through some difficult periods. I was also aware that there were some medical and other issues in his family which were causing him some anxiety. In addition, he was approaching the end of his long service as a police officer and this in itself was a major life event. Nevertheless I thought that he was coping well, and at our regular meetings he seemed to be in good spirits but clearly tired and ready for a rest. He had coped with some traumatic personal and professional events in the past, and had come through them well. He was on the receiving end of some political criticism, but there was nothing new about that. I was aware that both the Attorney General and Andrew Lewis were looking forward to his departure, and would probably be happy to see him forced out sooner, provided someone else did it and did the explaining afterwards. I felt that the right approach was to stay calm and seek to achieve a seamless transition. Mr Harper was already in the process of closing down his role in the enquiry and this should be allowed to continue. I did at some time make the obvious point that he had by then passed the time where any disciplinary sanction could be applied to him, even if he had done anything which merited such action. The right thing to do was to manage him through his final weeks, and then re-launch the enquiry on a revised basis. In arguing for this approach I did not foresee the (279, 281) episode, but neither did anyone else, and by the time it had happened the handover had already begun.

234. Finally with regard to this part of the statement, I note the comments by some of the lawyers who have provided statements to the effect that from their perspective things improved significantly when Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell became involved in the enquiry, and the apparent willingness of some lawyers to see this as evidence to my detriment. There is an absence of comment, or even apparent curiosity, as to where Mr Gradwell and Mr Warcup appeared from. Presumably nobody thinks that they dropped suddenly from the sky, although a reading of some statements might give this Impression. Yet again, and for the record, let me repeat that both Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell were appointed to their roles as part of a structured plan which I devised, and which I drove through the political process in the face of significant difficulty. If it had not been for my efforts neither Mr Warcup nor Mr Gradwell would have been appointed at all. When appointed they implemented my wishes, well documented before their arrival, to develop an effective partnership with the Law Officers Department. This is the basis of the claim made at the beginning of this section of my statement. Not a single lawyer identifies a single facility or a single piece of information which was not fully delivered, either by me personally, or by subordinates acting under my instructions, and at the time of my suspension there was in place a working partnership which met all of their expectations. That was an outcome of my efforts on behalf of the enquiry. There is not a shred of evidence that I failed to deliver in respect of any legitimate expectation regarding the working relationship with the Law Officers Department.

235. The Search of Haut de la Garenne. 

I have been asked to comment on "The justification for the search of HDLG." I do not think that I have a great deal to say on this matter, The reasons which led Lenny Harper as the Senior Investigating Officer to conclude that an examination of some locations at HDLG was  appropriate are well documented. That was primarily his decision. From what I was told of the evidence, his decision seemed perfectly reasonable. I recall the original expectation was that we might be there for a couple of weeks or not much longer. The intention was to do some initial exploration to see if there was justification for further work. I have described earlier in this statement how I discharged my obligations under the Police Law by meeting with the Connetable of the Parish, and providing him with a briefing on the day the operation started.

236. As is now well known, the initial examination of the scene indicated a need for further work, and this in turn identified a need to explore further. I am aware of no speculative searching at HDLG. All of the searches were based on intelligence or evidence. The whole of the complex is a fairly large site. I have not worked it out precisely, but suspect that we might have searched no more than 5% of the total area. From time to time the work at the scene indicated that there were rooms and areas which had been "bricked up" and there was at least one false wall. These understandably aroused interest and it was necessary to determine whether there was justification for a more detailed search. The search dog seemed to play a significant role in determining whether a specific location needed to be examined further. I am not an expert on dogs or what they do. I do know however that this dog and its handler came with the appropriate recommendations from the U.K, and it was used accordingly.

237. There was always an intention to call a halt to the searches as soon as possible, but as soon as a potential exit date approached there would be another find, which necessitated further work. It has at some stage been suggested to me that we could have avoided having to search HDLG at all. Ithink that this is unrealistic. During Rectangle we were attempting to mop up rumours, reports and allegations which had been circulating for decades. As I have explained earlier, Rectangle was the chance to bring closure to a long running saga. The only way to do this was to be in a position to say that every line of enquiry had been pursued, and there was nothing else to do. If we had not searched HDLG when we did, then It would have become necessary for it to be searched at a later date, and in the intervening period the allegations of cover-up and conspiracy would have grown more complex, and taken a stronger hold in the beliefs of the community. I am sure that we were right to undertake the search at HDLG, and to place the Force and Jersey in a position to say that the whole issue of what may or may not have been concealed there, had been examined as thoroughly as possible.

238. I believe this was a common view at the time, although the views of some others appear to have been influenced by hindsight. For example I note that the former Chief Minister, Frank Walker whose statement indicates that he now holds a different view, nevertheless had no hesitation in April 2008 in telling the States that "I am satisfied. completely satisfied, that the police have a totally legitimate need to investigate those cellars." (Statement Frank Walker paragraph 20.)

239. Operation Rectangle as a "Critical Incident."

I have been asked to write about my understanding of the term "Critical Incident" in the context of policing. To some extent I have done this earlier when I described the policy-making process, and how consideration was given to adopting the concept of a "critical incident" in Jersey, I described how the necessary work was not finished, and how accordingly, the concept was never formally adopted.

240. I have examined the guidelines produced by the National Policing Improvement Agency for England and Wales (NPIA.) I will offer some comment on the guidelines, and their local relevance. Where applicable I will emphasise a particular part of the quoted text. Such emphasis will of course be mine and not that of the authors.

241. The guidelines state that they contain "Practice advice to assist policing in the United Kingdom." The guidelines go on to state"The implementation of all practical advice will require operational choices to be made at local level in order to achieve the appropriate police response." The broad sweep of the guidelines emphasises the need for early identification of an incident which may have a wider Impact than the initial circumstances may suggest. Examples are given in the guidelines of cases which had a major impact, but which were initially regarded as relatively routine, with some consequential loss of control and effective management. The Stephen Lawrence and Harold Shipman cases are given as examples. Elsewhere in the document guidance is given on the relationship between local policing, in the form of Basic Command Units (BCUs) and the Chief Officer team based at the force headquarters. Readers are alerted to issues which can arise if local commanders are slow to recognise the significance of an incident, and bring it to the attention of the Chief Officer team. The advice is set in an overall context in which "more than two fifths (forty two percent) of victims were less than 'fairly satisfied' with the police response they received," and in which there are issues of trust and confidence to be managed in partnership with minority groups in the community. There is also an identified need to access groups which are described as "hard to reach or hard to hear." The guidelines emphasise the priority of addressing the impact on victims, their families and the community. These appear to be the priorities on which the police are encouraged to focus.

242. I cannot criticise the guidelines for their wisdom and value in a U.K. urban policing context. They do however describe a background which is a world apart from island policing, and the situation in Rectangle. Jersey has a single professional police service in which the Force headquarters and territorial policing are combined. All key managers meet every morning, and operational incidents are monitored by the management team both at work and from home on a 24/7 basis. Levels of public confidence are high, sometimes exceeding 90% in key areas, and the Jersey Social Survey indicated that in some cases minority group confidence was higher than the overall average. There is no suggestion that the significance of Operation Rectangle was in any way overlooked or missed. Far from it, the significance was recognised early. Oversight and investigation were provided at a rank level several tiers above that which might be considered normal for an enquiry of that scale (Statement of Peter Britton 5th March 2009. Paragraph 6.) The approach to the hard-to-reach groups, who for the most part constituted the victims and witnesses in Rectangle, was carefully managed and effective. I will deal with this in more detail later in connection with a question relating to the "Gold Group."

243. I see from the documentation which has been provided to me that on 28th December 2007 Mr Harper recorded that in his view Rectangle was "technically a critical incident." He then goes on to describe features of the critical incident model which he had decided not to apply at that time. I also note that on 7th May 2008 Inspector Fossey records that "The historical abuse enquiry is a critical incident," she then goes on to describe the family liaison strategy for Rectangle, and how this differs from the normal model used in U.K. This ambiguity is understandable. What is evident is that Jersey officers are showing an awareness of U.K. guidelines and are effectively "cherry picking" those aspects which they see as locally relevant. That is what they are supposed to do. That is the long established and politically endorsed method of policing in Jersey. If there is now a wish that things be done differently in future then that is a matter for government. It is not something which the force can determine alone, and it is certainly not a matter within the sole remit of the Chief Officer of the force or the Management team. 

244. Decisions relating to the application or otherwise of Critical Incident guidelines were taken by the investigating team and in particular by Mr Harper, who was the "Chief Officer" responsible for the enquiry. I recall no direct involvement on my part and would not necessarily expect to be involved in the kind of details which, for example, are included in the comments of D.I. Fossey as described above.

245. The Role of the "Gold Group."

I have been asked to provide information regarding my understanding of the concept of a Gold Group and related issues. I note from the disclosure evidence provided that all relevant witnesses confirm the success of the Gold Group, established under my command and on my instructions. I note that the Gold Group was operating successfully for over two months before my suspension. I believe that my timing for the establishment of a Gold Group was correct. and Iwill give reasons for this later in this statement.

246. However, to return to the initial question, I offer the following information on my understanding of the concept of a gold group, and my history of engagement with a group of this nature. I have described previously that I was promoted to Assistant Chief Constable In Lothian and Borders Police in 1991. I learned soon after my appointment that Chief Officer had evaluated a command system known as "Gold, Silver and Bronze." The result of the evaluation was that the system was judged unsuitable for use in the police service. As I recall the reasons given included the fact that the proposed system envisaged an officer at police headquarters exercising command over the officer in charge at the scene of an incident. This was felt to be the wrong way round, and contrary to the established role of the O.I.C. (officer in  the case/officer in charge/officer in command) system which operated generally in the service. It was also felt that "Gold Silver and Bronze" necessitated and additional layer of bureaucracy ,and obscured issues of individual responsibility. I recall that the other emergency services also rejected the system for similar reasons. At some stage I learned that police forces in England had come to an opposite view. I cannot comment on this. I have not lived or worked in England for approaching 20 years, and am not able to speak with any authority on how things are done in that country.

247. When I was appointed as Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police I noted that "Gold, Silver and Bronze," was in use for major events, I did not interfere with this. The force was accustomed to working that way, and I do not believe in change without justification. I did however ensure that whenever I was Involved, Gold command operated with a light touch and that primacy was given to the judgement of the senior officer on the ground.

248. I recall a series of discussions around the concept of a partnership based approach for Rectangle. I remember discussing "partnership working" more than the concept of a "Gold Group" although the two concepts are basically the same. These discussions were with Lenny Harper and Andre Baker and also, I think, with Wendy Kinnard, although I am less sure of the latter. Lenny Harper has documented his reasons for not establishing a Gold Group In December 2007. In summary these relate to the fact that there were allegations touching upon potential partner agencies, and that the establishment of a group at that time could involve the risk of compromise. He was right in that decision. In the early rush of activity after Rectangle became public knowledge, allegations of involvement, conspiracy, and cover-up were flowing thick and fast. Prominent individuals were being "named" and it was impossible to predict where all of the allegations were leading. I was sure that the force needed to move towards something along the lines of a "Gold Group" model, but equally sure that this could only be done when the evidential picture had achieved a level of stability which was not present in the early stages.

249. There were nevertheless discussions as to what compensating measures could be taken In the intervening period. Lenny Harper's engagement with the N.S.P.C.C. from England was a positive move. They became part of the Rectangle team and brought a level of expertise which might have been available through a local partnership had circumstances been different. I also gave thought to how my own actions could bridge the gap until a time when a more formalised partnership could be in place. As a normal part of my duties I was meeting with the Chief Executive and the Chief Minister from time to time. I would use these occasions to provide updates and receive feedback. This would in turn be fed into my daily meetings with Mr Harper. Other routine meetings included the Attorney General, and to a much lesser extent the Bailiff. I also made use of rny regular cycle of meetings with the Minister for Home Affairs and the Assistant Minister. These meetings provided an opportunity for briefings and feedback, which was supplemented by informal meetings, and encounters in-between more formal meetings. For example, notebook 07/358 page 50 records a chance meeting with Senator Perchard, who was at that time Assistant Minister for Health, during which issues around the enquiry were discussed. I have described earlier the meeting cycle of the force, and how this involved regular contact with finance staff. These meetings continued throughout Rectangle and will be addressed in more detail later in this statement. Additional to my discussions with the Jersey authorities I provided periodic confidential briefings to His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor in his capacity as the representative of British Crown interests.

250. Perhaps the most significant of the contacts I established and maintained during this period was with Senator Stuart Syvret and his partner Deputy Carolyn Labey. Senator Syvret was by nature a person who was unlikely to work In co-operation with any group he saw as representing the Jersey "authorities," and this included the police. Yet he was a person who victims and witnesses would trust. He was our route into the "hard to reach and hard to hear" groups whose co-operation and confidence was important to the enquiry. I worked with Mr Harper in maintaining contact with Senator Syvret and Deputy Labey, and building their confidence in the independence and integrity of the police operation. This was done without compromise to confidential information held by the police. It was a relationship which was able to survive Senator Syvret's disappointment at the result of his complaints against the Attorney General and others which I have described earlier. Victims and witnesses would approach the Senator with information, and he would agree to pass this to the police. In reality this information rarely added to our knowledge. What was however, of greater value were his public assurances that the police investigation would be thorough and independent, and his encouragement to anyone with information to contact the Rectangle team. This is my perspective of the relationship with the Senator, and how it worked to the advantage of the enquiry. The investigating officer may see merit in obtaining an account from the Senator's own perspective.

251. It would be an over-statement to describe the activity in the preceding paragraphs as constituting the operation of a "Gold Network," but I was nevertheless conscious that it combined some of the principles which I hoped to incorporate into a more formal group at the right time.

252. While the logic of the narrative to this point would appear to require that I go on to describe the transition to a full gold group and its timing, I am conscious that I have also been asked to write about issues relating to a Community Impact Assessment and the Independent Advisory Group (l.A.G.) There is a degree of overlap in the subject matter which makes it difficult to address these themes separately. There is also the significance of the consequences of the formation of the I.AG. and how these amounted to a setback for the intention to form a gold group.

253. The Independent Advisory Group and Related Issues. 

To begin with, I have been asked to comment on the matter of the Community Impact Assessment (C.I.A.) My recollection is that this was mentioned to me by D.I. Fossey in an informal conversation which might have happened when I was on "walkabout" within police buildings or HDLG. She told me that a C.I.A. was being prepared. I noted what she said, and did not seek further involvement. From the context of the conversation I took it that she had been asked to complete the assessment by Lenny Harper. I was not familiar with the concept of a C.I.A. at that time but have since read about it from the guidelines on the management of a critical incident.

254. I see that the purpose of a C.I.A. is to "identify factors which may have an effect on community tranquillity." Under the guidelines the responsibility for ensuring that an assessment is carried out rests with "Chief Officers." Lenny Harper was a "Chief Officer" for the purposes of those guidelines. The guidelines state that assessments "may involve cross-border considerations (eg. where an incident takes place in one B.C.U. and the family lives in another.) From my reading of the guidance it appears that the primary relevance is to larger forces where communities are diverse and where there may be tensions in relationships with the police. I take the reference to factors which may have an effect on "community tranquillity" to be coded language which relates to the risk of police actions having the potential to trigger public disorder.

255. I decided not to get drawn into a discussion of the relevance of a C.I.A. in Jersey. Island policing is very different from the situations described in the guidelines relating to critical incidents. To begin with, the police service in Jersey lives within the community it polices. There is nowhere else where it can live. I have previously worked in urban stations in the U.K. where no police officer lived in the community we were policing, nor would we want to. We drove in to work, policed the area we were paid to police, and then drove home afterwards, often thankful that we did not have to live near our place of work. Island policing is not like that. We live and work as part of the community we police. We shop in the same shops, and drink in the same pubs. Our children go to the same schools, and we get our hair cut in the same hairdressers. Police officers are known and recognised on and off duty. Our police officers are recruited from every significant ethnic and economic community in the island. In these circumstances I question the need for elaborate tools to tell the Force what is going on in the street where we live. I am aware that there will be other views. However, I am the Chief Officer of the Force and that is my view.

256. Irrespective of my views regarding the relevance of a CIA, it had clearly been commissioned by the S.I.O. and that was a matter for him. I did however continue to monitor a reliable source of community views on a regular basis. This was the crime victim survey work undertaken by the force research unit. Among other things, victims were asked a few simple questions designed to provide a measure of public confidence in the force. The results were published quarterly, but I would visit the unit on a regular basis. I did this because I had a natural professional interest, and also because the then Chief Minister, Frank Walker, and the Chief Executive Bill Ogley, had told me from time to time that Rectangle was "damaging the reputation of the force." I once asked Frank Walker how he knew this, and he said that he knew it was true because all of his dinner-party guests and tennis partners said so. I was inclined to believe that the people to whom he referred were not necessarily a cross-section of the community, and thus sought reassurance from a more scientific source. For this reason I repeatedly checked with the research unit to see If there was any statistically significant change in public perceptions which might be attributed to Rectangle. None was found.

257. In his statement (paragraph 23,) Andre Baker describes a meeting he had with Lenny Harper, and myself at HDLG at which the formation of a gold group and an Independent Advisory Group (IAG) was discussed. Mr Harper did not want either but I was coming to the view that we might need both eventually, although I could see the argument that the time was not yet right for a gold group. There was a convincing argument that there was not yet sufficient clarity around who, in the potential partnerships which would constitute the group, might be directly or indirectly compromised as a consequence of the investigation. After discussion I decided that we would press ahead and form an IAG. All that I knew about an IAG was what Andre Baker told me at the meeting. I had never been involved in one before. Andre said that he would provide the necessary guidelines, terms of reference and advice. At that time I had mixed feelings regarding the relevance of an IAG but felt that on balance it should be tried. For reasons which I have discussed previously, I had reservations regarding the importation of English policing methodology into a small island force. However, I was resolved that an IAG would be formed and given a chance to succeed. In taking this decision I had a number of considerations in mind. Firstly, it might prove to be worthwhile in itself. Secondly, I had committed myself to working to the advice given by Andre Baker, and this was his advice. I either had to accept it or think of a good reason why not, and I could not think of one. Thirdly, in spite of my ingrained resistance to bureaucracy I was coming to the view that Rectangle was reaching a scale at which some of the management processes used in larger forces may need to be applied. This included a gold group. I saw the formation of an IAG as "making a start" which could be progressively developed Into other processes.

258. Having agreed to an IAG I then set about putting it together. I used contacts to produce a list of names and was pleased when all agreed to take part. I took a personal involvement in the early business of the group then deliberately pulled back to allow the relationship between the group and the Rectangle team to develop. Quite early in the life of the IAG I found myself fielding political "flack" from a variety of sources. No matter how often the purpose of the group was explained It was clear that some States members saw it as a threat. The group was portrayed as some sort of "watchdog" or oversight board which, it was argued, usurped the role of elected members. It was not long into the life of the group that the Attorney General became involved. This happened after the group had, with the best of intentions, invited public representations In respect of Rectangle. The Attorney General asked that I meet with him about this.

259. The Attorney General set out some of his reservations regarding the appropriateness of establishing such a group in Jersey. In his witness statement he says : 

"I was not sure that there was a role for such a group here in Jersey for this specific case alone. Whilst I can see the relevance of having such groups set up in the U.K. to advise for example where there were potential racial difficulties. I was not sure that there was (were any potential difficulties in this case which could be perceived by the community and which were unknown to the police."

(Witness statement of William Bailhache, H.M. Attorney General for Jersey, dated 30th April 2009 paragraph 112.
He also told me that he felt that the public consultation by the IAG put them in contact with potential jurors, and could prejudice future proceedings.

260. I could see the logic in the view of the Attorney General. I knew through the history of our working relationship the he was sensitive to any introduction of U.K. practices into the island, and the formation of the IAG was bound to run counter to his views. He also echoed my own views, expressed earlier, that in a small island force we do not need elaborate mechanisms to tell us what is happening on the streets in which we live. In case it is not obvious I make the point here that in some ways the experience regarding the IAG almost encapsulates one of the principal dilemmas in the command of an island force, and in some respects the command of 
Rectangle. If we do not follow U.K. procedures we may be accused of failing to follow !"best practice." If we do follow U.K. procedures we may be accused of unnecessarily importing foreign practices and undermining local autonomy.

261. The Attorney General told me that he wanted the IAG disbanded. I thought that this would be a bad Idea. It would be a media event in its own right, and create yet another incident to be managed. I spoke to colleagues and said that we should keep the group in existence if we could, but try to do this in a way which gave it a low profile. Conscious that if no action was taken it might just "fade away" I intervened on 4th August 2008 to press for a "re-launch" of the group. On 14'" August 2008 I pressed for a further meeting and a chance for the group to meet David Warcup. D.I. Fossey asked for delay due to availability problems. I feared that if another meeting did not happen soon, then recovery would be impossible. I Instructed that a meeting should "happen" irrespective of whether all members could attend. This would allow David Warcup to introduce himself to members, and attempt to take the group forward undEr his Leadership. (Email chain 4th-14th August 2008.) The group continued to meet throughout 2008. I later learned that they resigned in 2009 well after I had been suspended. Whatever led to their demise, it was not due to any actions taken by me. I respect all members of the group for the effort they put in and for their patience during a difficult experience. They were all busy people who had voluntarily given up their time to undertake a difficult public role. I wish that things had worked out differently.

262. The experience of the IAG caused me to think again about the extent to which I should be following the model recommended by the HWG, and in particular the timing of the introduction of the gold group. I was having these thoughts at a time when relationships between Mr Harper and the Law Officers were strained, and there were corresponding tensions with other areas of the public sector. I was coming to the view that the formation of a gold group and the application of some of the processes associated with a major crime enquiry In the U.K. would stand the best chance of success if positioned as part of the change in the management regime for Rectangle. I discussed this with David Warcup, and indicated that I would try to keep things "ticking over" until he took command, and that thereafter, we should make a series of changes in the management and oversight of the enquiry. After David Warcup assumed responsibility for Rectangle we had a series of discussions regarding the enquiry, but specifically regarding the need for the new SIO, when appointed, to bring the investigation within a management structure which Mr Warcup would find more familiar. This is confirmed by David Warcup in paragraph 183 of his statement when he says "Throughout the selection process it was absolutely clear that we were recruiting a candidate who had the skills and experience to work to the. recognised national standards which I have previously referred to."

263. It was through this chain of events that the Gold Group came into being and was launched at a time when it had the maximum chance of success. I am pleased that this new innovation in the policing of the island has proved successful. I attribute much of its success to the preparation and timing which I brought to its Introduction.

264. Finally I have been asked in this context to provide information on the process of review, and the justification for a single agency approach. I believe that both of these issues have been covered in earlier parts of this statement.

265. Financial Management. 

I have been asked to comment on my obligations under the Public Finances (Jersey) Law 2005 and the financial management of Rectangle. The introduction of the 2005 Law was a significant event for the Jersey Public Sector and for the Force. Prior to the introduction of the Law the Force had a Finance Director and supporting staff who assisted the management tearn by monitoring budgets and providing day to day advice. The Director of Finance was a member of the Force senior management team and attended executive meetings. During this period, and all other times under my command the force has operated within budget. 

266. The 2005 Law Introduced the concept of an "Accounting Officer." I saw a copy of the law at the draft stage, and noted it proposed that the Accounting Officer responsible for the Force would be the Chief Officer of the Home Affairs Department who was Steven Austin-Vautier. I also noted that in the guidelines accompanying the draft law the duties of an Accounting Officer included the setting of targets and objectives for line managers, and the monitoring of their performance. This had the appearance of an attempt by stealth to bring the management of the force under the control of a Civil Servant. The Chief Officer for Home Affairs took his instructions directly from the Minister for Home Affairs, and he also had a line of reporting through the Treasurer to the States, to the Minister for Finance. I suspected that it was yet another move in a recurrent agenda which sought to bring the police service "Into line" and give it a status no different from any other States Department. A few years earlier I had spotted a similar move during the drafting of the Employment (Jersey) Law 2003. The Initial draft of the Law effectively turned police officers into employees of the States, and gave Ministers direct powers of discipline and suspension. With valuable and much appreciated assistance from the Law Officers Department this aspect of the law was withdrawn, and the status of police officers as "office holders" accountable to their Chief Officer was preserved. However, the Public Finances Law proved to be more problematic.

267. I had meetings on the subject with the Chief Executive Bill Ogley, The Treasurer to the States Ian Black, and the Chief Officer of the Home Affairs Department Steven Austin-Vautier. I also submitted at least one paper opposing the proposals and giving examples of good practice advice from elsewhere. The thrust of my argument was that the Chief Officer of Police should be the Accounting Officer for the force, with appropriate qualified support, and that there should be no intrusive powers vested in a civil servant or any other person who was not a sworn police officer. This would maintain operational and financial responsibility under a single chain of command. The outcome was that I won half of the argument. On my analysis, once it became clear that the proposed controlling influence over the management of the force had been identified, and that it had been made clear that this would be challenged, there was no appetite to take it further. The attempt to bring the management of the force under political control through the small print of the Finance Law had been discovered, and whoever was behind the proposal would have to await their chance another day. However, it was decided that the Chief Officer of Home Affairs would be the Accounting Officer, but he would have no control over the management of the Force. Then, as now, the Chief Officer of Home Affairs is Steven Austin-Vautier. He had supported the original proposal. I told him that I thought that he was foolish to do so. He had accepted responsibility for something over which he had no control and this was always bad practice. In my view he should have supported my bid to assume the role of Accounting Officer, or better still, he should have supported my efforts to remove the Force from direct Ministerial influence by the establishment of a Police Authority as recommended by the Clothier Committee some seven years earlier, along with the devolved budget which formed part of the Clothier Model.

268. Not long afterwards the then Director of Finance and his staff were removed from police premises and re-located in the offices of the Home Affairs Department. I then had to think about how we would manage the Force without any qualified finance staff, and without any direct access to financial information. Having discussed the matter with Steven Austin-vautier I decided that I should make it clear to the management team that the Home Affairs financial staff would have unrestricted access to the force, and that finance staff were expected to attend meetings of the Executive Strategy Group and the Force Management Board. This would give them formal engagement with the management of the force every one or two weeks as well as any informal contact they needed at other times. The Home Affairs Department financial staff (some of whom had recently been the police finance staff) did as requested and their attendance at Force meetings is well documented in the minutes of those meetings. There was always a standing item regarding finance, and the visitors from Home Affairs were encouraged to produce a single page report on headline issues. Primarily, this would involve details of spending to date and projections to the year end. If there was a projected over or under-spend there would be advice on how this could be addressed. If there was a "problem," for example expenditure which appeared to be inconsistent with the budget, or a demand for expenditure which was hard to address, the meeting would nominate a member of the Operations Management team to work directly with the finance officer to resolve it, and report the outcome to the next meeting. Importantly, this was also an occasion for the Accounting Officer, through his representative, to formally record any concerns. The record will show that this hardly ever happened.

269. I believe that the record of the meetings referred to will show effective corporate governance of the finances of the force in difficult circumstances. Sometimes the arrangement  led to near-farcical situations. On occasions the Treasurer to the States would ask for expenditure information, or there would be a need for the provision of financial data for some reason. This request would usually be addressed to the Accounting Officer or his nominee at Home Affairs, although sometimes it would be addressed to "all Chief Officers" which meant that it came to both me and the Accounting Officer. In the latter case the request would then be forwarded to me to deal with. I would respond by asking the relevant Home Affairs Finance Officer to provide the required information. I would then re-transmit the information back to Home Affairs so that the Accounting Officer could respond to the enquiry. Somehow we made the system work, but it is not an ideal way to conduct the financial management of a police force. At the end of each year Steven Austin-Vautier asked me for assurances regarding financial management. I think that this was a requirement of the finance Law. This would trigger some exchanges about the degree of assurance I was able to give. We usually agreed a form of words which made it clear that I was providing any assurance on the basis of advice which I had been given by his staff. I know of no other police organisation which operates without any financially qualified staff, and without direct access to financial information. When the arrangement was first imposed as a consequence of the Finance law, I speculated with Steven as to whether he and I were being set up to fail. He did not think so.

270. When it became clear that Rectangle was likely to have significant financial implications I asked Steven Austin-Vautier what arrangement he wanted in respect of financial management. I was conscious that it was his decision to make. He was the accounting officer and he had the legal responsibility for the budget. He said that he would appoint his Senior Finance Officer, Liz Middleton, to work directly with the Rectangle team. Liz was in many respects the right choice. She was his most senior finance officer, well accustomed to working with the police, and her abilities were respected. There was however a drawback which I was not able to discuss with Steven. I was aware that she was in a relationship with one of the suspects. The person concerned was (redaction) (108) (redaction)  The relationship was said to have been formed when (redaction) When the relationship became more generally known Liz was transferred to Home Affairs and (108)  retired not long afterwards. Both (108) and (Redaction)  Mario Lundy, were both being "named" in connection with allegations at the time.

271. This was during a stage in the enquiry when new allegations were a daily event and the picture was still incomplete. It later became clear that the main allegations against (108)  and Lundy related to physical abuse in their supervision of young boys, and that some might characterise this as "harsh treatment" rather than criminal abuse. However, at the early stages it was not possible to predict how far reaching or serious the allegations may turn out to be. I discussed with Lenny Harper how we should manage the appointment of Liz Middleton to the role and he did not seem concerned. As I recall he felt that she could manage the financial issues without access to operational information. He would monitor the situation and ensure that she did not gain access to the sensitive aspects of the enquiry.

272. From that point onwards I checked periodically with Steven Austin-Vautier that he was getting full cooperation from the Force. The budget for Rectangle was discussed regularly at management meetings. The record will show that details of Rectangle expenditure were reported at force meetings, and significantly. no concerns were expressed. No matter what the finance staff may say now, the fact is that they repeatedly attended meetings in the force when they "had the floor" and also had the opportunity to record any concerns regarding budgets, expenditure  or access. They could do this verbally or in writing. The minutes were always an agreed true record of what occurred, and would be forwarded to Ministers and published on the force Intranet. No significant concerns were recorded.

273. There were a few key events along the way which merit comment. One was the unexpected announcement by the Chief Minister, Frank Walker to the effect that money would be no object in the abuse enquiry. Under the Finance Law he had no authority to do this. Only the States could vote for expenditure which was beyond the allocated budget. This took all Chief Officers by surprise, and undermined efforts which were being made to impose financial discipline. This was not unprecedented. Ministers were sometimes prone to making headline- seeking announcements which had financial implications, without then having any notion of where the money would come from. In this case it was more serious because of the potential scale of the expenditure, and because most Chief Officers had not assessed the implications for their department, or how they would be managed. While Chief Officers and financial staff understood the true position in respect of the Chief Minister's announcement, most other staff did not, and some saw it as a licence to spend as they saw fit. Myself and others then had to devote time and effort explaining the correct legal position to staff and restraining those who were about to commit to significant expenditure. My email to David Minty dated 1st May 2008 is one example. In short, I had been asked to sanction some additional expenditure in consequence of the enquiry. I pointed out that the announcement by the Chief Ministef may have been "ultra-vires" and that we should await the outcome of a formal vote in the States before making further commitments.

274. From time to time I received verbal assurances from Liz Middleton and her staff, and from Lenny Harper that the direct relationship was working well and that full access to financial information was being provided. Steven Austin-Vautier appeared to be doing things his, way, which tended to be relaxed and informal. His department did not appear to me to have the same rigour in its corporate governance structure as the police. Nevertheless, it was his business and not mine, I was conscious of the problems which can occur when there are "two captains on the bridge of the same ship," and I remained respectful of his responsibilities by keeping a discreet distance. This was particularly so in light of the assurances I was being given.

275. Things changed on 22nd May 2008 when the Treasurer to the States, Ian Black, intervened and appeared to remind Steven Austin-Vautier of the extent of his responsibilities as Accounting Officer. In an email the Treasurer told him "the Accounting Officer was personally responsible for prudent and economical administration, and that resources are used efficiently and effectively." Steven was prompted to contact me on 27th May and ask me to sign a letter which provided him with assurances regarding the financial management of the investigation. This request was in addition to the annual document of assurance which I have referred to earlier. As far as I know this was the only action which Steven Austin-Vautier proposed to take in response to the email from the Treasurer. I declined to sign the letter. I was not directly involved in Rectangle which was being overseen full time by Lenny Harper. In addition, I had deliberately kept a distance from the relationship between Lenny Harper and the finance team. I resisted the temptation to remind Steven Austin-Vautier that the only way I could get financial information on any police activity was to ask a member of his own staff, who would be in an office a few feet from his own. However, Steven had asked for support, and I resolved that I would provide It. I also saw it as an opportunity to bring my own style of working to bear on the financial oversight of Rectangle, as opposed to what I saw as the less structured approach which Home Affairs had been taking.

276. I responded to him on 9th June 2008. The delay was because I had taken a few days leave which I had spent locally. (Notebook 08/95 pages 36-37.) I responded by suggesting that what the situation needed was a Financial Oversight Board (FOB) with agreed membership, an agenda, and minutes of meetings. I recommended that apart from myself and Steven the membership should include Liz Middleton and the S.I.O. Steven agreed to my proposal, but seemed slow to take it forward. I see that the first meeting did not take place until 23rd July 2008. I recall that at the first and subsequent meetings I seemed to be the one taking the proactive approach. I introduced the concept of "constructive challenge" into the terms of reference and I urged Steven to obtain support from auditors. All of this was accepted. The investigating officer will note from the minutes of the Financial Oversight Board that there is no record of any unresolved concerns raised regarding the expenditure associated with Rectangle.

277. I was alert to the fact that I had agreed that David Warcup should press ahead with the establishment of a gold group, and there was an overlap with the responsibilities of the Financial Oversight Board. I envisaged that once the Gold Group was firmly established, it would be possible for it to absorb the FOB into its business. I discussed this with David Warcup who had asked me about the future of the FOB. I explained the difficulty that both Steven Austin-Vautier and I were then in positions where we were taking personal responsibility for finance, and I was not ready to let go of personal control through the FOB until I was sure that a proper and proven arrangement was in place for discharging those responsibilities on our behalf.

278, I have been asked to cover a number of other points relating to finance, some of which are tactical and some operational. I will provide as much information as I have on these issues. To begin with there is the curious matter of the Rectangle overtime costs, and their alleged impact on Jersey pensions. This is referred to in my email of 20th August 2008. This followed a meeting of the Corporate Management Board (CMB) which is the public sector Chief Officer group. Towards the end of the meeting we were given advance information on the pension rises for the year, which were due to be announced. I recall that this information was given by Mick Pinel who is a senior civil servant in the Human Resources Department. He said that pension rises were linked to pay costs in the public sector and that these had risen by 5%. It was recognised by all present that this created a potential problem. There was a constant political agenda around the cost of the public sector, which in popular belief was overstaffed and costly. This belief was countered by claims by Ministers that costs were being reduced. I recall that the public sector pay increase for the relevant year had been about 2.5% and that there had been no significant increase in staff. A cost increase of 5% therefore needed some explaining. I had little doubt that the rise would be due to questionable re-grading and similar devices used to overcome pay restraint. I was therefore not pleased to hear that it was proposed to attribute the increase to the overtime costs of Rectangle. I saw this as a straightforward evasion of responsibility by those tasked with restraining public sector staff costs.

279. I argued it was not plausible that police overtime should have such an impact. The Force as a whole only constituted 6% of the public sector. I said that if challenged, I would point this out. There was some discussion and back-tracking, but I left the meeting feeling that an attempt might still be made to make the police scapegoats for failings in the system, or of individual performance. On returning to my office I sent out my customary email to the management team alerting them to relevant issues arising from the CMB. In this case the pension rise and its  implications was the only item. I alerted them to the issue and set out "lines to take" in the event of any media enquiries. I have stated earlier how it is my practice to suggest "lines to take" with the media on difficult issues. This is a practice to which I will refer again later in this statement. I make no apologies for the attempted mirth in the email. We were having few enough laughs at the time, and an attempt to ease the famine was justified.

280. In respect of specific issues, such as the financial policy book and travel costs I see that an email chain dated 27th May 2008 indicated that the Accounting Officer, Steven Austin-Vautier and Liz Middleton were meeting directly with Lenny Harper. The emails also confirm that access was given to the financial policy book, and that there was scrutiny of travel costs. This is in accordance with my own recollection. I recall only one issue about travel costs in which I became directly involved. I believe that it concerned a trip to Australia to interview witnesses which resulted in questions In the States to the Minister for Home Affairs. I asked Lenny Harper about the costs and he provided an explanation which addressed the concerns. I have also been asked about hotel bills and hospitality. I do not think that I can help with this. These issues are a long way down the management chain, and I assume that nobody expects that I would have personally scrutinised hotel bills and things of that nature. I was satisfied that qualified financial personnel were being given unrestricted access to all relevant items. I was satisfied that they were reporting regularly to both me and the Accounting Officer on the results of their work. and I have no recollection or record of any relevant concerns being raised. Similar reasoning applies to issues such as the costs of forensic and other experts. My understanding is that these resources were obtained in consultation with the relevant U.K. authorities and their cost was whatever is normally paid in such circumstances. I am not an expert on what forensic experts should or should not be paid. I was not personally involved in the recording of any of this expenditure, nor as Chief Officer of the Force would I expect to be. The feedback I received from the appointed financial experts was that all matters were properly documented and the records were available for examination. The finance personnel employed by the Home Affairs Department have a number of roles, one of which is to give me regular advice on the financial management of the business of the force, and to bring to my attention any matter which requires my intervention. No evidence has been offered that any financial matter was brought to my notice which was not properly addressed by me. 

281. I have been asked about cordon costs, and I can help a little with this. In a small force the cordon could only be staffed by means of overtime, and I knew this would be expensive. I used my contacts and influence with the Honorary Police to maximise their involvement. I encouraged the establishment of "mutual aid" to the St Martin's Honorary Police, and personally and actively worked the relationship to maintain commitment and involvement. This included networking with senior honorary officers, as well as regular visits to the honorary officers staffing the cordon. If this had not been done successfully the costs would have been substantially higher. As with a previous item. Corroboration may be available from Centenier Malcolm L'Amy who was actively involved in this partnership.

282. On a minor point Liz Middleton, in paragraph 18 of her statement, speculates as to whether I received financial training on 27th March 2007. Notebook 07/120 page 2, records that during the day in question I was engaged in other matters which included the planning of a cycle event. I recall this involved a stage of the Tour De Bretagne, and there were sensitive issues to be managed including the presence of the Gendarmerie for the duration of the race. I have no recollection of being given the training to which she refers.

283. I do not think that there is a great deal more that I can add on the subject of finance. I was actively engaged in attempting to make a seriously imperfect system work, and at every stage I was advised by qualified financial experts. I have seen no claim or any evidence that any access, or information, was denied to anyone with a legitimate responsibility for the management and scrutiny of the budget of Rectangle.

284. Finally, I notice that on 25th July 2009 the Jersey Evening Post carried a report of evidence given to the Public Accounts Committee by Steven Austin-Vautier. He is reported to have said that Rectangle exposed "serious weaknesses" in Home Affairs accounting arrangements. The report says that he described the difficulties arising from the fact that the department had two Chief Officers, and that he as Accounting Officer had no control over police operations. He described the arrangement as "vulnerable." There is no report of Mr Austin-Vautier having told the Committee that I opposed the arrangement from the very beginning because of the divided responsibility and vulnerabilities which he describes. He also appears to have been silent on his own role in undermining my attempts to prevent the arrangement being imposed.

285. Media Management. General. 

The Investigating Officer has provided me with a significant list of points to cover in relation to the media aspects of Rectangle. Included in these is a request to comment on "The sensationalist media releases and the consequences of these." I am happy to do so, and it is perhaps appropriate that I begin with an admission. I am aware of one media event associated with Rectangle which can fairly be described as "sensationalist." It is apparent that during the course of that event, both the media and the public were provided with misleading information, and that the consequences of this were both damaging and long term. I refer to the media conference staged by Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell on Wednesday 12th November 2008. I will address that event in more detail in a later section of this statement, but will first set out some of the history in an approximate chronological sequence.

286. To begin with it needs to be remembered that for about the first year of its existence Rectangle was a covert operation, with no media aspects to address. That is not to say there was media silence on the general subject matter. Senator Syvret and his supporters were active in alleging that Jersey had a hidden history of child abuse, and that the authorities were resolved to do nothing about it. He was equally sure that the police were compromised, and that the local force would never take effective action. We obviously monitored these media and political events, but made a conscious decision not to counter any of the stories by admitting the existence of Rectangle. Over time the media focus grew stronger and interest was shown by U.K. broadcasters in the story. It was clear that at some stage we would have to go public, but that ideally this should be at a time which met operational requirements, and was allied to an appeal for witnesses and victims to come forward. I know that Lenny Harper spent some time visiting a specialist unit in the Metropolitan Police, where he received advice on timing and process. Work was done developing a website giving contact details for the enquiry and to encourage victims and witnesses to get in touch.

287. Throughout this process, the roles of myself and Lenny Harper fell into a pattern which was to be carried forward into the later stages of the enquiry. He managed the enquiry. I managed the external relationships and the running of the force. I did not reveal anything confidential to Stuart Syvret but I tried by various means to convince him that the police were independent, and  that we would respond professionally to any evidence of abuse. I also had brief conversations with the Minister for Home Affairs Wendy Kinnard, the Chief Minister Frank Walker and the Chief Executive Bill Ogley. I did not divulge a lot of detail, but the core of what I said was that we were looking at some historical reports in order to determine whether a full investigation was justified. I gave Wendy Kinnard what amounted to political advice on the matter. I said that how she positioned herself in relation to the Syvret campaign was a matter for her, but that a position in which she appeared to suggest, as some were, that Syvret was making allegations which had no substance, could leave her wrong footed. I gave similar advice to Bill Ogley with the suggestion that he try to influence the public statements of Ministers accordingly. I also advised Bill Ogley and Frank Walker that should a major abuse enquiry be launched there would be significant media management demands upon the islands government, and they should consider making appropriate preparations. I do not think that they absorbed this message.

288. As things progressed I decided that my briefings to the key figures needed to be put on a more formal footing. This was done by the reading of prepared statements from my notebook to Wendy Kinnard and Bill Ogley. It may be recalled that I have mentioned these statements previously. They were agreed in advance between myself and Lenny Harper, and intended to put key figures on formal notice that the profile of events was likely to increase. I also described one attempt to read a statement to Frank Walker, but he decided not to attend the briefing. As before, these statements can be found In notebook 07/58 where they commence on pages 20 and 24. There can be no doubt from these entries that key figures in government were formally put on alert that Rectangle was about to "take off" and that some preparation would be appropriate. They also show evidence that there had been earlier briefings containing less detail. Through all of this I was trying to maintain common ownership of the enquiry, and maintain unity through what I anticipated would be a difficult period.

289. When Rectangle became public, which was in the latter part of 2007, the political controversy intensified. There were angry exchanges in the States and elsewhere, which in brief involved Senator Syvret stating that he was right all along, and Ministers defending their position. On 19th February 2008 the search at HDLG began. Attempts were made to keep information about the search on a need-to-know basis, but it somehow came to the notice of the media and a photographer, said to be from the News of the World, was found hiding in the bushes. According to my notebook this appears to have been on the same day. (Notebook 07/358 page 79.) I have recorded that I spoke to the Chief Minister, Frank Walker, and alerted him to possible media interest in order that he could prepare himself for any approach. I discussed the position with Lenny Harper. We agreed that we could not let the local media 
discover details of the search by reading the News of the World, and that it was appropriate to give them some indication of what was going on. I am not sure, but it might be this was done on the same day or the following day.

290. I have been provided with a copy of a press release which appears to have been issued on 23rd February 2008 and relates to the "first find." I recall we prepared something before that but I am not sure. My recollection is that we discussed drafts of some initial media releases which were low profile, suggesting that we were examining the location for evidence and nothing more. It may even be that we passed brief details verbally to contacts in the local media. This recollection is re-enforced by a notebook entry on 22nd February which refers to my discussion of a "cover story" with Lenny Harper. (Notebook 07/358 page 83.) I also note that Louise Journeaux refers to a media release which was not issued (statement Louise Journeaux paragraph 8.) Whatever it was we said, or indeed if we said anything at all, it cannot have gained wide attention because I see that in his statement Senator Shenton states that when we worked a nightshift together on 22nd February 2008 he was unaware of what he describes as the "excavations." (Statement of Ben Shenton paragraph 2, and notebook 07/358 page 83.) I do not want to get diverted on this point, but there is among all this, clear evidence that we hoped to undertake necessary work at HDLG and to leave afterwards, with the minimum of media attention,.We were not looking for a media presence at HDLG. Jersey politicians were providing enough media entertainment of their own, and we hoped that we could keep the search operation out of the spotlight.

291. Things changed when we had the first find, generally known as the "fragment of skull.'' There had been a build-up to this event which is worth a few words to set the scene. My notebook indicates that on 20th February Mr Harper had told me that the search dog had given an "indication" (notebook 07/358 page 80.) near to the point on the floor where bones had been reportedly recovered around 3/4 years previously. The brief history of this was that bones had been found during building work but had been identified as animal bones. Some witnesses had subsequently cast doubt upon this identification. I spoke to the Chief Executive Bill Ogley and he had agreed that we could start to take up the floor (notebook 07/358 page 80.) In case it is not obvious I spoke to him because it was States property and he had agreed to be the point of contact for any consent. I see from my notes that much of this day and the other days between the start of the search, and the first find, was spent speaking to various people in government, keeping them updated, and resolving any misunderstandings. I also followed up an issue regarding suspect (Redaction) who had visited the scene, (Redaction) I asked Bill Ogley about this, was later told by him that he had made enquiries, and been assured that the visit was apparently legitimate, and in connection with departmental business (notebook 07/358 page 81.). I did not think this plausible, but felt that the matter could be taken no further at that time. I would have informed the Major Incident Room (MIR) of the result of this enquiry.

292. I see from my notes that on the morning of Sunday 23rd February 2008 Lenny Harper telephoned and told me about the first "find." (Notebook 07/358 page 83.) My recollection is that he said that it was "a piece of a child's skull." He said that it had been positively identified by a qualified scientist at the scene, and that it had been found in the location where the bones had been found previously. By then the media interest had grown, and he felt that he had to make an announcement to counter leaks and speculation. I do not know if he said so at the time, but he had an agenda of seeking to build confidence in the momentum of the investigation, and refute claims that the police were part of any establishment cover-up. We could do little for the reputation of the government or the criminal justice system, but we were both resolved to place strong emphasis on the independence and integrity of the police. The challenge of achieving this is comparably difficult in Jersey. In the U.K. and other jurisdictions the authorities may have their problems, but it would be unusual to find any comparable part of the British Isles where suspicion and cynicism regarding those in authority was so ingrained in the popular culture. There are no ACPO guidelines which offer help in dealing with this scenario. Yet it was ever present. It is the "elephant in the room" which had an influence on the enquiry, and the actions of many of its key players.

293. After this conversation I made contact with the Minister for Home Affairs, Wendy Kinnard and the Chief Minister Frank Walker. I gave them an update. (Notebook 07/358 page 84.) This was part of a further effort to prepare the Island's government for the inevitable increase in media Interest. Later that day Lenny Harper issued his media release which refers to the "potential remains of a child." We had not as far as I can recall discussed the wording which would be used in the release. He was a long-serving and experienced police officer who had a style and mind of his own. Nevertheless, I was a bit surprised at the words he had used. Not because they were untrue, because it was believed that they were, but because they were insufficiently precise and capable of wider interpretation. Nevertheless, If we had found a part of a child's skull, then a child was dead. There could not be much doubt about that. Never at any time did I suspect that the original identification by the scientist might be wrong. So far as I was concerned a qualified forensic expert had identified the find, and the police were acting on the basis of what we had been told.

294. This news led to a significant rise in the political temperature, and some high profile appearances in the U.K. media involving the Chief Minister Frank Walker and Senator Stuart Syvret. It was generally felt that Walker did not perform well, and did not succeed in convincing his audience that his government had nothing to fear from the enquiry. I make this point because It is my recollection that it was the political exchanges as much as the police investigation which was driving media interest. Journalists were becoming focussed on the political debate as much as anything which was said or done by the police. The news of the find also fitted a wider agenda of "Island of Secrets" with hidden money, hidden bank accounts, hidden abuse and now hidden bodies. Over the days which followed, I was busy in discussions with government, visits to the scene and related issues. I was concerned that Jersey's government was not handling things well, and this was feeding media interest. I spoke to the Chief Executive Bill Ogley and encouraged him to form a small crisis management team which 
should meet every morning. He did this and included the Home Affairs Minister Wendy Kinnard along with a group of other Ministers. I do not know the full composition of the group but I believe that it Included the Chief Minister Frank Walker, the Health Minister Ben Shenton, and the Education Minister who I believe was Mike Vibert. Wendy Kinnard only attended the first few meetings. She told me that at every meeting she had come under attack from the other Ministers because of her responsibility for the police. This was a constant theme in her discussions with me during the enquiry.  On more than one occasion she told me that whatever Ministers were saying in public, in private they did not support the enquiry and just wanted it to go away.

295. I also had a direct discussion with Frank Walker in the presence of Bill Ogley. According to my notes this appears to have been on 26th February 2008. (Notebook 07/358 page 86.) I told the Chief Minister directly something he already knew, namely that he was performing badly in the U.K. media, and that this was damaging to the island. He was not used to dealing with a hostile media and was finding the whole experience traumatic. I offered some suggestions. I said that he needed expert advice, or he should start listening to the advice he was being given. I then offered some advice of my own. I pointed out that he repeatedly appeared in outdoor Interviews, in a long dark coat and dark glasses. He looked, and sometimes sounded, like a Mafia Godfather. He needed to address that image. I was conscious that the poiitlcal pantomime was attracting media attention to the enquiry and encouraging sensationalist reporting. The media were releasing interviews with victims, or people who said that they were victims, and the whole agenda was escalating. The Chief Minister made some changes to his approach in consequence of the advice given to him by myself and others. Nevertheless, the media performances of Frank Walker and other local figures continued to constitute a "media magnet" which had consequences for the coverage of the enquiry.

296. A few days earlier I had heard some news which created further challenges in respect of media management. I discovered that the Dean of Jersey, The Very Reverend Bob Key had arranged a Church service which would be attended by local dignitaries, and anyone else who wished to take part. This was in the Church at Gouray, close to HDLG. I forget what the official reason for the service was, but in the media and the public mind it seemed to assume the status of a communal act of remorse or something of that nature. I should say that I have not the slightest doubt, that this was arranged for the very best motives and with hindsight some move of this nature was probably inevitable. It did however constitute a further enhancement of potential media Interest. I have a note that on 25th February I telephoned the Dean and we discussed the service. (Notebook 7/358 page 85.) I was concerned that the whole thing was spiralling upwards and that public perceptions were being driven by what the media were alleging, rather than what the police were saying. I told Bob Key our position was that we did not know if any crime had been committed, and that contrary to reports there was no murder enquiry. I suggested as best I could, that he tone his words accordingly.

297. I discussed the Church service with Lenny Harper, who immediately said that he would have nothing to do with it. It would inflame media interest, and his presence would only make matters worse. I agreed, but as Chief Officer of the Force I did not think I had the luxury of choice. I had to attend. To do otherwise would have created yet another story. Accordingly, appropriately dressed in my best uniform, I attended the service on the evening of Tuesday 26th February 2008. (Notebook 07/358 page 87.) When I arrived at the church, I was surrounded by cameras and microphones, and when I left the church, I was blinded by spotlights, and again surrounded by the media. I gave a significant number of media interviews on that occasion, as I did on a number of subsequent occasions. I will now go on to address what our approach to the media was at the time, our respective roles in dealing with the media, and the key messages we tried to emphasise.

298. From the beginning we agreed that we would try to be as transparent as the circumstances allowed. This was to build confidence in the enquiry and to encourage anyone with evidence to come forward. The media frequently contrasted this with the "secrecy culture" which they perceived to exist in the governance of the island. There was no suitable place at HDLG to hold a conventional style press conference. Lenny Harper decided to give his interviews in the road outside. This was a style which suited his general approach. I have seen many police press conferences on television. These are usually carried out from behind a table and accompanied by attempts to manage the questions. Some are good. Many are wooden and laden with police-speak. Few have the feel of being genuine or personal. It was never likely that Lenny Harper would be comfortable in a formal conference setting. He was up close, direct and personal. It was his natural style. He was also good at it. He could face the world's media without a script and answer any questions without notice. Few police officers can do that.

299. We divided our responsibilities and agreed "lines." I would concentrate on the strategic questions, and he would deal with the operational aspects. There was bound to be overlap, but I was resolved not to get into operational detail. In some discussions with politicians, I was occasionally asked if I could also cover the details of the enquiry itself, and effectively combine the two roles. This was suggested as some people felt Lenny was the cause of the intense media interest, which some in government found uncomfortable. In my assessment, the main causes of much of the interest were the number of people giving detailed accounts of abuse to the media, (described in HWG first report paragraph 8), and the bumbling attempts of some politicians to address media questions. Additionally, I did not have the command of detail which Lenny had. He was engaged in the enquiry full time. I was attempting to concentrate on the running of the force, and, in accordance with the policy described earlier in the HWG reports, acting as a buffer between the enquiry and external distractions. I note from the statement of the Force Media Relations Officer, Louise Journeaux (paragraph 3) that in the early days of the enquiry she believes I had about ten interactions with the media. This would be consistent with my recollection. I know that from the commencement of the enquiry up to the appointment of David Warcup I gave interviews on a regular basis. After David Warcup was appointed I deliberately pulled back so that he could take the lead.

300. Sometimes the media interviews I gave were specific to the enquiry, but frequently they were an aside to other matters. As Chief Officer of the force I had a high profile and would give media interviews on request at almost any time. I do not remember ever turning down a request for an interview by the local media on any policing issue. During Rectangle these interviews might be about operational events, crime statistics or some other relevant topic. There was an understanding that when I had spoken on the main theme of an interview I would answer a few general questions about Rectangle (this approach is touched upon in the HWG second report in reference to Recommendation 13.) I see that in the notes provided to me it is suggested that some people think I did not do enough In my dealings with the media. This is plain nonsense, and needs no counter-argument from me. The record speaks for itself. 

301. Our media lines were consistent and well co-ordinated. They can be confirmed by accessing the recordings made at the time. We would stress that we were investigating serious allegations of abuse. We were searching at HDLG because there were reports of suspicious incidents, and scientific indications which we had a duty to investigate. There may be foul play, or there may not. Everything which had been found could have an innocent explanation. We were not investigating a murder. In his early briefings Lenny Harper said "We have no allegations that anyone died or was murdered here." (Media Review. M. Tapp. Page 22.) The HWG reviewed the media strategy and said "The SIO has retained an open mind with regard to the piece of skull that was recovered. He acknowledges that it could be quite dated and not from a murder." (HWG first report paragraph 8.)

302. As part of the disclosure process, I have been provided with a report by a P.C. Dunwell-Smith which reviews some of Lenny Harper's media broadcasts. The document speaks for itself. The following are representative comments which are consistent with my recollection of what was being said to the media:.......... "28/02/08 ...SKY...'Must stress that there may be an innocent explanation far what the dog may have found." ......."Journalist asks about 'shackles'......... . . . LH states that they haven't found any shackles in there and thinks they relate to a statement given by a builder in the last couple of days. An 'item' was found in the cellar, making enquiries into this."............ "LH emphasises that there is no evidence that anyone was murdered or died at HDLG in these rooms but there is evidence of abuse there."

303. My own media work was in a similar vein, but less specific. I emphasised that we were dealing with serious allegations of abuse. I said that these types of allegations were hard to investigate. Sometimes in enquiries of this nature there would be cases which people might think should to go to court, but which were not prosecuted. That was because historical cases were recognised as difficult, but we would nevertheless do our best. Anyone with evidence was encouraged to come forward. The police were working independently of any political interference and Lenny Harper was doing a good job trying to thoroughly investigate what was alleged.

304. On some occasions I was drawn into more specific comment. Some of this happened after the Church service, and will be on record. I recall one exchange because it typified the yawning gap which was emerging between what the police were saying to the media, and what the media were reporting. This was a frequent source of tension with Ministers and other politicians. They would read something sensational in the press and just assume this was what Lenny Harper had said. I repeatedly had to point out that he had said nothing of the sort. At times I had the feeling that some politicians were stepping beyond reasonable challenge and criticism, and were seeking to demonise Mr Harper as the source of all of the problems. I had to remind them that the cause of the problems was the historical abuse, and the apparent failure to confront it over many years, not the person who was trying to discover the truth and bring closure to the situation. In this context I recall being asked during a media interview about the number of locations which were being searched within the HDLG complex. I said that we were searching about 6 locations. We were doing this because we had been given scientific advice that these were locations which merited investigation. I recall saying that "we might find something or we might find nothing." I said all we could be sure of was that these were locations which, as professional investigators, we had a duty to explore and try to find the truth one way or another. The following day I saw a headline which said "Police Search for Six Bodies." 

305. I monitored Lenny Harper's interviews through Sky News, and in our regular meetings the media strategy was discussed. We talked of the advantages and disadvantages of scaling down media interest. We knew that it was difficult and expensive for the U.K. media to operate in Jersey. We felt that if we slowly reduced the number of briefings they would effectively grow hungry for news elsewhere and gradually drift away. Running counter to this was Lenny Harper's view that the media coverage was opening doors, and bringing in new evidence. From time to time he would point to the number of calls which had followed a particular broadcast. I checked this out for myself. When on "walkabout" I would talk to the staff operating the dedicated phone lines for victims and witnesses. We had published the numbers of these lines in the press and on the internet, and repeated the numbers during the media broadcasts. The staff I spoke to provided anecdotal evidence of interviews with Mr Harper which, when broadcast, had resulted in a surge of calls, necessitating the deployment of extra staff and overtime. This anecdotal evidence should now be capable of objective assessment. The Investigating Officer may see value in a linear chart indicating the number of calls over a period of time and an analysis of whether any surges appear to be related to a particular media event.

306. By mutual agreement we began to scale down the release of news, and as anticipated most of the media drifted away. We then faced the task of putting the record straight, and shifting the perceptions created by misleading reporting during the initial phase of the search at HDLG. I will return to this aspect later In this statement.

307. I will now turn to some of the specific aspects I have been asked to address. I have been asked to comment on the media strategy. Following the initial work at HDLG the pressure of events appear to have impacted on the preparation of a written media strategy. I note that the Force Media Officer, Louise Journeaux says in paragraph 27 of her statement that a written strategy was produced with help from Devon and Cornwall Police, but that this work was not finished until 1st March 2008, and later updated. I have seen a copy of the media strategy. I see nothing exceptional in its contents, and note that it relates to the investigation of offences of historic sexual abuse. It does not refer to the investigation of any other crimes. I have also seen the comment on media policy in the first report of the HWG section 8 which refers to the attempts by the SIO to respond to media speculation and "minimise sensationalism." 

308. I have also been asked to comment on ACPO and NPIA guidance in relation to media strategy. I cannot claim to be well acquainted with either. The Investigating Officer has helpfully provided a copy of the ACPO Media Advisory Group Guidance Notes. They constitute a formidable document, and no particular area is highlighted. I have seen nothing in the document which runs contrary to my recollection of the media policy during Rectangle. I have also been provided with a Home Office research paper entitled "The Effective use of the Media in Serious Crime Investigations." It appears to offer advice on best practice based on research. I note that It makes the following comments:

"Getting Information out allowed the investigation to take the lead in press handling at an early stage, while allowing the rest of the investigation to progress. Furthermore, it was argued that early initial communication with the press limits the degree to which they formulate their own accounts of what happened and begin their own investigations"

"Finding 'unknown witnesses' was the most frequently stated objective for press appeals" 

"The media can be an Important mechanism for generating valuable Information from the general public."

"providing more detailed Information to the general public can Increase the likelihood of generating additional valuable Information." 

This advice appears to be entirely consistent with the approach taken to media management during Rectangle.

309. I have also been asked to comment on "an abuse of process argument, the damage to the reputation of the SOJ and the loss of ability to identify new genuine complainants by corroboration of their statements with Investigative discoveries." I will deal with the "abuse of process" issue first. It is my understanding that some of the accused who were charged as a result of the enquiry claimed that there had been media releases which constituted an abuse of  process. I also understand that their claims were subject of a hearing before the Royal court. I have been told that after hearing the evidence the Court ruled that no abuse of process had occurred. Accordingly I see no need to comment on this issue.

310. I am not sure what is meant by "damage to the reputation of the SOJ.'' Taken literally this means damage to the reputation of the Island's parliament and government I am not sure I accept that the preservation of the reputation of political institutions is necessarily a priority for a police force. I rather think that the principle of policing "without fear or favour" takes precedence over other considerations. However, if there was evidence of any reputational damage, I would be more inclined to attribute this to the media performances of the former Chief Minister Frank Walker, rather than any actions of the police. I notice that Mr Ogley alleges damage to tourism and business, but offers no data in support of this. I have seen nothing which provides evidence of damage to the island's Interests as a result of Rectangle. On the other hand, there is evidence that the enquiry enhanced confidence in the island's criminal justice system. This is demonstrated by the substantial increase in the number of reports of historic abuse. I have referred previously to the one statistic which I have seen, namely an Increase of 152% in the number of historic abuse reports. This was reported in statistics published by the Force In late 2008. The Investigating Officer may wish to satisfy himself that this figure reflects a general tend. I do not think that there is any more I can offer on this topic.

311. The comment regarding "the loss of ability to identify new genuine complainants by corroboration of their statements with investigative discoveries," Is not a matter on which I can offer any detailed comment. It is clearly an issue of investigative tactics. Lenny Harper was an experienced detective of Chief Officer rank. He was advised by Andre Baker who was recognised as a leading expert in the investigation of serious crime. I did not question, nor was I qualified to question, the operational judgement of either on matters of detail.

312. It might be appropriate at this stage to make reference to the apparent views of Wendy Kinnard as Minister for Home Affairs during the peak period of media interest in HDLG and Rectangle. As described earlier, she was our single line of political accountability. There is no Home Affairs Committee and no Police Authority. Just one Minister to whom we are accountable. The views of Wendy Kinnard as Minister for Home Affairs in respect of Mr Harper's performance are therefore significant. They are particularly significant because the stance she took at that time constitutes the position of the person to whom the force was politically accountable during that period. It appears that other people have subsequently taken Ministerial office, who have a different view. That might be the case now. but they were not in office at the relevant time. During the key period of the enquiry we responded to the political lead we had. There was no other political lead for us to respond to. Throughout this period Wendy Kinnard expressed support for Lenny Harper's media management and leadership of the enquiry. She was frustrated by the criticism made by political colleagues. and discussed how she could do more to support Mr Harper's efforts. At some stage she decided that she wished to award him a Ministerial Certificate of Commendation for his media management and leadership in the enquiry. I have a note that this award was presented on 21st April 2008 (notebook 08/95 page 20.) I recall that the decision to make the award was taken by Wendy Kinnard some weeks previously, and my P.A (Redaction)  was tasked with producing the framed certificate. During the course of the Haven enquiry I have asked the current Minister for Home Affairs to provide me with a copy of the certificate in order that I can produce evidence of the award. He has refused.

313. Finally in the general section of this topic, I see that I have been asked to comment on the media issues relating to the arrest and the release of (279, 281) I believe this has been covered fully in the section which relates to the working partnership with the Law Officers. I cannot think of anything further I can add on this issue.

314. Issues concerning the "first find."

I have been asked to comment on "The facts surrounding the 'skull' find and your efforts to establish the truth in light of questions being raised in the media and the SOJ." The initial  "find" and the announcement which followed have been described earlier in this statement. During our regular meetings Lenny Harper told me that the dating of the layer in which the first find was made had placed it outside of the parameters of the enquiry, and that accordingly it was no longer of evidential significance. At no time in our discussions did he ever suggest that there was any doubt regarding the nature of what had been found.

315. On 30th April I received an email from Senator Jim Perchard, who at that time was the Assistant Minister for Health, which asked me to confirm that the "piece of bone" had been confirmed as human. His enquiry did not ring any bells at the time. I had heard nothing which had cast any doubt on the nature of the first find. Before I replied to Senator Perchard I corresponded separately by email with Lenny Harper, and I took his response to be confirmation that nothing had changed. I have since re-read his email and note that it is less specific than it could have been. It could even be said that it "avoids the question," by referring to problems which had arisen in dating the item, then saying "other than that there is nothing to add." Nevertheless, it is fair to say that his message does not alert me to the possibility that the fragment might not be bone. Accordingly I responded in good faith to the enquiry from Senator Perchard, and told him that nothing had changed in relation to our knowledge of the item. I responded to the Senator on the basis of the information I had been given, and I had no reason to believe that anything I said to him was untrue. That was the only basis on which I would respond to a legitimate enquiry. If, for example, an enquiry related to a matter which was operationally sensitive, then I might say that for operational reasons I was not able to comment. If I decided that I could comment, then I would only offer the truth.

316. I recall that I had just arrived in the Isle of Man for a meeting, when someone told me that there was a news story which claimed that the first find was a piece of coconut. This would be on 20th May 2008. (Notebook 08/95 page 34.) The report came as a total "bolt from the blue.'' Nothing had prepared me for this news. I spent the next couple of days in phone calls speaking to Lenny Harper and Wendy Kinnard. I sought more information, and advised on "holding lines" to take with the media and others. (Notebook 08/95 page 34.) On 23rd May 2009 I had returned to Jersey when I received a phone call from a journalist called David Rose. (Notebook ~8/95 page 34.) Our conversation was brief. Some time previously, another journalist from a respected newspaper had warned me to be wary of Rose. I was told that he was a good investigative journalist, but for some unknown reason had built up a history of attempting to undermine abuse enquiries. I did however listen to what Rose had to say. He wanted to question me about whether I had told the truth to Senator Perchard. Significantly, he read out to me details of the earlier email exchange between myself and the Senator. It was clear that he had been given a copy of this correspondence. I think we discussed this, and he did not  
make a clear admission, but the inference was that he had obtained it from the Senator. I told Rose that he was "just a voice on the end of the phone" and I could not discuss the matter with him. I see from the above notebook entry that following the conversation with Rose I sent a note to Lenny Harper and Louise Journeaux. The Investigating Officer may see value in attempting to trace this document.

317. By then the political and media Interest in the issue was rising. I had a number of discussions with the Minister for Home Affairs Wendy Kinnard, and Lenny Harper. (Notebook 08/95. Pages 34-36.) I asked Mr Harper directly about the doubts concerning the first find. He said that there had been confusing messages from the lab in relation to the matter, and he would "take full responsibility." About that time he did a live media interview on the subject. I remember thinking this was rather brave in the circumstances but typical. As I recall, he said that the scientific evidence was inconclusive, but apart from that, the age of the sample put it outside the parameters of the enquiry. I remember that he was challenged as to why he did not report the doubts earlier. He said that he did it to protect the victims, because he knew that if the doubts became public some Jersey politicians would use the opportunity to attack and undermine the victims and witnesses. This was hardly diplomatic, but I do not remember hearing anyone deny this.

318. I discussed with Wendy Kinnard, and also the Chief Executive Bill Ogley, how we should deal with the matter. I recall that I gave strong advice. I said that we should bring the issue within a formal accountability process, and seek to close down further discussion meanwhile. I pointed out that the Minister had the authority to require a report on any matter of concern, and that she should do this. She should then refuse to give any further comment on the basis that she was awaiting a report, and she would decide on any further measures when this had been studied. Accordingly, I asked Lenny to submit a report on the whole issue. He did this. I then attached a covering letter, and sent the report and the letter to the Minister for Home Affairs. (I am 80% sure that it was a letter. It may have been done by email but I think not.) My covering letter set out the options available to the Minister, and I also discussed the matter with her. I pointed out that she might have concerns regarding the conduct of Mr Harper. She might also have suspicions that I had not told her the truth. If she felt this, then the proper thing to do was to ask for an investigation headed by an appropriate senior officer from an outside force. I had no difficulty with that. I also added however, that any enquiry should also be asked to address the question of the apparent leak to David Rose, and whether Senator Perchard, or another person, had committed any offence under the Data Protection Laws by leaking the contents of the email. The report and my covering letter were given to Wendy Kinnard and I believe they then went to the Council of Ministers. After that I heard nothing more about the matter. I was not surprised. While some Ministers would have welcomed the opportunity to initiate an investigation into myself or Mr Harper, they would have less interest if it affected one of their political colleagues. They would have to wait their chance another day. 

319. Some Brief Issues on "media lines."
In paragraph 111 of his statement David Warcup describes a matter which occurred after he had been sworn in as D.C.O, on 8th August 2008. I believe that at this time Mr Harper was still officially a member of the Force, but that he had taken some leave prior to his retirement date, and had effectively left the service. It is even possible that he had left the island. There had been a newspaper report which claimed Mr Harper had made some negative comments regarding the prosecution process. I consulted the Attorney General and we agreed that he would provide any response which was required. I then communicated a "line to take" to David Warcup. 

320. In his statement, (paragraph 111) David Warcup places a negative interpretation on the line I was suggesting. He says that he was surprised to see a comment from me which said "A good time to keep our heads down if possible." He then goes on to say "I did not feel it was a 'good time to keep our heads down' as the matters concerned needed addressing not avoiding." In light of this it is worth examining what was actually said and done in more detail. To begin with:

• The Attorney General had agreed that he would respond to any matters implying criticism of his department. It was my view that in light of this we should avoid getting involved in a triangular exchange which would allow the media to look for differences in the tone or content of our response, and thereby imply that there were further unseen Issues.

David Warcup is quoting only part of the relevant section of the email. When the rest of the text is seen the meaning is different. What the email actually says is (my emphasis.) "A good time to keep our heads down if possible." "We are aware that a number of files relating to suspects are currentlv under consideration by the law officers department. As these relate to current Investigations it would not be appropriate for the force to comment at this time." In other words I am offering a clear media "line" as to what we should say. I am saying that we should make use of the fact that cases had entered the prosecution process, and try to "close down" media discussion. This was a good tactic. Nothing was to be gained by re-visiting old tensions. This line was also copied to the force Media Relations Officer Louise Journeaux. My practice of suggesting media "lines" in difficult situations has been described earlier in this statement.

. I now turn to his comment that "the matters concerned needed addressing not avoiding." The "matters concerned" related to the relationship between the force and the Law Officers Department. David Warcup and I had first discussed this in February 2008, and in the months before his appointment we had agreed that he would take the lead in establishing a new working partnership. We had discussed this directly with the Attorney General and the necessary changes had already commenced. Nothing was being avoided. 

321. In order to demonstrate consistency in my approach I offer one further example. Following further alleged comments by Mr Harper after his retirement, I sent an email to Andrew Lewis on 16th September 2008. As part of that email I say "I suggest a 'straight bat' at this time." "we should not prolong the debate by adding to it. Comment would give rise to further questions and so on. Also given that prosecutions and arrests are pending then any comment from the force could cause legal problems. I understand that the A.G. has issued a statement in consultation with David, this might be the one you have, and I suspect that our view is that this is enough said for now."

322. This was a consistent line which I followed in the period in question and one which I encouraged others to follow. It might be that another person would have taken a different line. That is not the point. The point is that I decided on the position we would take and communicated that position to those who needed to know. The decision on the "lines to take" fell entirely within the parameters of matters I was entitled to decide, and I took the decision.

323. "Putting the Record Straight" in July 2008.

I have described earlier In this statement how, following the events surrounding the arrest of (279, 281) In late June 2008 I had less contact with Lenny Harper and for most of the time worked directly with Detective Inspector Alison Fossey. I was also in regular touch with David Warcup. There was however one matter which Mr Harper and I periodically discussed. This was the need to "put the record straight" after the misleading media coverage earlier in the year. I have stated previously how we had become concerned at the gap between what we were saying to the media, and what the media were reporting, and how our concerns were compounded by the difficulty which some people in government had in distinguishing between the two. Some of the misleading reporting was a consequence of journalist seeking out and interviewing victims and witnesses, but some seemed to be pure invention. There had been repeated attempts at the time to communicate a more accurate line, but success had been limited. For example, I note that in his statement Frank Walker refers to an announcement that a full homicide enquiry could not be justified, which was made on 13th April 2008. (Statement Frank Walker paragraph 21.) Other similar announcements were made around that time but did not seem to receive adequate exposure.

324. The calmer atmosphere of this period allowed Lenny Harper to give a number of media interviews which served two purposes. Firstly, he was able to give updates on the forensic finds, and describe the emerging forensic picture. Secondly, he could make a further attempt to dispel some of the wilder stories.

325. The investigating Officer may wish to do his own research. However, I have viewed a report of an interview dated 31st July 2008 on the B.B.C. website which appears to me to be representative of some of the media work done at the time. In the interview Mr Harper makes it clear that there is no murder enquiry as a result of the Investigations at HDLG, and he gives an analysis of the forensic findings up to that date. He then offers the conclusion that there is no basis for a murder enquiry to commence. The B.B.C. website summarises the item as "Jersey murder inquiry 'unlikely.'" The Investigating Officer may wish to contrast the calm, balanced and professional manner in which Mr Harper deals with this subject, with the sensationalist style in which the same news was presented again by Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell almost four months later on 12th November 2008.

326. The Build-Up to the Events of 12th November 2008. 

The publicity which had accompanied Mr Harper's retirement soon faded away, and I do not recall any significant media reports concerning him in the months which followed. I made media comment on Rectangle from time to time. This would rarely be during an interview concerned entirely with the enquiry. Most commonly it would be tagged-on to the end of an interview about other issues. A large number of media interviews in Jersey are structured this way. My consistent "line" was that the enquiry was progressing in a calm, thorough and professional manner and that I could not comment on matters of detail, as a number of cases were now being considered for prosecution.

327. Mr Gradwell did not start work as the S.I.0. until 8th September 2008 and for reasons I have given earlier I did not have a great deal of contact with him during his settling-In period. I did however have regular contact with David Warcup from the date of his appointment. Occasionally we would talk about the media aspects of Rectangle. I remember there were occasions when I thought that his beliefs about what the force had said during the enquiry were too heavily influenced by some of the media reporting. This was understandable during the phase when he was still familiarising himself with the details of the enquiry. From time to time I emphasised the difference between what the force had said, and what had appeared in the media. He spoke of recent forensic results and how a clearer picture was emerging. He said that on his reading of the forensic results to that time, there was no basis for commencing a murder enquiry. This was consistent with the earlier findings and media interviews of Lenny Harper during July 2008 and the preceding months. It was clear that Mr Warcup was not an admirer of Mr Harper's style of policing. They were different personalities with different professional backgrounds. I did however point out that Lenny Harper appeared to be no longer active in the media and that we should now concentrate on achieving a seamless transition from the old management arrangements to the new. I made it clear that I would not be party to any deliberate "rubbishing" of Lenny Harper's work. That would be counter productive. It would re-ignite old issues, and distract from the calm and evolutionary changes which were now taking place. It also had to be remembered that Lenny Harper had a loyal following among victims and witnesses, whose commitment could be undermined by any visible rift. I recognised there would be a need for further changes in the style of the enquiry, and anticipated these would follow the receipt of the report of the review of the investigation, which was being prepared by the Metropolitan Police.

328. In his statement David Warcup refers to "Operation Adrian," which relates to an investigation into the leak of a police document. This was a report by Mr Harper into aspects of the arrest and release of (279, 281) The report came initially to me, and I forwarded it with a covering letter to the Attorney General. I note from his statement that the contents of Mr Harper's report featured in an article in the "Times" newspaper on 14th August 2008 and it later appeared on the internet "blog" of Senator Stuart Syvret. I think it is fair to say that from the beginning it was suspected that the leak had come from Lenny Harper. Most people seemed to suspect that he had retained a copy of the report, and leaked it after his retirement. That does not mean these beliefs are true. It was however the case that many people believed it. I thought that it was the most probable explanation, but I had no evidence to support that belief.

329. My attention was drawn to the Times article by means of a phone call from the Attprney General (notebook 08/95 page 78.) I recall that shortly afterwards I discussed the matter with David Warcup. This would have been during one of the frequent discussions on Operational and Professional Standards issues recorded in the subsequent pages of the same notebook. I was very clear that this was something which needed to be independently investigated. I said that he should ask a U.K. force to investigate the matter. I also commented that he should bear in mind that I may have to be interviewed, as the report had crossed my desk on its way to the Law Officers. He said that he did not think that would be necessary. I see from Mr Warcup's statement that Inspector David Burmingham was asked to make some enquiries within the force relating to the matter. My recollection of this is not precise, but I believe that David warcup and I agreed that it was necessary to preserve evidence, and prepare an internal audit trail of the preparation and movements of the report. We also needed to know whether anyone else had accessed the report on the relevant IT. system. I offer this Information because it seems to be implied in Mr Warcup's statement that he was acting on his own initiative in this matter, and I was in some way an absent figure. That was not the case. I remember being particularly strong in my insistence that if Lenny Harper was a suspect for the leak then an enquiry by an outside force was the only way to address the issue. To date, I have not been interviewed about the alleged leak of the by from Lenny Harper, or asked for a statement about when I received it and what I did with it.

330. I see from my notebook that during August and September I conferred from time to time with David Warcup on the progress of the enquiry. It was during this time that our views began to differ. From my perspective he had an inappropriate focus on "picking faults" with the work of his predecessor. I have mentioned earlier in this statement that, unusually for a person of his rank, David Warcup had no experience of moving from one force to another. Virtually his entire working life had been in Northumbria Police. In my own career I have moved force and taken up new positions, several times. In my experience it is normal for a new appointee to want to do things a different way from his or her predecessor. This is quite normal. The skill which is required in these situations is to achieve the necessary changes in a seamless and non-disruptive manner. Rubbishing the work of someone who has retired is a "cheap shot," and counter productive to the smooth working of an organisation. I tried to encourage Mr Warcup to concentrate on moving matters forward rather than focussing on the past.

331. At some stage during this period David Warcup floated the idea of a press conference to "put the record straight" regarding then enquiry. I definitely saw this as a bad idea. I was aware of nothing significant which had not already been addressed during the final weeks of Lenny Harper's service. If subsequent forensic results were changing the picture, as it could be expected that they would, then my recommended approach was to gradually feed these into the public domain through a series of short statements and interviews, possibly tagged on to other media issues. We had spent months restoring calm to what had been a difficult situation, much of which had not been of our making. It was not the time to set the whole issue alight all over again. There was another reason I was against David Warcup engaging in the type of press conference he envisaged. I did not think that he had the necessary skills. I thought that he would be comfortable reading a prepared statement, but he would struggle to cope well with challenging questions under pressure. I think the transcript of the actual media briefing shows I was right in that assessment.

332. On 1st October 2008 I had a conversation with the Chief Executive Bill Ogley as an aside to a meeting of the Corporate Management Board. This was after I had been in the U.K. for a few days on police business, and I was still catching-up with developments. I was surprised that he seemed to be better informed than me regarding David Warcup's intentions in respect of the media, and quite set in his own mind that there should be a press conference at which the police would "admit to mistakes" in respect of the Investigation. This was the first indication I had that "something was going on behind my back." It was clear that Bill Ogley had been engaged in discussions regarding the matter with Mr Warcup, probably during my absence, and that he had a strong line to which he was committed. Following this conversation I sent an email to David Warcup asking to discuss the issue. My notes indicate that this discussion occurred on 2nd and/or 3rd October 2008. (Notebook 08/95 pages 91-92.)

333. I said that I thought the best way forward was for me to take responsibility for the whole matter and to do the job myself. I suggested I do this by way of further questions during planned media interviews on unrelated issues in November 2008. (Statement of David Warcup paragraph 256.) I had no anxieties regarding this. I have no difficulties with the local media and am quite comfortable with live interviews on policing issues. This is normally regarded as one of my strengths. Mr Warcup did not seem to take this suggestion seriously. I said that I would need a brief from him on any new information he wanted me to put into the public domain, but he seemed reluctant to provide this. I was also concerned that in spite of being in the post for over two months he did not seem to have a full grasp of the facts. He still seemed to think that the force had claimed there had been murders at HDLG, and that this was something which needed to be corrected. (Statement of David Warcup paragraph 257.) I encouraged him once more to look at what Lenny Harper had actually said. If he thought that Mr Harper's statements in July and at other times, making it clear that there would be no murder enquiry, had not taken hold in the public perception, then it would be proper to undertake further media work which "drew attention" to what had been said already. I came to a point where I did not think that I was making any progress in these conversations, and began to think about what would be the best way forward.

334. It was against this background that on 8th October 2008 I met with Mr Matt Tapp who was introduced to me as a media consultant. (Notebook 08/95 page 94). I rarely employ consultants, believing that Chief Officers should be competent in their roles without the need to be supported by expensive advisors. I am aware that others think differently. I met with Mr Tapp at the request of David Warcup. The meeting did not begin well. He said we needed a plan to announce the fact that "the murder investigation had finished." (Statement of Matt Tapp paragraph 14.) Given that there had never been a murder investigation, and that the decision there was not going to be one had been announced over two months previously, this was not a good start. I was beginning to see his "sales pitch." He was talking up a crisis, then presenting himself as the person who could resolve it, no doubt for a large fee. I thought about ending the discussion there and then, and with hindsight it is clear that it would have been better if I had. Instead Is pent some time trying to improve his understanding of the position. I now see that this was futile. His mind was closed and he did not absorb what I was telling him.

335. I told Mr Tapp that most of the news he was referring to was already out in the public domain. All that appeared to remain was some adjustment in consequence of recent forensic results, and, in some cases, to draw attention to information which had been released previously but which might not have fully registered. I explained that the police were treading a difficult line in trying to hold together an alliance of opposing factions for the general good of the investigation. We had to maintain a working relationship with the Law Officers and the Jersey Establishment, while at the same time maintaining the confidence of the wider community, many of whom shared a common perception that there was widespread corruption and cover­ ups in relation to child abuse and other issues. It was one thing to say the evidence did not support the view that there were murders. It was quite another to say we did not believe that there had been any murders. Beliefs are a personal matter, and it was probable that many people would believe that murders had occurred, but had accepted the assurances from the force that the evidence did not enable the relevant lines of enquiry to be taken further. This delicate balance had to be treated with care if unnecessary tensions were to be avoided. I repeated the course of action I had urged David Warcup to support, which was to release incrementally those things which we needed to release, and where possible decline further comment on the basis that prosecutions were now pending. I agreed that the public had been misled, but pointed out that we had not been responsible, and had in fact done much to put the record straight. Misleading and sensationalist media reports had raised expectations and a great deal of hard work had already been done to restore calm and reality. The situation could not be improved by provoking the resurrection of the "media circus" which had followed the behaviour of politicians, and other events associated with the early forensic work at HDLG. By the end of this conversation I felt that Mr Tapp and I were not going to agree and I wished him a pleasant journey. I see from his subsequent statement that he has not reacted well to my reluctance to engage his services.

336. Over the following days, by various direct and indirect means, it became apparent that David Warcup had built up a broad alliance in favour of the major media conference event which he favoured. This is corroborated by the statement of Matt Tapp, who describes how, following his meeting with me, he networked with, and briefed a number of key figures including the Chief Executive Bill Ogley and the Chief Minister Frank Walker. This was on 8th October 2008. I also became aware indirectly that the Attorney General was committed to the Warcup line. I therefore gave the matter more thought. By then It was approaching mid-October. I had some leave pending in the near future and my last working day was 5th November 2008. This leave had been arranged so that I could attend to some urgent family matters in the U.K. which could not wait. I came to the view that whatever I said or did, my absence on leave would be used as an opportunity to press ahead regardless of my wishes, and that this was a course of action which would be supported by the Attorney General and Ministers. I was also conscious that David Warcup had been appointed to his position on the understanding that he would to take the strategic lead in Rectangle, and that it was intended that he would provide continuity for the enquiry after I had retired. I therefore took a decision. I told David Warcup that I would not stand in the way of the press conference, but wanted a chance to influence the content, in the hope that the damage which I anticipated it would cause could be reduced,.This was in the second half of October. David Warcup passed this news to the other relevant parties. (Statement of John Edmonds paragraph 30.)

337. In spite of repeated requests, I was given nothing by way of material for the press conference during the rest of October, or the first four days of November. Considering that Mr Warcup had been determined to stage the event for some weeks, he gave the impression that he had done little preparation. I was eventually given a draft script and other papers on 5th November 2008, literally a few hours before the commencement of my leave. I was concerned with the nature of the content, which appeared to be poorly thought through, confrontational with the media, and too ready to be definite in respect of some evidence which remained ambiguous. Additionally, it did not provide a sufficient line of retreat should further evidence emerge which indicated that there had been murder or similar crimes. In one respect however it was encouraging. It contained a definite statement that "It has never been suggested by the States of Jersey Police that child murder took place at Haut De la Garenne." This was entirely consistent with the line which Lenny Harper, and myself, had been taking for months. I took this statement as an indication that Mr Warcup had by then achieved a better grasp of the true nature of the media statements made on behalf of the Force. Other encouraging aspects included confirmation that the police were not behind the story regarding the "shackles," and a reiteration of the earlier police statements to the effect that everything which had been found could have had an innocent explanation. Emphasis was also given to the fact that the media had been given access to the "cellars," and therefore by implication, nobody had been misled regarding their size and nature. (It is also of note that after the Chief Minister Frank Walker had visited the scene with his wife, and viewed things for himself on 31st March 2008 he was content in addressing the States, to describe the areas he had viewed as "cellars.") (Statement of Frank Walker paragraphs 19 and 20.)

338. The papers and notes accompanying the draft, which I not unreasonably took to be part of the intended briefing material, also contained references to the fact that the Force received scientific opinion on 7th March 2008 apparently confirming that the first find was a piece of skull and that it was not until 29th March that the first doubts emerged. By that time the item had been ruled out of the enquiry on the basis that the layer in which it had been found pre-dated the parameters of the investigation. The briefing notes indicated that the precise identity of the item remained unknown. A section of the notes dealing with the teeth, made reference to the local expert opinion given at the time that "they were unlikely to have been shed naturally."

339. In the very limited time available to me I made some hurried notes in the margins of the draft. I discouraged the use of confrontational statements such as "We hope that the presentation of these facts will enable members of the Media to report accurately about this ongoing case in the future." I also encouraged language which presented a message of an evolving forensic picture, in which earlier statements to the media were being amended as more detailed scientific findings came to light. I passed all of this back to David Warcup and left to make arrangements to travel to the U.K

340. While I was in the U.K. I received one phone call from David Warcup. He reminded me of when the media briefing was taking place, and I said that I was aware of the date. I do not think that we had a great deal of conversation about the subject. At some point I would have asked him if there was anything else of interest as I always do when contacted. He did not tell me of anything other than the media conference. In particular he said nothing of his intention to provide a briefing to Ministers and others the evening before the media conference. This was clearly a matter which affected my interests. At no time was it mentioned to me by David Warcup or anyone else until after it had happened. Even after the passage of time, and the opportunity to reflect on whatever motives may have influenced the actions of Mr Warcup and others, I can only regard the failure to inform the Chief Officer of the Force of the briefing to Ministers on the evening of 11th November 2008 as a deliberate act of deceit.  

341. On Tuesday 11th November 2008 at some time not long after 5-30p.m. I was at home having arrived on the Clipper ferry from the U.K. The fact that I was at home at that time was an unusual thing. The Clipper usually travels from the U.K. to Jersey via Guernsey, and arrives in Jersey after 7p.m. For some reason on this date It sailed directly to Jersey, and so I arrived home a couple of hours earlier than would be normal. I received a call on my mobile phone from Andrew Lewis, who was then Minister for Home Affairs. He said that he was sorry to be ringing me when I was on the ferry, but he wanted to see me the following morning. I said that I was not on the ferry I was at home. The first time I said this it did not seem to register, and he made another reference to the ferry so I repeated that I was at home. He seemed taken aback by this information. I could not work out why at the time. He had obviously taken some interest in my travel arrangements, but had not spotted the unusual change to the timetable. I wondered why he was apparently unsettled by the fact that I had arrived home early. I realise now that Andrew Lewis had expected I would be at sea when the briefing to Ministers was being held, and the fact that I was at home took away any excuse for me not being asked to attend the briefing to Ministers and others. He asked me to meet him in the office of the Chief Executive at 11a.m. the following day. He said that this was in consequence of a briefing which he and others had received. This was the first I had been told of any briefing. To complete this part of the account, it is now a matter of record that I attended the office of the Chief Executive as requested and was suspended from duty. This occurred without notice of the purpose of the meeting, without a hearing, and without representation. I now move on to what I know about the media conference, which was held at Police Headquarters, while my suspension meeting was taking place elsewhere.

342. Before leaving home on the morning of 12th November 2008 I watched Sky News. There was extensive advance coverage of the press conference. I now know that this was in consequence of advance information which had been put out by the Force ahead of the scheduled media briefing. The media coverage was high profile, sensationalist, and contrary to almost all of the assurances I had been given by David Warcup. I have since seen the advance media release issued on his direction, it states "Statements which were issued by the States of Jersey Police suggested that serious criminal offences had been perpetrated against children and also that there was a possibility that children may have been murdered, bodies had been disposed of and buried within the home." This statement is almost the exact opposite of that contained in the draft script I had been shown before I departed for my leave. Equally, it later emerged that the actual release had changed significantly the presentation of information in relation to the cellars, the teeth and the alleged shackles. On the evidence available I can only conclude that I was seriously and deliberately misled by David Warcup as to the intended content and style of the media conference on 12t h November 2008. 

343. Unsurprisingly the media were enlarging on what was being released by the Force. I heard a reporter on Sky News refer to something along the lines of "previous police claims of mass murder and burial." As recently as about three weeks ago, I heard a report on Channel News which referred to "previous police claims of mass murder" or words to that effect. As I have discovered more about the press conference on 12th November 2008, the more it is evident, that it was deliberately sensationalist, intended to gain maximum coverage, and designed to portray Mr Warcup and Mr Gradwell as the "good guys" putting right the failings of their predecessors.

344. Before attending the meeting with the Minister I went briefly to my office to deal with correspondence and other routine tasks. I saw that the police main car park was full of satellite vehicles linked to major media organisations. For the rest of the day, and on the days which followed, the story filled the news. Journalists were not likely to admit that they had previously exaggerated the situation, or that they had fabricated stories in order to compete with one another. It was more comfortable for them to claim that they had been misled by the police, and that became their consistent line. I had spent months moving the investigation into a position from which It could progress in a calm and low profile manner. I saw it all undone in a single morning. Jersey was once again world news.

345. In the weeks and months which followed, the delicate coalition of views and interests which had been held together in 2008 began to break apart. Senator Syvret has moved from being a supporter of the enquiry to being an outspoken critic, thereby bringing a negative influence to bear on potential witnesses. There have once more been allegations of "cover ups." Mr Harper, who had retired to the West of Scotland, and by November 2008 had become inactive with the media, appears to have felt sufficiently provoked to make a number of public statements criticising the integrity of the Jersey system of justice. I have seen at least two articles in "heavyweight" newspapers which imply a lack of impartiality and integrity in the island's justice system. Political wounds have been re-opened, and the enquiry is once again the subject of angry exchanges in the island's Parliament. My own suspension has proved to be high profile and divisive. I was told by reliable sources that in the days which followed my suspension a number of victims contacted the enquiry team and expressed concerns that the independence and commitment of the investigation was being undermined. The chances of Jersey convincing the world that these matters have been investigated and resolved in a fair and politically impartial manner have diminished, as have the chances of achieving final closure of these events. It may take Jersey a number of years to recover from the consequences of the media conference of 12th November 2008. As Chief Officer of the Force I accept a degree of responsibility for this. In my defence I point out that I was seriously misled by David Warcup as to the intended content and style of the media briefing on 12th November 2008 and accordingly, could not have anticipated the damaging consequences which would follow.

346. I expect operation Haven will discover that on some occasions the Police made mistakes. That may be so. The Attorney General William Bailhache, has accepted that lawyers may have made mistakes. It is probably beyond dispute that Politicians made mistakes; and it is highly likely that some people in senior positions have failed in their duty to protect vulnerable children. I led the organisation that tried to get to the truth, and tried to achieve closure. Throughout the investigation I was managing against a background of political tensions and controversy, and doing so without the protection of the checks and balances which apply to the political governance of policing in comparable jurisdictions. I am the only person suspended. I am the only person who has been subjected to a disciplinary investigation. I deny that I am guilty of any misconduct of any kind, or of any serious failings in my professional duties. I will continue to defend my reputation and integrity by all legitimate means.

Signed in the Parish of St Heller, 

Jersey, on Thursday 30'" July 2009.

Graham Power. Q.P.M.
Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police.